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Health Care’s Market Bureaucracy
Allison K. Hoffman

ABSTRACT
The last several decades of health law and policy have been built on a foundation of economic
theory. This theory supported the proliferation of market-based policies that promised maximum
efficiency and minimal bureaucracy. Neither of these promises has been realized. A mounting
body of empirical research discussed in this Article makes clear that leading market-based
health care policies are not efficient—they fail to capture what people want. People struggle
when making choices, and they often choose poorly. Even more, this Article describes how the
failed struggle to bolster these policies—through constant regulatory, technocratic tinkering that
aims to improve the market and the decisionmaking of consumers in it—has produced a massive
market bureaucracy.
To illustrate the growth of the market bureaucracy, this Article traces the origin and development
of several market-based theories that have been central to the modern era of health policy and law.
The first, called managed competition, looks to consumerism in insurance markets and contends
that people will choose wisely among health plan options, and their choices will drive higher value
health care. The second, sometimes called consumer-driven health care, relies on consumerism
when using medical care. The notion is that when people are subject to a share of the costs, they will
more selectively choose when and where to use medical care and will avoid low-value products or
services. The final example considers the application of antitrust to health care mergers, ostensibly
to create a competitive field on which consumerism can flourish.
This Article shows that, in application, these ideas have not, nor will ever, deliver as imagined
in a world that deviates irreconcilably from theory. Nonetheless, these ideas continue to spawn
a vast web of health law and regulation in their support. The cost of this market bureaucracy
includes the scaffolding to hold up an ineffective market-based structure and, more importantly,
the opportunity cost of foregone alternatives to solve important health care system challenges.
Health care’s market bureaucracy endures in light of repeated failure in part, as others have
discussed, due to politics and political economy. Yet, this Article suggests that it persists
equally because of its role in the sanctification of values of individualism and choice. Choice
seems especially appealing when it comes to decisions about our health. We want to believe
we are in control. Yet, choice as translated into market-based policies has proven empty.
Understanding that markets do not actually enhance meaningful choice—and are as bureaucratic
as any other approach—can clear the way to ask how to design better health law and policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Health policy and law is in flux. For most of its history, health law focused
on the doctor and his patient, guided primarily by the goal of fostering the
medical profession and protecting physician autonomy.1 The law gradually took
equal interest in protecting patients’ autonomy. One way this interest has
manifested most recently is in patients’ role as consumers in a health care
marketplace, as economic theory has emerged as the guiding light of health
regulation.2
Patients as consumers are now charged with using their purchasing power
to solve what are considered health care’s most intractable problems: relatively
high spending and poor outcomes in the United States.3 The United States
spends nearly one-fifth of its gross domestic product on health care,4 more than
all other peer nations and over 50 percent more than France, Germany, or
Canada.5 Yet, we fall comparatively and embarrassingly short on key health
outcomes, including life expectancy and infant mortality, as well as on subjective
patient experience.6

1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE RISE OF A
SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 27 (1982) (“Throughout the
medical system, the profession was able by 1920—and for the next half century—to
establish organizational structures that preserved a distinct sphere of professional
dominance and autonomy.”).
See JACOB S. HACKER, THE ROAD TO NOWHERE: THE GENESIS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON’S PLAN
FOR HEALTH SECURITY 156 (1997) (“In the health policy community, the most influential
ideas have been associated with economists.”).
TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN
MOVEMENT (2007); Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers
Direct Health Care?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2009).
National Health Expenditure Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-andreports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html [https://perma.cc/SG66-P7MJ] (last
updated Apr. 26, 2019).
See ERIC C. SCHNEIDER ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, MIRROR, MIRROR 2017:
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON REFLECTS FLAWS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR BETTER U.S. HEALTH
CARE
4
(2017),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/
___media_files_publications_fund_report_2017_jul_schneider_mirror_mirror_2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FJ9F-KPJZ].
Id. at 8–9, 11–12 (describing higher rates of mortality amenable to health care than peer
nations, lower life expectancy, and higher infant mortality rates, even despite relative strong
performance on things like in-hospital mortality after health attack or stroke); for more on
high rates of infant mortality, see Marian F. MacDorman et al., Recent Increases in the U.S.
Maternal Mortality Rate: Disentangling Trends From Measurement Issues, 128 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 447, 453 (2016). There is no neat explanation for this divergence. Poor
outcomes remain after adjusting for demographics. And, higher spending is not easily
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The United States is also unique in that it now relies on competition and
consumer choice to attempt to fix the disparity between spending and outcomes.
Market-based solutions enticingly promise patients control of their care, rather
than relinquishing authority to doctors or insurers, as had been the practice in
medicine in earlier eras.7 With the right incentives, theory predicts, consumers
will select what they value most.8 In turn, health regulation has increasingly
become a tool to define and lubricate markets, and a profession once exempt
from competitive concerns is now consumed by them.
Market-based approaches have dominated all U.S. regulatory fields since
the Reagan revolution. In this Article, I focus on the particular dysfunction that
has resulted in health care regulation, where conditions are especially
unconducive to consumerism and where getting regulation right is critically
important for a massive industry that deals with life and death.
The turn to markets in health law and policy has been widespread and
apartisan,9 favored by the Reagan and Clinton Administrations alike. When
President Obama assembled his health reform team, he turned to economists and
economic theories.10 These advisors brought market-based ideas, which formed
the bedrock of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) and of

7.

8.

9.

10.

justified by investing in innovation. Evidence in many areas suggests that we have reached
the flat of the curve, where “innovation” does not improve outcomes. See, e.g., Jonathan S.
Skinner et al., Is Technological Change in Medicine Always Worth It? The Case of Acute
Myocardial Infarction, 25 HEALTH AFF. 34 (2006); see also discussion and sources infra
note 321.
STARR, supra note 1, at 27 (1982) (describing deference to the profession); see Schneider &
Hall, supra note 3, at 10 (“Managed care has had successes in controlling costs, but it has been
savaged by patients who felt they were losing control of their medical care and by doctors
who felt they were losing control of their work.”); see also William M. Sage, Regulating
Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701
(1999) (describing a shift from regulatory solutions to disclosure-based solutions that try to
improve purchasing through more information on pricing and quality).
As Deborah Stone, a skeptic, describes: “[M]arket reforms invite people to treat their health as
a consumer good and to approach diagnostic, curative, preventive, and rehabilitative services
as if they were part of the family market basket.” Deborah Stone, The False Promise of
Consumer Choice, 51 ST. LOUIS L.J. 475, 477 (2007).
ROBERT I. FIELD, MOTHER OF INVENTION: HOW THE GOVERNMENT CREATED FREE-MARKET
HEALTH CARE (2014); Stone, supra note 8, at 477 (“Indeed, the health sector has been
more dramatically reconfigured according to market theory than any other sector of
social policy.”).
Glenn Kessler, Did Jonathan Gruber Earn ‘Almost $400,000’ from the Obama Administration,
WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2014/
11/14/did-jonathan-gruber-earn-almost-400000-from-the-obama-administration/?arc404=true
(discussing role of Gruber’s work and Microsimulation Model in the design of the 2006
Massachusetts reform and the ACA); Kevin Sack, Health Plan from Obama Spurs Debate,
N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/ 23/us/23health.html (citing
economist David Cutler as an early influential advisor).
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thousands of pages of rules and regulations to direct market dynamics. Likewise,
after the election of President Trump, the administration and Republican United
States Congress sought to scale back comprehensive insurance coverage based on
the economic theory that people will spend more judiciously with their own
money at stake.11 Scholars and think tanks, in turn, have focused on regulating
markets through constant technocratic tinkering, rarely pausing to reevaluate or
challenge their prominence.12
Market-based policies are hailed as offering two main advantages: being
more efficient and less bureaucratic than alternatives.13 Efficiency is defined as

11.

12.

13.

See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,813, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,385 (Oct. 17, 1017) (encouraging increased
uptake of Association Health Plans, short-term plans, and Health Reimbursement
Accounts); American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. tit. II, subtit. A
(2017) (promoting tax favored health savings accounts in House Bill that passed house on
May 4, 2017).
See K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 5–7 (2017) (describing the
managerialist approach from the New Deal to the present and its reliance on expertise that
coexists with the centrality of markets). Even health law literature that recognizes the
problems with consumerism often works within its paradigm. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Carl
E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace,
106 MICH. L. REV. 643 (2008) (describing doctrinal approaches that give patients the benefit
of the doubt because of their compromised bargaining position for medical care); Russell
Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice Architecture: The Behavioral Law
and Economics Solution to the Health Care Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L. REV 523, 526–27 (2014)
(acknowledging problems people have making insurance decisions but proposing an
alternative that requires they do so). But see, e.g., Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social
Justice, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 47, 51–52 (2014) (noting increased attention to
collective needs and social determinants of health, rather than just individual preferences);
Stone, supra note 8 (critiquing the rise of consumer choice and free markets in health care).
There are softer and harder versions of pro-market arguments, which vary in level of
commitment to an unregulated market. Harder versions argue that government should be
reduced to zero, or close to zero. See e.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY (1973);
EDWARD PETER STRINGHAM, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: CREATING ORDER IN ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL LIFE (2015). Softer versions concede government regulation for limited functions,
such as to provide public goods that private providers might undersupply. See, e.g., F.A.
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 45 (1944) (rejecting the elimination of government); MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962) (arguing that the government role includes
enforcing law and order, diminishing “neighborhood effects” and controlling money);
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (arguing for a minimalist state, arising
from anarchy). In health care, pro-market arguments universally recognize some role for
regulation, primarily to correct for market failures. See generally CHARLES SILVER & DAVID A.
HYMAN, OVERCHARGED: WHY AMERICANS PAY TOO MUCH FOR HEALTH CARE (2018) (arguing
that consumer control over spending is the only way to control health care spending); CLARK
C. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: PLANNING FOR COMPETITION
(1982) (arguing for deregulation to create a competitive market); MARK V. PAULY, MERCATUS
CENTER, GIVING COMPETITION IN MEDICAL CARE AND HEALTH INSURANCE A CHANCE (2019),
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/pauly-competition-medical-care-mercatus-researchv1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V4D-WJWL] (discussing empirical evidence on competition and
where regulation is beneficial); James F. Blumstein & Michael Zubkoff, Perspectives on
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producing what people want—maximizing their preferences, to put it in
economic terms. Markets are held up as the singular vehicle to achieve this goal,
and thus to honor autonomy and choice. Through such framing, individual
choice has emerged as a sacred value in health care decisionmaking—where
decisions are often scientifically imprecise, deeply personal, and potentially very
expensive.14 Promises of market choice now pervade all corners of health care.
You can choose your own insurance plan. You can choose your own doctor.
You can choose your hospital, imaging center, pharmacy, urgent care facility, lab,
and outpatient surgical center. You can choose your own procedures, drugs, and
course of treatment. You can get your care at CVS, or in India. Market choice is
sold as equivalent to freedom.
Regulation, in ironic contrast, is critiqued as ill-suited to provide what
people want. In Richard Epstein and David Hyman’s words: “No administrative
agency or committee of experts, no matter how well intentioned and highly
credentialed, will be able to do a better job of meeting consumer demands than
the private market.”15 In the private health care market, they posit that
competition among businesses will in theory generate an array of options,
allowing people to make individualized decisions.
The second promise of market-based policy is limited government and, in
turn, less opportunity for government failure. Even though most experts concede
markets need some regulatory structuring to exist,16 proponents claim
government regulation can and should be more limited in a market-based

14.

15.
16.

Government Policy in the Health Sector, 51 MILBANK Q. 395, 401 (1973) (describing the public
finance criteria for government intervention—externalities, public goods, monopoly, and
market imperfections—and how they apply in health); Richard A. Epstein & David A.
Hyman, Fixing Obamacare: The Virtues of Choice, Competition, and Deregulation, 68 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 493, 495, 517–536 (2013) (mapping out health care deregulation yet
yielding the possible need for some price control). For a version of a health care system closer
to complete deregulation, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT
TO HEALTH CARE? (1997).
Cf. Philip E. Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and Taboo Cognitions, 7
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 320 (2003) (describing how commitment to some values becomes
sacred, where tradeoffs with secular value of money or convenience is unthinkable, unless
those tradeoffs are reframed rhetorically); Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral
Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1601 (2014) (describing choice
bias as broadly driven by the rise of behavioral law and economics and its “presumption or
precommitment in favor of choice-preserving regulatory options over others”).
Epstein & Hyman, supra note 13, at 537.
STEVEN K. VOGEL, MARKETCRAFT: HOW GOVERNMENTS MAKE MARKETS WORK (2018)
(describing the many forms of public and private market governance); see also sources cited
supra note 13.
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system, which will lessen the influence of bureaucrats, who are criticized as both
paternalistic and captured by powerful, vested interests.17
This Article draws from a mountain of empirical evidence to document the
irrefutable failure of health care’s most popular market-based policies to live up
to both of these promises. To the contrary, despite decades of efforts and
refinement, these policies produce exactly the opposite: a myth of choice and a
market bureaucracy. Rather than helping people get what they want, marketbased policies produce a maze of obligations and decisions that confuse people
and burden them when they are sick. To illustrate, take just one example from
the many described in more detail below. When selecting an insurance plan,
people struggle to choose, dread the shopping experience, and often do not
choose well. One study simulated plan choice in an ACA marketplace among a
relatively informed group of participants, and they chose an objectively better
plan only half of the time.18
Furthermore, efforts to fix flailing competition-based policies have required
armies of health regulators, reams of regulation, and seemingly endless
evaluation and adjustment by technocratic experts—to no avail. Behavioral
economics-inspired attempts to educate and nudge participants to better results
fall short,19 despite significant investments of time and money into these efforts.
The result is a market-lubricating regulatory scaffold—a bureaucracy as
vulnerable to capture and at least as large as what more direct regulatory
approaches would likely produce.
Health care’s market bureaucracy amasses equally within the walls of
private industry.20 The United States relies heavily on private industry to achieve
social welfare goals. To the extent private industry forms the backbone of public
programs, high private industry profits and salaries become part of the cost of

17.
18.
19.
20.

VOGEL, supra note 16, at 10.
See Eric J. Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The Value of
Choice Architecture, 8 PLOS ONE 1 (2013).
Id. at 3 (describing that traditional tools like cost calculators and just-in-time education did
not significantly improve outcomes).
The United States has lower public social expenditures relative to other countries, but total
social expenditures—public plus mandated private expenditures (those that serve
redistributive purposes but are not directly government administered)—are higher in the
United States than in all other countries except France. Ryan McMaken, “Social
Expenditures” in the US are Higher Than all Other OECD Countries, Except France, MISES
INST. (Oct. 30, 2015), https://mises.org/wire/social-expenditures-us-are-higher-all-otheroecd-countries-except-france [https://perma.cc/LK83-5VP8].
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bureaucracy21 and drive the administrative costs of the U.S. health care system
well above those of its peers.22
The popular narrative about the benefits of markets over other forms of
regulation is empirically, and clearly, wrong in key areas of health care regulation.
Market-based policies do not enable effective consumer choice.
This Article argues that health policies that depend on consumerism, like
those discussed below, have and will inevitably continue to fail. To be clear, it
does not suggest no role for economics in health policy. Conversely, nor does it
intend to imply, by elucidating that market-based policies have proven neither
efficient nor nimble, that the aim of social policy should in fact be economic
efficiency or minimalist government. Others have offered compelling critiques
of these aims,23 and have made explicit the hidden normative agenda of
neoliberalism, obscured by the objective tone of the language of economics.24

21.

22.
23.

24.

As just one example, in 2018, the compensation of the CEO of Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Michigan (just one insurer in one state) was $19.2 million. Jay Greene, Blues CEO’s
Compensation Rises 43 Percent to $19.2 Million, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Mar. 1, 2019, 2:25
PM),
https://www.crainsdetroit.com/health-care/blues-ceos-compensation-rises-43percent-192-million [https://perma.cc/58ZY-F84G].
See Austin Frakt, The Astonishingly High Administrative Costs of U.S. Health Care, N.Y.
TIMES: THE UPSHOT (July 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/upshot/costshealth-care-us.html [https://perma.cc/R5VE-WTE3].
There are more examples than I could possibly cite here, but I list a few from different
disciplines. Robert Evans and Tom Rice describe market-based policies as a form of
American exceptionalism that replicates inequitable access and unusually high system
administrative costs and prices. THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED
(Ronald M. Andersen et al. eds., 1998); Robert G. Evans, Going for the Gold: The
Redistributive Agenda behind Market-Based Health Care Reform, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, &
L. 427, 432 (1997) (“Distributional questions may be suppressed in economic analysis, but
they remain at the forefront of public policy debates.”). Tim Jost has aptly observed: “Even
though the foundations and conclusions of neoclassical economics as a science are
questionable and the ideological inclinations of the discipline render its normative
prescriptions suspect, economics retains great influence on policy making in the United
States, more so than any of the other social sciences.” JOST, supra note 3, at 117. Much of
Deborah Stone’s work critiques the overinfluence of economics on policymaking. See, e.g.,
Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J.
11, 14 (1999). Jacob Hacker critiques the rise of the idea of personal responsibility as part of
the neoliberal project and how it has contributed to economic insecurity. See JACOB S.
HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN JOBS, FAMILIES, HEALTH CARE,
AND RETIREMENT AND HOW YOU CAN FIGHT BACK (2006). For normative critiques of
neoliberalism in other fields, see Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative
Liberty and Laissez-Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (2014);
Amy Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (2014).
See, e.g., David M. Frankford, Scientism and Economism in the Regulation of Health Care, 19 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 773 (1994); see also, e.g., Suzanne Mettler, Reconstituting the
Submerged State: The Challenges of Social Policy Reform in the Obama Era, 8 PERSP. ON POL.
803, 804 (2010) (summarizing the notion Mettler has advanced of the “submerged state,”
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Rather, this Article shows that even when measured on their own terms, marketbased policies have fallen short in health care and will continue to do so.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. The first Part describes why health care
is fundamentally inhospitable to market-based policies. There is no one reason
why health care consumerism does not work. Rather, the failures arise from
multiple levels of structural problems. From the time Kenneth Arrow brought
health care into mainstream modern economics, he warned that the most basic
economic assumptions were belied in health care, including the most
foundational principles that people have well-ordered preferences and the agency
to make meaningful decisions.25 Yet Arrow’s caution did little to slow the eager
adoption of microeconomic market-based approaches in health care.
Health care also defies the recipes of behavioral economics, ascribing to all
of the cognitive ills and responding to few of the prescriptions for cure.
Proponents have been overly optimistic about the ability to correct failures both
in the markets and in patient decisionmaking, the totality of which is inscrutable.
This first Part attempts to preview and summarize health care’s exceptional
characteristics as context for the pervasive failure of market-based approaches
detailed in Part II.
Part II then traces the arc of microeconomic influence, through three
market-based ideas that have deeply shaped the regulation of health care
financing (how we pay for health care) and delivery (how we use and provide
health care) and that have, in the end, fallen short of expectations. Market-based
solutions to both financing and delivery problems fail for the same reasons: People
lack the preferences, capacity, and desire to choose as these solutions demand.
The first example looks at consumerism in health insurance, focusing on the
theory of managed competition, made famous by Alain Enthoven.26 He argued
that when people make good choices among health plans in a carefully regulated
health insurance market, the choices will send signals to stimulate higher-value
health care delivery. This idea undergirds the ACA and its health insurance
exchanges and was influential for decades prior, as part of President Clinton’s
failed Health Security Act of 1993, Massachusetts’s health reform in 2006,
Medicare Advantage (Medicare’s managed care marketplace), and the creation of
Medicare’s prescription drug program in 2003. The second example looks at
patient decisions in health care delivery, about how and when to use medical care,

25.
26.

where policies are enacted in ways that are “formidable and elusive,” such as through tax
reform so that their inequitable results are opaque).
Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 941, 948 (1963).
See supra Part II.A.
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and the trend toward what is often called “consumer-driven” or “consumerdirected” health care (CDHC), where higher out-of-pocket medical costs are
supposed to incentivize patients to economize more wisely.27 This pervasive
trend is often described, somewhat crassly, as consumers having “skin in the
game.” The final example focuses on antitrust law and oversight of mergers,
which has seen a recent resurgence, and the hopes that healthy competition will
benefit end consumers.
Each of these ideas spawned a regulatory structure built on a simple
blueprint—the idea that if health law and regulation support a functioning
market, people can make meaningful choices that will, in turn, improve the value
of health care spending. These ideas transform the role of health regulation into
fixing market failures and “flawed” decisionmakers. Yet, despite intensive
regulatory tinkering, markets are still not delivering as promised.
The final Part of this Article examines why market-based approaches
persist, even as evidence of their shortcomings amasses. The persistence of
market-based policies is in part a story of conflict avoidance and political
economy. Policymakers and regulators can avoid dealing with political pressure
and hard normative tradeoffs over how much care we use, who uses it, and how
much we pay for it. The market-based bureaucracy is, in part, the price we pay to
avoid wrestling collectively with hard moral or political challenges.28
Yet, market-based solutions also endure because they have elevated
choice—a narrow version of it defined by how people spend their dollars in a
market—as the barometer of good social policy. Market-based solutions are sold
as the epitome of choice, even when the choice they produce proves empty.
Thus, this Article concludes by arguing that to develop more productive
future foundations for health care regulation, we must revisit the privileging and
narrow definition of choice that has undergirded the last era of health policy and
law. In some cases, the value of choice has been overemphasized. We would be
better off if simply handed the best available health plan, or, more controversially,
if denied treatments and therapies that are low in value or do not work.
Yet, moving choice off its pedestal does not preordain paternalistic
regulation; rather, it demands seeking proxies other than purchases in a market
to understand what people most value. This final Part ends by describing several
recent examples that illustrate how democratic processes and collective

27.
28.

See supra Part II.B.
Cf. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 417 (1999)
(“Citizens of diverse commitments converge on the deterrence idiom to satisfy social norms
against contentious public moralizing; public officials likewise converge on it to minimize
opposition to their preferred policy outcomes.”).
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deliberation are surfacing shared values that can, in turn, inform regulation. In
many ways, what people value most in a health care system is not so complicated
or varied, as these examples show. People want to be able to see their doctor
when they are sick. They do not want to have to go broke, nor do they want
others in their community to go broke, to stay healthy. Most people expressly do
not want to spend their time wading ineffectively through choices of health
insurance plans, medical care prices, or treatment options. For all of these
reasons, we must avoid the temptation to continue to build reflexively on the
market bureaucracy in the next era of health policy and regulation.

I.

PERFECT CONDITIONS FOR A MARKET BUREAUCRACY

The gap between economic theory and successful application in health care
is vast. For this reason, economists did not see health care as an industry
appropriate for economic analysis for many years.29 In fact, the early health
economists who worked on policy saw economics as one tool among many and
not especially helpful in making normative decisions.30 As an economist who
served on the Council of Economic Advisers under President Kennedy wrote, “it
is important that our political leaders listen to the wishes of society, not just the
analyses of economists.”31
Many viewed the early increasing attention to health care microeconomics
with a healthy dose of skepticism. At the nascence of modern health economics,
Kenneth Arrow wrote that health care lacks many of the conditions necessary for
a competitive market.32 In the late 1980s, even as market policies were gaining
steam in the field, half of all economists agreed in one study that competition in
health care does not work .33 Now, however, many scholars, policymakers, and
commentators have lost this skepticism;34 others seem to know that getting health
care markets to work is a Sisyphean task, but they keep at it, as examined below.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Daniel M. Fox, From Reform to Relativism: A History of Economists and Health Care, 57
MILBANK Q. 297 (1979).
Id. at 307–14 (describing the early work by economists, which deferred to medical views on
questions of need and distribution of medical care).
Rashi Fein, Commentary, From Reform to Relativism: A History of Economists and Health
Care, 57 MILBANK Q. 353, 357 (1979).
Arrow, supra note 25, at 948.
RICE, supra note 23, at 22.
See SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13; David Brooks, Do Markets Work in Health Care, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/opinion/do-markets-work-inhealth-care.html?emc=edit_tnt_20170113&nlid=19338766&tntemail0=y&_r=0
[https://perma.cc/8M56-ES7M].
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This Part provides the groundwork for understanding why economic
theory—both neoclassical and behavioral—repeatedly falls short in health care as
context for understanding the many reasons that the policies discussed in Part II
fail. Although market-based approaches can be, and have been, critiqued in
many fields, this Part illustrates why health care is especially problematic. Thus,
even though the studies in Part II below do not always explicate or fully examine
why market-based policies have failed in each instance, this Part should make the
evidence of such failure unsurprising.
The challenges are multilayered, and some are insurmountable. The basic
assumptions of neoclassic economics—like well-ordered preferences and the
possession of (or ability to acquire) necessary information and skills—evade
consumers when it comes to health care. Even without such fundamental
problems, health care consumers experience the full range of cognitive biases—
from information overload to anchoring to deference—that have proven tough
to correct using traditional behavioral economics interventions. In short, nearly
every condition necessary for a well-functioning market is lacking.
At the most fundamental level, basic assumptions underlying economic
theory are absent in health care.35 First, neoclassical economics assumes that
consumers have well-ordered preferences or “tastes” that are genuinely aligned
with their interests. For this to be true, people must be able to judge what is in
their best interest, but they routinely fail to do so with respect to medical care or
health insurance choices.36 As Arrow wrote: “The most obvious distinguishing
characteristics of an individual’s demand for medical services is that it is not
steady in origin as, for example, for food or clothing, but irregular and
unpredictable.”37
Instead of considering self-interest, people form preferences based on what
they have experienced in the past, which economist Tom Rice describes as
“wanting what they got rather than getting what they want.”38 He offers the
example of Americans accustomed to high use of medical technology and
wanting more of it, whether beneficial or not.39 Even if someone did have an

35.
36.

37.
38.
39.

Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want?, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, &
L. 383 (1997).
The Rand Health Insurance Experiment showed that when people have less insurance, they
reduce equal amounts of what experts consider to be the most effective treatment and what
experts consider to be the least effective types of treatment. Kathleen N. Lohr et al., Use of
Medical Care in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment: Diagnosis- and Service-Specific
Analyses in a Randomized Controlled Trial, 24 MED. CARE S1, S31 (Supp. 1986).
Arrow, supra note 25, at 948.
RICE, supra note 23, at 400.
Id.
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accurate sense of self-interest, the most basic economic concept of “willingness to
pay” is hard to understand in the context of decisions that can be life or death.
People must also understand the counterfactual, or what could have
happened if they had made a different choice.40 As one expert explains:
What a buyer wants to know is the difference between his state of
well-being with and without the commodity being
considered . . . . Thus, a consumer of such services who gets better
after the purchase does not know whether the improvement was
because of, or even in spite of, the ‘care’ that was received. Or if no
health care services are purchased and the problem becomes
worse, he is generally not in a strong position to determine
whether the results would have been different, and better, if he had
purchased certain health care.41

In short, people cannot judge their decisions against foregone alternatives.
Furthermore, interests must be exogenous and stable enough to inform
meaningful decisions. Preferences are at times not exogenous but rather shaped
by social pressure or addiction, which might cause someone to smoke, use illegal
drugs, forgo a helmet, or gamble, any of which are not in a person’s long-term
best interest.42 And preferences on critical matters can change across short time
frames.43 Women, for example, change their preferences about pain treatment
throughout their pregnancy, during labor, and after labor.44 People’s views about
whether they would want lifesaving treatment if it comes with a high risk of
physical or cognitive disability change over relatively short periods of time.45 We
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RICE, supra note 23, at 73–74.
Burton A. Weisbrod, Comment, in COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE, PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY THE BUREAU OF
ECONOMICS, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 49, 52 (Warren Greenberg ed., 1978).
RICE, supra note 23, at 22.
See, e.g., Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski, Discount Functions and the Measurement of Patients’
Values: Women’s Decisions During Childbirth, 4 MED. DECISION MAKING 47, 47 (1984)
(showing that women’s preferences about using pain treatment during labor varied based on
when measured during and after pregnancy); Terri R. Fried et al., Inconsistency Over Time in
the Preferences of Older Persons with Advanced Illness for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 55 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1007, 1010 (2007) (reporting nearly half of study participants expressed
inconsistent preferences over a short timeframe on willingness to risk disability in order to
avoid death); Donald A. Redelmeier et al., Understanding Patients’ Decisions: Cognitive and
Emotional Perspectives, 270 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 72, 74 (1993) (describing reasons for
inconsistent preferences). For a more detailed discussion of the lack of stable preferences in
health care decisionmaking, see Wendy Netter Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92
WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1275–77 (2017).
Christensen-Szalanski, supra note 43, at 47.
Fried et al., supra note 43, at 1008 (when asked about willingness to risk physical or cognitive
disability for survival, half of all participants responses were inconsistent over time).
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simply do not have preferences about health care in the way that economic
theory envisions.
Another basic assumption of market-based policies is that consumers are in
control of their choices. Health care decisions, however, are replete with what
economists call principal-agent problems; decisions are often strongly influenced
by doctors or by employers, who choose a menu of health plans and design
benefits. There is ample evidence that people want their doctors to make
decisions about their health care.46 Studies suggest that half of the time patients
simply do—and in fact a majority prefer to do—what a physician recommends.47
Sometimes, physicians’ recommendations align with a patient’s preferences, but
physicians can also be influenced by factors like time constraints and conflicting
profit motives.48 Finally, many people cannot afford good clinical decisions, even
when the best option is clear—sometimes referred to as “financial toxicity.”49
Health care markets also fail to meet another critical prerequisite for wellfunctioning markets—that people possess and understand information
regarding options. The health care system is notoriously opaque. Patients rarely
know the price of medical care.50 Even if they did, patients do not understand
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47.

48.
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50.

See e.g., Peter Henry Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 405,
422 (2010) (“[P]eople often prefer not to make decisions by procrastinating, leaving decisions
to others, making second-order decisions, or avoiding decisions . . . .”).
Wendy Levinson et al., Not All Patients Want to Participate in Decision Making: A National
Study of Public Preferences, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 531, 532 (2005) (“Fifty-two percent [of
respondents] preferred to leave final decisions to their physicians and 44% preferred to rely
on physicians for medical knowledge rather than seeking their own information.”); see also
Neeraj K. Arora & Colleen A. McHorney, Patient Preferences for Medical Decision Making:
Who Really Wants to Participate?, 38 MED. CARE 335, 338 (2000) (finding that 69 percent of
patients prefer to leave medical decisions to their physicians, with rates increasing among
older, less-educated, and sicker patients). But see Betty Chewning et al., Patient Preferences
for Shared Decisions: A Systematic Review, 86 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 9 (2012)
(reviewing studies on shared decisionmaking from 1980–2007 and finding mixed results on
patients’ preferences for an active role). See generally CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF
AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS (1998).
See John McKinlay et al., Non-Medical Influences on Medical Decision-Making, 42 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 769 (1996) (describing a range of nonmedical factors that influence physician
decisionmaking); Amitabh Chandra et al., Who Ordered That? The Economics of Treatment
Choices in Medical Care, 2 HANDBOOK HEALTH ECON. 397, 412–18 (2012) (describing
financial influences over physician decisionmaking).
S. Yousuf Zafar & Amy P. Abernathy, Financial Toxicity, Part I: A New Name for a Growing
Problem, 27 ONCOLOGY 149 (2013). See also COMM. ON CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE,
INST. OF MED., CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE TOO LATE 27–28 (2002) (describing
studies showing that the uninsured lack access to necessary care); Stone, supra note 8, at 478–
81 (describing the many ways that people make poor decisions for their own health when
operating within budgetary constraints). See also studies cited infra Part II.
Hall & Schneider, supra note 3, at 47–62 (describing the opacity of pricing in health care and
the reticence of doctors to discuss or patients to ask about prices).
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basic aspects of the system, including that a doctor might recommend
unnecessary surgery, that a doctor can only admit a patient to a hospital where
she has privileges, or that doctors are not reexamined routinely prior to licensure
renewal.51 Understanding these realities would make a rational person approach
medical advice and decisions with some skepticism.
More information is not the answer. Many Americans, regardless of
education level, lack the numeracy and literacy to make the kinds of complex
decisions necessary to choose among health plans or medical care options.52
Studies have shown that over half of American adults have only basic or below
basic quantitative skills.53 This means, for example, that they are unable to
determine whether their car has enough gas to get to the next gas station,
knowing all of the relevant inputs (the distance to the next station, the reading on
their gas gauge, and how many miles per gallon their car gets).54 Or even more
pertinent, they cannot determine what time to take a prescription medicine,
51.
52.

53.
54.

JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE ET AL., HOW SOPHISTICATED ARE CONSUMERS ABOUT THE MEDICAL CARE
DELIVERY SYSTEM? 6–10 (1981).
On numeracy, see, e.g., Wendy Nelson et al., Clinical Implications of Numeracy: Theory and
Practice, 35 ANNALS BEHAV. MED. 261 (2008) (providing an overview of research on health
numeracy and the clinical implications for patients); Ellen Peters & Irwin P. Levin, Dissecting
the Risky-Choice Framing Effect: Numeracy as an Individual-Difference Factor in Weighting
Risky and Riskless Options, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 435 (2008) (showing that lower
levels of numeracy led to higher loss aversion); Valerie F. Reyna et al., How Numeracy
Influences Risk Comprehension and Medical Decision Making, 135 PSYCH. BULL. 943, 945–46
(2009) (reviewing studies showing links between innumeracy and poor health decisions);
Stacey Wood et al., Numeracy and Medicare Part D: The Importance of Choice and Literacy
for Numbers in Optimizing Decision Making for Medicare’s Prescription Drug Program, 26
PSYCH. & AGING 295, 296 (2011) (summarizing studies showing that low numeracy impedes
health-related decisionmaking). On health literacy, see, e.g., ZSOFIA A. PARRAGH & DEANNA
OKRENT, HEALTH LITERACY AND HEALTH INSURANCE LITERACY: DO CONSUMERS KNOW WHAT
THEY ARE BUYING? (2015), http://www.allhealthpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/01/Health-Literacy-Toolkit_163.pdf [https://perma.cc/X732-GG4N] (describing health
literacy and summarizing studies on health and health insurance literacy); Helen Levy & Alex
Janke, Health Literacy and Access to Care, 21 J. HEALTH COMM. 43, 45–46 (2016) (reporting
that individuals with low literacy are more likely to forgo needed care or to self-report
difficulty in finding a health care provider); Tetine Sentell, Implications for Reform: Survey of
California Adults Suggests Low Health Literacy Predicts Likelihood of Being Insured, 31
HEALTH AFF. 1039, 1044–45 (2012) (finding that low health literacy is higher among the
uninsured and that people with low health literacy are likely to be sicker). On financial
literacy, see generally Annamaria Lusardi, Financial Literacy: An Essential Tool for Informed
Consumer Choice? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14084, 2008),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w14084.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF4N-5YT7] (explaining that
financial “[i]lliteracy is widespread among the general population and particularly acute
among specific demographic groups, such as women, African Americans, Hispanics, and
those with low educational attainment”).
MARK KUTNER ET AL., AM. INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, LITERACY IN EVERYDAY LIFE: RESULTS FROM
THE 2003 NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ADULT LITERACY 13 fig.2-2 (2007).
See id. at 7.
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based on the drug label instructions for timing of doses to eating.55 Even college
educated patients, doctors, and medical students show surprisingly high levels of
error on numeracy assessments and simple arithmetic tests.56 Many patients do
not understand straightforward and important information, such as when their
next appointment is scheduled.57
People especially lack health insurance literacy. Repeatedly, studies affirm
that people do not understand the technical terms that describe their health
insurance policy, how much it costs, and what benefits are covered.58 Most
people do not understand even the basic structure of their health insurance,
including whether they are in a plan where they can see any doctor or in a
managed care plan that restricts provider options.59 In a survey of insured adults,
only 14 percent correctly answered four simple multiple-choice questions about
cost-sharing features like a deductible.60 Yet, people overestimated the extent to
which they understand insurance concepts, which suggests many would not seek
more information even when needed and if offered.61
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Id.
See Nelson et al., supra note 52, at 263.
Id. at 262–63.
See, e.g., eHealthInsurance, New Survey Shows Americans Lack Understanding of Their Health
Coverage and Basic Health Insurance Terminology, EHEALTH (Jan. 3, 2008),
https://news.ehealthinsurance.com/news/rel344367
[https://perma.cc/68LD-AZ58]
(reporting that in a phone survey, “[l]ess than a quarter of respondents (23 percent) reported
that they were very sure of what the terminology used in their health insurance policy
actually means” and only half knew how much they paid for monthly premiums or annual
deductible); M. SUSAN MARQUIS, RAND CORP., CONSUMERS’ KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THEIR
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 12, 15–16 (1981) (showing in survey that many people do not
understand what their insurance covers, many patients underreport coverage especially when
their insurance covers outpatient care, and that with higher cost-sharing and more
complicated insurance structures, more people incorrectly report that physician services and
prescription drugs are not covered); Deborah W. Garnick et al., How Well Do Americans
Understand Their Health Coverage?, 12 HEALTH AFF. 204, 206 (1993) (finding that even
though consumers largely understood whether their plans covered hospitalization or doctors’
visits, they underreported that their plans covered services including mental health, alcohol
and drug abuse treatment, or prescription drugs and overreported that their plans covered
longterm care).
Peter J. Cunningham et al., Do Consumers Know How Their Health Plan Works?, 20 HEALTH
AFF. 159, 161–62 (2001) (finding overestimation of the need to sign up with a primary care
provider and to get approval for specialty care); David E. Nelson et al., What People Really
Know About Their Health Insurance: A Comparison of Information Obtained From
Individuals and Their Insurers, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 924, 926 (2000) (reporting that
84.2 percent of people in fee-for-service plans incorrectly believed they were in managed
care plans).
George Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ Misunderstanding of Health Insurance, 32 J. HEALTH
ECON. 850, 855 (2013).
Id.; KATHRYN A. PAEZ & CORETTA J. MALLERY, AMERICAN INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, A LITTLE
KNOWLEDGE IS A RISKY THING: WIDE GAP IN WHAT PEOPLE THINK THEY KNOW ABOUT
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The vast gap between this reality of what health care consumers know and
understand and an idealized informed consumer cannot be bridged, even if it
could be somewhat narrowed. Often, solutions to these problems focus on
providing more information or real time education or coaching on options,
which is like chipping away at the tip of an iceberg.62 One might imagine more
literate and numerate decisionmaking if everyone in the United States received a
better basic education, but that reality is unlikely to manifest in the name of
producing better health care consumers. Even with the best structured just-intime education, most consumers will never be able to navigate many choices in
health care in the way models assume. These gaps in capacity and understanding
should be disqualifying, in and of themselves, of approaches that look to patients
as consumers.
Finally, even in the extraordinary situation where these basic neoclassical
conditions were all met—well-ordered, exogenous preferences, good
information and understanding of both choices and counterfactuals, agency to
decide, and the financial resources to make the best decision—a patient must
then act consistently and rationally in line with her preferences and understanding.
The abundant work in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics has made
clear that decisionmakers are far from the rational archetype.63
The reasons people fail to make rational decisions are heightened in the
medical care and health insurance contexts.64 Medical decisions are often
scientifically and technically complex.65 People are overly optimistic about their
own health, especially since the consequences of decisions are often delayed (for
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HEALTH INSURANCE AND WHAT THEY ACTUALLY KNOW (2014), https://www.air.org/sites/
default/files/Health%20Insurance%20Literacy%20brief_Oct%202014_amended.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4Y8Y-RRZZ].
See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 18, at 3 (showing that most interventions, including
educational interventions, only made a small change in the number of people choosing a
dominated health plan).
See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1955). For a
sampling of this work in law, see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Christine Jolls et al.,
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–79 (1998)
(describing the research on bounded rationality—the reasons why actual behavior differs
from rational behavior); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051
(2000) (outlining empirical evidence inconsistent with the rationality assumption).
See Redelmeier et al., supra note 43 (describing reasons, based on studies in cognitive
psychology, why patients are flawed decisionmakers); Korobkin, supra note 12, at 532–38
(summarizing some of the key factors that contribute to bounded rationality in health
care decisionmaking, such as complexity, novelty of the decision, evaluability problems,
and emotion).
See Schneider & Hall, supra note 3, at 54.
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example, skin cancer develops years after the pleasure of warm sun on your
face).66 People tend to focus too much on possibilities that are unlikely but
frightening (for example, a spot that a doctor says has a very small probability of
being cancerous) when making a decision.67 Emotional responses, such as
disgust, are overly influential.68 People struggle deeply to comprehend and factor
risk into decisions69—an element central, of course, to choices of health insurance
and medical care (for example, what does it mean for something to increase or
decrease your risk of heart attack by 10 percent?). When people are making
decisions about major medical care, they are often dealing with questions of first
impression. Even when not, people do not accurately remember past medical
experiences. Duration of past pain, for example, is less memorable than intensity
of pain.70 Framing can significantly affect decisions, as when people make
different decisions when told survival rates versus mortality rates.71
Medical care decisions often must be made when ill and vulnerable or, in
the case of emergency care, unconscious.72 For most big-ticket items, health care
spending does not feel discretionary. Consider the case of a patient with
advanced cancer, who must decide between expensive, intense treatments with
no chance of cure yet some probability of prolonging life for months or years, on
one hand, and less expensive, less invasive treatment (or no treatment) that will
mean a better quality of life in the remaining time but less likelihood of prolonged
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See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 806 (1980).
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 63, at 1100–02 (describing “anchoring” errors); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI.
1124 (1974); Redelmeier et al., supra note 43, at 75 (“[S]udden problems with short deadlines
tend to be most compelling, whereas intermittent problems of insidious onset are often
overlooked.”).
Redelmeier et al., supra note 43, at 75 (describing a study showing that people are averse to
wearing clothing of people with disease, disfigurement, or moral faults after that clothing has
been sterilized).
Id. at 71–72 (describing how people tend to categorize something as safe or dangerous,
without regard for the level of risk, and overvalue reducing risk to zero). For an overview of
cognitive biases with respect to risk and uncertainty, see Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and
the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643 (1961); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing
Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 203–24 (2006); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 264 (1979)
(showing that people tend to make choices inconsistent with their own expected utility when
dealing with risky options).
See Redelmeier et al., supra note 43, at 75.
See id. at 73.
See Farzon A. Nahvi, Don’t Leave Health Care to a Free Market, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/opinion/health-insurance-free-market.html
[https://perma.cc/86JG-2S8B] (“describing the circumstances under which patients make
decisions in an emergency room.”).
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survival, on the other. The patient is sick and scared, perhaps under pressure
from family to make certain choices, and she knows that no choice will save her
life. These are impossible conditions for decisionmaking, and yet are routinely
present in medical care decisions.73
It should be unsurprising that with so many major barriers separating
theory from reality, a mounting body of empirical evidence, discussed in detail in
Part II below, has shown that consumerism does not work in health care. As an
illustration, among expectant mothers who felt they had a choice in prenatal care
providers, only 24 percent seriously considered another provider and only 14
percent had contact with one.74 These low rates belied the authors’ expectations
because of the importance of the decision and the relative ease of searching for a
prenatal care provider.75
The widespread academic response to evidence of consumerist failure,
motivated by the rise and deep influence of behavioral law and economics, has
been to try to nudge imperfect consumers to better answers through choice
architecture.76 Yet, the studies below illustrate that nudges are falling short.77
Addressing all of these aforementioned barriers would demand Herculean effort,
and some barriers cannot be dismantled, even with such efforts.
Economic theory and competition can be productive in some
circumstances in health care. For example, there is evidence that in more
competitive provider markets, hospitals compete on price, and when price is
fixed, on quality.78 The threat of disruption by retail clinics or medical tourism
can prompt doctors and hospitals to lower their prices, even if patients have not
yet begun to flee.79 These supplier-level dynamics seem to have the potential to
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See Hall & Schneider, supra note 3, at 650–51 (describing how illness affects patient, pulling
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See Thomas J. Hoerger & Leslie Z. Howard, Search Behavior and Choice of Physician in the
Market for Prenatal Care, 33 MED. CARE 332, 341 (1995).
See id. at 348.
See generally NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (I. Glenn Cohen
et al. eds., 2016).
Infra Part II.
See Martin Gaynor et al., Death by Market Power: Reform, Competition, and Patient
Outcomes in the National Health Service, 5 AM. ECON. J. 134, 150–51 (2013) (finding market
concentration has a positive effect on mortality); Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Is
Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?, 115 Q.J. ECON. 577, 601 (2000) (finding that
Medicare patients receiving care for heart attacks in less competitive areas experienced higher
rates of mortality); Marah Noel Short & Vivian Ho, Weighing the Effects of Vertical
Integration Versus Market Concentration on Hospital Quality, 2019 MED. CARE RES. & REV.
(finding that increased market concentration is strongly associated with reduced quality,
based on patient satisfaction).
See SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13, at 331–32, 352–53.
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produce some benefit, even without effective patient consumerism.80 In some
very limited and unique situations, consumer-focused competition may move
the needle. An oft-cited example, which may be due to consumerism or other
factors, is laser eye surgery, or Lasik, which costs one-tenth today what it did
twenty years ago, in nominal terms.81 Similar results have been shown with
plastic surgery, fertility services, and, most recently, hearing aids.82 But it is
fallacious to extrapolate from these examples of mostly simple, elective care to the
more common, complicated decisions that today’s policies are asking patients to
make.83 The patient earning just over minimum wage with a $500 deductible and
a chronic disease is in a wholly different decisionmaking situation than a cashpay patient seeking out elective breast augmentation.
The following Part illustrates what should be an unsurprising result of
policymaking on this shaky foundation: Decades of market-reliant policies are
not producing as promised.

II.

THE PRODUCTION OF HEALTH CARE’S MARKET BUREAUCRACY

Economic concepts may not translate well into law and policy for various
reasons. Some theories are wrong conceptually, even if applied perfectly.
Alternately, the assumptions underlying the theory may not prove true in
application, or in application in a particular field, for reasons such as those
outlined above in Part I. Policymakers, lawyers, and judges might extend a
theory beyond its usefulness84 or undermine benefits that can be derived from the
theory. This Part illustrates how all of these types of shortcomings have occurred
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insureds to use care in new settings. Cheryl-Ann N. Williams et al., Marketing Retail Health
Clinics: Challenges and Controversies Arising from a Health Care Innovation, 28 HEALTH
MARKETING Q. 270, 276 (2011) (“By 2007, only 15.9% of retail clinic visits were paid cash out
of pocket. . . . Some insurers, for example Aetna and Blue Cross Blue Shield, give their
members incentives which could include low or zero co-pays for using a retail health clinic
for nonurgent health issues instead of an emergency room or urgent care facility.”).
Brooks, supra note 34; see also SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13, at 318–19.
See SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13, at 318–22, 324–25.
Evans, supra note 23, at 450. Even though these examples are cited as successes because
prices have decreased over time in real terms, it does not mean that patients navigate these
markets especially well. Anyone who has been to Los Angeles knows there is a glut of bad
cosmetic surgery, even if competitively priced.
Cf. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or
Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003) (describing the disconnect between doctrines of contract
law and predictions of economic theory).

1948

66 UCLA L. R EV. 1926 (2019)

as economic theory has permeated health law and policy in the form of
microeconomic market-based solutions.
As these market-based ideas have been increasingly adopted as the favored
policy approach, health law has shaped to accommodate them, using regulation
as scaffolding. Examining several of the most vital areas of modern health care
regulation reveals that market ideology has become increasingly
institutionalized—and bureaucratized—as the intellectual core of the field.
Each of the following Subparts look to a different economic theory and
market tool employed to reduce health care spending or improve quality. Part
II.A examines the theory that consumers will choose well among insurance plans,
eventually reshaping health care delivery. Part II.B examines the idea that higher
cost-sharing can incentivize patients to ration medical care and price compare
and, in turn, reduce low-value health care spending. The final Part II.C describes
using antitrust regulation to improve dynamics in larger market competition to
drive value for end consumers. By considering these ideas in parallel, this Part
highlights that they share two main themes. First, each relies on the theory that
markets and consumerism will achieve the best solution if we can just get the
regulation (or deregulation) right. Second, they have all failed, despite
tremendous investment of regulatory effort and intellectual capital. Although the
studies cited below do not prove definitively that the ideas never work, concerted
efforts over decades have repeatedly fallen short. At the very least, these failed
efforts are proof that these ideas rarely work.
A.

Managed Competition and the Market for Health Insurance

Managed competition has been one of the most influential ideas of the past
half century in the development of health insurance design and regulation, yet its
predictions of what consumer choices among health plans will produce have not
materialized. This Part documents this irrefutable failure, as well as the
Herculean efforts and massive regulatory infrastructure built in unsuccessful
attempts to produce better results. Subpart II.A.1 describes the theory, Subpart
II.A.2 describes why it has failed in implementation and why efforts at refinement
have likewise fallen short, and Subpart II.A.3 describes the bureaucracy built up
to support this faltering idea.
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The Theory of Managed Competition and Its Promise

The ACA’s health insurance exchanges were built loosely on a concept that
has come to be called managed competition, most often associated with Stanford
economist Alain Enthoven.85 Republicans, even as they called for a dismantling
of the ACA, proposed policies that build on this same idea,86 and private
exchanges have begun to develop in parallel to serve the employer-based health
insurance market.87
The oversimplified idea is that when consumers choose among health plans
in a regulated marketplace that is carefully controlled by “sponsors,” they will
make choices based on their preferences.88 Since they will presumably choose
plans where they get better care at lower costs, their choices will ultimately drive
health plans to compete for their business by offering higher-value options.89
Enthoven initially called the idea “Consumer-Choice Health Plan” (CCHP),
emphasizing the element of choice involved.90
Enthoven proposed implementing this idea with a system of vouchers for
buying health insurance, where each person would receive a credit to buy a health
plan in a regulated, competitive market.91 The value of these vouchers would vary
based on an individual’s age, and low-income people would receive additional
subsidies.92 The ground rules he proposed included mandating that insurers
accept any applicant during an open enrollment period (guaranteed issue),
requiring “community-rated” premiums that do not vary based on health status,
and placing limits on out-of-pocket spending93—all rules that the ACA enacted

85.

86.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Alain C. Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan (First of Two Parts): Inflation and Inequity
in Health Care Today: Alternatives for Cost Control and an Analysis of Proposals for National
Health Insurance, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 650 (1978) [hereinafter Enthoven, First Part]; Alain
C. Enthoven, Consumer Choice Health Plan (Second of Two Parts): A National-Health
Insurance Proposal Based on Regulated Competition in the Private Sector, 298 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 709 (1978) [hereinafter Enthoven, Second Part]; Alain C. Enthoven, The History and
Principles of Managed Competition, 12 HEALTH AFF. 24 (Supp. 1993).
American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1626, 115th Cong. (2017); Pete Sessions et al., How
We Can Repeal the ACA and Still Insure the Uninsured, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170118.058364/full/#one
[https://perma.cc/CL4G-HMK2].
Alain C. Enthoven, Managed Competition 2014: Rescued by the Private Sector?, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG (May 12, 2014), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20140512.038969/full
[https://perma.cc/4ACT-JP2D].
Enthoven, Second Part, supra note 85, at 709.
Id. at 716–17.
Enthoven, First Part, supra note 85, at 650, 652.
Enthoven, Second Part, supra note 85, at 710.
Id.
Id. at 713–14.
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for exchange plans to make those plans both accessible and more affordable to
people regardless of their health status.
In his vision, an individual consumer would assess the different offerings
and structure among plans and buy the one most consistent with her preferences.
As Enthoven put it: “What distinguishes [this plan] from the others is that it seeks
to give the consumer a choice from among alternative systems for organizing and
financing care, and to allow him to benefit from his economizing choices.”94 For
example, Enthoven posited that if someone wanted a plan that prioritized better
access to home health care or ambulatory care over, for example, hospitalization,
she should choose it.95
Enthoven’s assumption when he introduced this idea at the nascence of
managed care was that tightly-managed health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) would prevail.96 In particular, he was motivated by HMOs that adopted
a payment model that pays doctors based on the number of patients they care for
and not based on individual patient visits.97 These plans relied on primary care
providers as gatekeepers to ration more expensive specialty and inpatient care,
enabling them to benefit financially if they kept down use of this expensive care
among their patients.98
This gatekeeping function, in turn, unlocks the rest of Enthoven’s
masterplan. The reduction of wasteful care would prompt a rationalization of the
health care workforce and reduce the number of specialists. Enthoven writes:
“Primary care physicians would assume more of the responsibility for the total
costs of care of their patients, and specialists whose costs were judged by such
primary care physicians to be excessive would find themselves obliged to
negotiate lower fees to retain their referrals.”99 Enthoven thought mobilizing
consumer choice could correct the overreliance on expensive, specialty doctors in
the United States—a politically thorny problem resistant to direct regulation.
This theory, now referred to as managed competition, has so deeply
permeated the health policy zeitgeist that it has influenced nearly every major
health financing reform effort of the past decades. It graduated to the main stage
of the policy scene in the early 1990s, when it was incorporated into the blueprint
for President Clinton’s attempt at health reform in 1993, the Health Security
Act.100 Although that reform failed, the idea persisted. It undergirds the design of
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 718 (emphasis omitted).
Enthoven, First Part, supra note 85, at 652.
Enthoven, Second Part, supra note 85, at 718.
Id. at 717.
Id.
Enthoven, Second Part, supra note 85, at 715.
Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993–1994).
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the Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage and Medicare Advantage, where
Medicare beneficiaries can choose among plans administered by private health
insurance companies. Most recently, the idea is reflected in the creation of the
ACA’s health insurance exchanges, or marketplaces, based on the 2006
Massachusetts reform. Managed competition ideals have informed proposals
floated by Republicans to replace the ACA and to privatize Medicare.101 And
managed competition emerged again in the 2020 Democratic primaries, usually
in the form of the idea of a public option to compete with private plans. Even
though none of these efforts followed Enthoven’s blueprint exactly, they all
internalized the concept he preached: Consumers with buying power will drive
value in a managed, competitive insurance marketplace.
2.

The Shortcomings of Managed Competition

Enthoven aimed to solve politically sticky problems in the health care system:
overuse of overpriced specialty care and fee-for-service payment, where providers
are paid per unit of care. The theory, as applied, however, has neither enabled
people to choose better what they want, nor has it generated the hoped-for system
transformation. The first Subpart describes why the idea is conceptually flawed.
The second Subpart offers empirical evidence of the failure of managed
competition in various health care programs. The final Subpart describes how
these shortcomings persist in the ACA’s exchanges, despite various attempts to
use decision aids and nudges to improve consumer decisionmaking.
a.

Conceptual Shortcomings

Enthoven’s vision is built on false assumptions about people’s ability to
select well among health plans. Choosing a health insurance plan implicates all of
the challenges described in Part I. To Enthoven’s credit, the best empirical
evidence on this point emerged later, but the outcomes were largely predictable.
Enthoven expected people to consider tradeoffs between, for example,
possible future use of home health care versus hospital care,102 possibly having no
experience with or exposure to either. Thus, it would be hard to imagine how
to order preferences between the two or know how much to be willing to pay
for each one.
Furthermore, insurance choices require at least moderate mathematic skills
to determine total possible spending, taking into consideration benefits,
101. See supra note 11.
102. Enthoven, First Part, supra note 85, at 652.
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networks, premiums, and cost-sharing.103 Most importantly, the choice of health
plan is all about risk and uncertainty, conditions that thwart decisionmaking for
even a perfectly informed and well-educated buyer.
Finally, even if Enthoven’s idealized customer did exist, managed
competition would be unlikely to transform health care delivery as it exists in the
United States. He imagined insurers would internalize consumers’ preferences
and negotiate with providers accordingly to improve health care delivery
structures.104 Yet, insurers lack the requisite market power vis-à-vis providers.
Although less true when Enthoven first wrote, providers have accreted
substantial market power through consolidation, undermining insurers’ relative
bargaining position.105 When providers flex their muscles in negotiations, they
usually win.106
Even more, the very structure of Enthoven’s model undermines insurers’
ability to gain leverage over providers. Managed competition relies on having
multiple insurers competing for customers, but the more insurers there are, the
harder it is for any single insurer to enroll enough people to gain bargaining
power over providers. The ACA’s piecemeal design exacerbates this problem by
rolling out the policy to a small slice of the population. In initial best-case
scenario estimates, about twenty-three million people (a mere 7 percent of the
population) would buy an ACA exchange policy by 2016;107 the actual enrollment
numbers have been less than half this number.108 This number of enrollees
spread across fifty states does not give insurers much added leverage against
behemoth hospital systems. The theory of managed competition becomes
untenable in real markets and, especially, with real consumers.

See supra note 53.
Enthoven, Second Part, supra note 85, at 717.
See infra note 339 and accompanying text.
Id.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 13 (2012),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/43472-07-242012-coverageestimates.pdf [https://perma.cc/69YC-FLEB] (“According to the current
estimates, from 2016 on, between 23 million and 25 million people will receive coverage
through the exchanges . . . .”).
108. EMILY P. ZAMMITTI ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE:
EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NHIS, JANUARY–JUNE 2016 1 (2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur201611.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RLBWNDW].

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
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Empirical Evidence on Managed Competition’s
Shortcomings as Applied

Mountains of empirical evidence confirm that people do not choose as
Enthoven predicted. Studies have tried to pinpoint what exactly impedes good
decisionmaking—from complexity of choices to insufficient information.
Increasingly, experts have recognized a fundamental inability among consumers
to evaluate and rank options even in the best-case scenario, with simple choices
and transparent information.109
Much of the empirical research on health plan choices examines situations
with a dominant—or clearly superior—choice among options.110 This means
that there is no scenario in which Plan A is better than Plan B, for any buyer. For
example, imagine two health plans with the same benefits and price but the
second has a smaller network; no one should choose the latter. Or imagine Plan
A has high monthly premiums and low cost-sharing and Plan B has low monthly
premiums and high cost-sharing, such as a high deductible. They cover identical
benefits and offer the same provider network, but someone who chooses Plan A
will face higher total annual spending at any level of medical care use. No one
should choose Plan A. Studies of private insurance, the Medicare market, and
ACA plans all reveal the pervasiveness of people choosing such dominated plans.
Since there is no one who would rationally choose a dominated plan, doing so is
objectively a poor choice and ripe for study.
Based on a simulated insurance purchase, one study by Eric Johnson and
colleagues reported that people have less than even odds of making the right
insurance choice when given a small number of options and information about a
family’s medical needs.111 This study excluded respondents who failed to

109. Saurabh Bhargava & George Loewenstein, Choosing a Health Insurance Plan: Complexity and
Consequences, 314 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2505, 2506 (2015) (“[T]he main barrier to financially
efficient choice was not the number of options confronting employees, nor the transparency
of their presentation, but rather the . . . lack of basic understanding on health insurance . . . .”);
Saurabh Bhargava, George Loewenstein, & Justin Snyder, Choose to Lose: Health Plan Choices
from a Menu With Dominated Options, 132 Q. J. ECON. 1319, 1325 (2017) (“Taken
collectively, results from the experiments suggest that the demand for dominated plans does
not predominantly reflect the informed preferences of consumers or the consequences of
menu complexity, but instead involves a failure of consumers to accurately evaluate and
compare plans.”).
110. Compare Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of
Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 Yale L.J. 1476 (2015) for a
discussion of the problem of choice of dominated options occurring in other financial realms.
111. Johnson et al., supra note 18, at 3. The study concludes: “Consumers left to their own devices
seem to make large errors when choosing health insurance . . . and they seem to be unaware
of that failure.” Id. at 5.
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demonstrate that they understood basic insurance terms (premiums, deductibles,
or copayments) after a brief lesson.112 This means that the under 50 percent rate
of success was among a pool of people with relatively more knowledge or
capacity. Even the Wharton business school participants in this study got it
wrong over one-quarter of the time.113
Studies reveal similar results when employees choose among options for
their employer-sponsored health insurance. Among enrollees in the University
of Michigan employee plan, over one-third of all workers enrolled in a
dominated plan, which was identical to another option in every way, except that
it had a more restricted provider network.114 Again, there is no scenario in which
a worker would be better off enrolled in this plan that a large number of the
University’s employees selected.115 Another study of a large U.S. firm similarly
found that a majority of employees chose a dominated option, which was more
expensive than a higher-deductible option at every level of possible health care
use but otherwise identical (in terms of benefits, provider network,
administrator, etc.), and which resulted in 24 percent excess spending on
premiums.116 Lower-income employees were more likely to select dominated
plans.117 These studies also refute the idea that employers serve as skilled
intermediaries, acting as more informed agents to select good plan option for
their employees.
In the Medicare market, a well-known study of Part D, where beneficiaries
choose among private prescription drug plans, showed that over 73 percent of
enrollees could have chosen a less expensive plan without increasing future
spending variance, and the average enrollee could have spent nearly one-quarter

112. Id. at 4.
113. Id.
114. Anna D. Sinaiko & Richard A. Hirth, Consumers, Health Insurance, and Dominated Choices,
30 J. HEALTH ECON. 450, 453 (2011).
115. One may rightfully ask why the University of Michigan is even offering such a plan—a point
discussed further below.
116. Bhargava, Loewenstein, & Sydnor, supra note 109, at 1321–22 (studying an employer where
employees can “build” their own plans by choosing four cost-sharing elements—deductible,
copayment, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket maximum—for plans that otherwise are
identical in terms of, for example, covered benefits, provider network, and plan
administrator). To illustrate a dominated plan, for employees to lower their deductible from
$1000 to $750, they had to pay $528 more in premiums per year, spending $278 more than
they would in any scenario under the $1000 deductible plan. But cf. Benjamin R. Handel,
Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts, 103 AM.
ECON. REV. 2643 (2013) (showing that in one employer setting, correcting inertia that
leaves people in dominated plans exacerbates adverse selection and leads to an overall
welfare reduction).
117. Bhargava, Loewenstein, & Sydnor, supra note 109, at 1322.
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less.118 Another revealed that fewer than 10 percent of Part D enrollees choose
plans that end up being optimal for them in terms of total cost.119 Even though
people might chose a more expensive plan for rational reasons other than price,
including formulary or favorite provider, this study tested and ruled out such
possibilities.120 One-quarter of individuals could have done better by picking at
random, and nearly three-quarters would have done better simply by picking the
plan with the lowest premium.121
Despite some early evidence suggesting that people might get better at
making decisions in the Medicare Part D program over time,122 these poor
choices have persisted in the decade since the program began and have in fact
grown worse, suggesting that people are not becoming better consumers.123
The same results emerge in the Medicare supplemental insurance market,
where people buy private policies to pay for costs not covered by traditional
Medicare, which only pays for 60 percent of costs for the average retiree.124 There

118. Jason Abaluck & Jonathan Gruber, Heterogeneity in Choice Inconsistencies Among the Elderly:
Evidence from Prescription Drug Plan Choice, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 377, 379 (2011). They find
that individuals consider premiums, instead of total out-of-pocket costs, in making decisions.
Id. See also Florian Heiss et al., Mind the Gap! Consumer Perceptions and Choices of Medicare
Part D Prescription Drug Plans 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13627,
2007) (finding that Medicare Part D consumers selected inexpensive plans when more
expensive plans with more comprehensive coverage were actuarially better); Chao Zhou &
Yuting Zhang, The Vast Majority of Medicare Part D Beneficiaries Still Don’t Choose the
Cheapest Plans that Meet Their Medication Needs, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2259, 2261 (2012) (finding
that only 5.2 percent of beneficiaries choose the cheapest plan and that, by doing so, they
spent on average $368 more annually).
119. Florian Heiss et al., Plan Selection in Medicare Part D: Evidence From Administrative Data
20–22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18166, 2012) (reporting that only
5.8 percent of individuals chose an ex post optimal plan in 2007 and 7.4 percent in 2008, with
average losses of $399 in 2007 and $435 in 2008).
120. Id. at 24.
121. Id. at 21.
122. Jonathan D. Ketcham, Sinking, Swimming, or Learning to Swim in Medicare Part D, 102 AM.
ECON. REV. 2639, 2653 (2012) (studying enrollment in Caremark Part D plans in the initial
and second year (2006–2007) and finding that people switched to plans that notably
decreased their overspending). Later studies, such as Abaluck and Gruber, supra note 118,
were not able to replicate such results while looking at a longer time period and a broader
range of plan options.
123. See Jason Abaluck & Jonathan Gruber, Evolving Choice Inconsistencies in Choice of
Prescription Drug Insurance 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19163,
2013). People err both by over- and under-insuring. Id. at 29.
124. PAUL FRONSTIN & JACK VANDERHEI, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., SAVINGS MEDICARE
BENEFICIARIES NEED FOR HEALTH EXPENSES: SOME COUPLES COULD NEED AS MUCH AS
$400,000, UP FROM $370,000 IN 2017 4 (2018), https://www.ebri.org/docs/defaultsource/ebri-issue-brief/ebri_ib_460_medicare-8oct18.pdf?sfvrsn=5c1b3e2f_2
[https://perma.cc/L97A-PN9R].
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are two main types of supplemental private plans that fill in the rest.125 Medicare
Advantage is a managed care plan that replaces original Medicare with a private
plan that has a narrower network of providers.126 These plans cover all Medicare
benefits, fill in gaps in cost-sharing, and sometimes cover additional services such
as dental, vision, and hearing.127 The second option, called Medigap plans, layer
on top of original Medicare, filling in cost-sharing gaps but not narrowing the
network or covering additional services.128 Once someone chooses between
Medicare Advantage or Medigap, few make an active choice again between them
in subsequent years, which leaves some people in a dominated plan.129 One study
documented that when a policy change made Medicare Advantage clearly
superior, 75 percent of enrollees remained in the dominated Medigap plans.130
The authors hypothesized any number of reasons might have influenced them,
from inertia to limited cognitive capacity to the complexity of these decisions and
the difficulty of comparing the many options.131 Not surprisingly, insurers in
this market take advantage of this stickiness by increasing premiums after the
first year.132
125. Patricia Neumann and Gretchen A. Jacobson, Medicare Advantage Checkup, 379 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2163, 2163–4 (2018).
126. Id. at 2164.
127. Id.; see also Medicare Advantage Plans Cover All Medicare Services, MEDICARE,
https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/what-medicare-health-planscover/medicare-advantage-plans-cover-all-medicare-services [https://perma.cc/V437-3TB6]
(last visited Oct. 19, 2019) (“Most Medicare Advantage Plans offer coverage for things that
aren’t covered by Original Medicare, like vision, hearing, dental, and wellness programs (like
gym memberships).”).
128. Neumann & Jacobson, supra note 125, at 2164.
129. Anna D. Sinaiko et al., Enrollment in Medicare Advantage Plans in Miami-Dade County:
Evidence of Status Quo Bias?, 50 INQUIRY 202, 211 (2013). This stickiness may be from a
genuine aversion to revisiting options or over-loyalty to a past choice, what psychologists call
“status quo bias.” For the study that first revealed status quo bias in the selection of health
plans, observing health plan choices among Harvard University employees, see William
Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 7, 26–31 (1988).
130. Christopher C. Afendulis et al., Dominated Choices and Medicare Advantage Enrollment, 119
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 72, 73 (2015) (finding that a majority of beneficiaries did not switch
out of traditional Medicare plans dominated by private fee-for-service plans, which became
available in the mid-2000s).
131. Id. at 75; see also J. Michael McWilliams et al., Complex Medicare Advantage Choices May
Overwhelm Seniors—Especially Those with Impaired Decision Making, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1786,
1791–92 (2011) (describing the cognitive limitations of Medicare beneficiaries, especially as
they age, and how it affects plan choice).
132. Joseph P. Newhouse & Thomas G. McGuire, How Successful is Medicare Advantage?, 92
MILBANK Q. 351, 359 (2014) (“For example, in 2006, the first year of Part D, the insurer
Humana priced its Part D policies much lower than its competitors and, as a result, obtained
a relatively large market share. It subsequently raised its premiums to near the level of its
competitors but largely maintained its market share, very likely because of status quo bias.”).
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Other studies document how the overwhelming number of options in the
Medicare supplemental market can also impede consumers. If there are too
many Medicare Advantage options, for example, people opt instead for original
Medicare and Medigap.133 Likewise, for Medigap, consumers can choose among
ten different benefits designs, but a majority choose the most comprehensive plan
design with the highest premiums.134 It is possible, but unlikely, that most retirees
have the same preference for this plan design.135 More likely, people are opting
for what seems simplest and least risky, as a result of what is called “choice
overload,” where too many choices cause people to attempt to simplify,136
disproving the basic economic assumption that more choices are better.137
Even when there is not a plan that is objectively a better option, people may
still not choose the plan most aligned with their own stated preferences because
of a variety of misunderstandings. A study of a large firm by economists
Benjamin Handel and Jonathan Kolstad showed that basic misunderstanding of
plan options could influence decisions significantly.138 The employees had a
choice between two health plans: a high deductible health plan (HDHP) or a
preferred provider option (PPO), the latter with higher premiums and lower
cost-sharing.139 Both offered access to the same benefits and medical network,
which is a critically important feature for choosing a plan but which over half of
the employees did not understand, despite this fact being emphasized in

133. McWilliams et al., supra note 131, at 1791. See also Yaniv Hanoch et al., How Much Choice Is
Too Much? The Case of the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 44 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1157,
1163–64 (2009) (finding that increasing the number of drug plan options decreased accuracy
of identifying plans with specific attributes, including lowest cost).
134. CTR. FOR POL’Y AND RESEARCH, AMERICA’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, TRENDS IN MEDIGAP
ENROLLMENT AND COVERAGE OPTIONS, 2014 10 (2015), https://ahip.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/MedigapEnrollmentReport_Linked.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AN5ELX5].
135. Mark J. Brown & Helen Doerpinghaus, Asymmetric Information and the Demand for
Medigap Insurance, 31 INQUIRY 445, 448 (1994) (“There is no statistically significant
difference in the policy provisions chosen or the premiums paid by self-reported high- and
low-risk insured individuals.”).
136. Sheena S. Iyengar & Emir Kamenica, Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset
Allocation, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 530, 538 (2010) (“Our results establish that the size of the choice
sets also impacts what types of options are selected by the market participants. We find that a
larger choice set increases the appeal of simple, easy-to-understand, options.”).
137. For a comprehensive, easily digestible version of this idea, see BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE
PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2016).
138. Benjamin R. Handel & Jonathan T. Kolstad, Health Insurance for “Humans”: Information
Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2449, 2485 (2015)
(“Consumers who believe that the PPO plan has a larger network of medical providers
value the HDHP by $2,326 less than someone who correctly knows that these plans
grants the same access.”).
139. Id.
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information given to them.140 A large majority of people also incorrectly
estimated their spending from the prior year, yet a majority were confident in
their estimates—more evidence that people do not understand their
shortcomings enough to seek to remedy them.141
This study estimated that someone who believed incorrectly that one option
with a lower deductible had a larger network than the second option with the
higher deductible valued the latter at $2,326 less than someone who understood
they both had the same network structure.142 Misunderstanding the options,
rather than a genuine preference for more comprehensive coverage, likely shapes
some decisions.
The bottom line of this body of studies is that regardless of age, plan type
and options, and capacity, people fail to choose well among health plans for a
variety of reasons. Early evidence on the ACA exchanges, discussed in the next
subpart, only affirms this fact. A common response has been to attempt to nudge
people toward better decisions. That strategy has not worked either, as the
following discussion illustrates.
c.

The ACA, More Flawed Decisionmaking, and Failed Nudges

Emerging studies of the ACA exchanges show that, even with “nudges”
toward better decisions, people are not choosing well. Consistent with the
evidence above, many people are selecting almost exclusively based on lowest
premium sticker price, often resulting in the choice of a dominated plan once
subsidies are factored in.143
Others choose health plans that are not aligned with their own stated
medical needs and preferences.144 In a study simulating the purchase experience

Id. at 2465.
Id. at 2466.
Handel & Kolstad, supra note 138, at 2485.
Reed Abelson, Cost, Not Choice, is Top Concern of Health Insurance Customers, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/business/cost-not-choice-is-topconcern-of-health-insurance-customers.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7HFV-3WKX]; DEP’T.
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH PLAN CHOICE AND PREMIUMS IN THE 2016 HEALTH
INSURANCE
MARKETPLACE
7
(2015),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/
135461/2016%20Marketplace%20Premium%20Landscape%20Issue%20Brief%2010-3015%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPQ6-U3F2] (noting that in 2014, the majority (64
percent) of enrollees selected the lowest (43 percent) or second lowest (21 percent) priced
plan in their metal tier. In 2015, 47 percent selected the lowest or second lowest price plans
(31 percent and 17 percent, respectively)).
144. Andrew J. Barnes et al., Determinants of Coverage Decisions in Health Insurance
Marketplaces: Consumers’ Decision-Making Abilities and the Amount of Information in Their
Choice Environment, 50 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 58, 67 (2015) (finding in a simulation based on
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on ACA exchanges, only one-third of respondents chose the cost-minimizing
plan, based on their own anticipated medical care need.145 In contrast, 43 percent
of respondents chose a plan that would leave them over insured (resulting in, on
average, overspending by 24 percent, or $1,324 on premiums), and nearly a
quarter selected a plan that would leave them underinsured.146 The authors
estimated that if all people buying plans on the ACA exchanges had similar error
rates as the study population, “the result would be roughly $7.1 billion of excess
spending each year, borne by a population with low to moderate incomes.”147
The study hypothesized that the labeling of plans in the ACA exchanges,
which was an attempt to steer people to better choices, may instead have created
confusion.148 The ACA plans are organized and sold by “metal” level, such as
Gold, Silver, and Bronze.149 Higher metal levels indicate that a plan will on
average pay for a higher share of spending on essential health benefits—known as
higher actuarial value—generally in return for higher premiums.150 The authors
found more generic labels improved choices, but only a little.151
Other studies show how low-income consumers are leaving money on the
table. For people with especially low incomes (defined as 100–250 percent of the
federal poverty level, or $25,750–$64,375 for a family of four in 2019152), the law
requires insurers to provide a second subsidy called cost-sharing reductions
(CSRs), which decrease out-of-pocket spending when someone uses medical

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

151.
152.

purchasing actual ACA exchange plans that 40 percent of respondents choose a plan that
would cost them at least $500 more than another option, based on their self-reported
health needs).
Saurabh Bhargava et al., The Costs of Poor Health (Plan Choices) & Prescriptions for Reform, 3
BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2017). This study varied plans only by cost. It told respondents that
benefits were equal among plans and did not mention network differences. Id.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 10.
See id. at 1.
The ‘Metal’ Categories: Bronze, Silver, Gold & Platinum, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/choose-a-plan/plans-categories [https://perma.cc/B4PZ-8BDB]
(last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
This is not universally true after the 2018 open enrollment, where plans in many states priced
up Silver Plans to increase federal premium subsidies to make up for the cost-sharing
reductions the Trump Administration will not pay. See Margot Sanger-Katz & Kevin Quealy,
When Silver Costs More Than Gold: How Trump’s Actions Have Scrambled Insurance Prices,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/upshot/when-silver-costsmore-than-gold-how-trumps-actions-have-scrambled-insurance-prices.html
[https://perma.cc/FBC7-JWEN].
See Bhargava et al., supra note 145, at 10–11.
Poverty Guidelines, OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION (Jan. 11,
2019), https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines [https://perma.cc/7BRW-JD9V].
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care.153 To get CSR assistance, someone must buy at least a Silver-level plan.154 If
she buys the plan with the cheapest premiums she can find, likely a Bronze plan,
she disqualifies herself from these subsidies, and her total spending on premiums
and cost-sharing will almost certainly be higher than if she bought the Silver-level
plan. Millions of low-income enrollees have fallen into this trap.155
The overwhelming response by scholars and policymakers to all of this
evidence has been to try to correct pervasive decisionmaking errors, using the
insights of behavioral law and economics.156 Several exchanges, for example, try
to nudge consumers eligible for cost-sharing reductions to Silver plans by
displaying them first on websites, instead of showing the cheapest Bronze plans
first as they do for other buyers who are not eligible for CSRs.157 More assertively,
the federal exchange healthcare.gov issues a warning if someone eligible for CSRs
tries to buy a Bronze plan.158 Even with such efforts, only about 80 percent of
people eligible for CSRs were buying Silver plans.159 It is possible that some
people could not stomach higher spending on premiums at the point of purchase,
but many will ultimately spend more in a year due to defaulting on the CSRs.
Marketplaces have acknowledged the challenges of designing useful
decision-support tools to help people choose their best option, balancing the
need for enrollment simplicity against predictive accuracy. One state reported,

153. Louise Norris, The ACA’s Cost-Sharing Subsidies, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.healthinsurance.org/obamacare/the-acas-cost-sharing-subsidies
[https://perma.cc/P3LL-E53P].
154. Id.
155. See Vicki Fung et al., Nearly One-Third of Enrollees in California’s Individual Market Missed
Opportunities to Receive Financial Assistance, 36 HEALTH AFF. 21 (2017); More Than 2 Million
Exchange Enrollees Forgo Cost-Sharing Assistance, AVALERE HEALTH (Aug. 19, 2015),
http://avalere.com/expertise/managed-care/insights/more-than-2-million-exchangeenrollees-forgo-cost-sharing-assistance [https://perma.cc/22M2-6C23].
156. See, e.g., TOM BAKER ET. AL, PENN LEONARD DAVIS INST. HEALTH ECON., WINDOW
SHOPPING ON HEALTHCARE.GOV AND THE STATE-BASED MARKETPLACES: MORE CONSUMER
SUPPORT
IS
NEEDED
(2014),
https://ldi.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/
pdf/window%20shopping%20on%20healthcare%20gov.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZNP9-P6EB];
JUSTIN GIOVANNELLI & EMILY CURRAN, COMMONWEALTH FUND, EFFORTS TO SUPPORT
CONSUMER ENROLLMENT DECISIONS USING TOTAL COST ESTIMATORS: LESSONS FROM THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S MARKETPLACES (2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/
sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_publications_issue_brief_2017_feb_1929_giov
annelli_total_cost_estimators_rb.pdf [https://perma.cc/2E3B-UNPD].
157. BAKER ET AL., supra note 156, at 4. See also In Washington State, Too Many Low-Income
Bronze Plan
Buyers, XPOSTFACTOID (Mar. 29, 2015, 10:41 AM),
http://xpostfactoid.blogspot.com/2015/03/in-washington-state-too-many-low-income.html
[https://perma.cc/RF9W-W5LP].
158. Id. (“While the site does provide a pop-up warning to CSR-eligible buyers who make a
preliminary selection of a metal level other than silver, it’s not a very clear warning . . . .”).
159. Id.
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tellingly, that it avoided asking too many input questions because it “might give
consumers a false sense of accuracy.”160 The outputs from any website supports
are inevitably complicated, breaking down total annual estimated costs into
monthly premiums, deductible spending, and basic plan information.161 One
study aptly noted: “Delivering on this vision [of a consumer-friendly shopping
experience] is difficult because health insurance is complicated.”162 More, or
different, information does not necessarily help.
The Johnson simulation, discussed above, tested various decision-support
tools and concluded that most had little positive effect. A cost calculator, for
example, which displayed total annual cost among options, resulted in only small
decisionmaking improvements.163 The only approach that substantially reduced
errors was a combination of just-in-time education, cost calculator, and, most
importantly, a smart default with an opt out.164 Yet, consumers with these tools
did not demonstrate a large increase in their confidence in their decisions, even
though their final decisions were considerably better.165 The study authors
conclude: “Consumers left to their own devices seem to make large errors when
choosing health insurance, suggesting that they will select options that are not
cost-efficient and they seem to be unaware of their failure.”166
Another favorite approach among researchers is to simplify the choices or
to package them differently. One set of health economics researchers homed in on
and tested the hypothesis that people would do better if they had fewer, simpler
options, only to find out that it made little difference when tested empirically.167
Others propose repackaging medical care into different bundles to fix
decisionmaking errors caused by bounded rationality. For example, law
professor Russell Korobkin has proposed a redesign of health insurance policies,
which he calls “relative value health insurance.”168 Insurance policies would
bundle services based on evidence of their comparative cost effectiveness, or
technically-calculated value.169 Putting aside the lack of data to calculate in this
way (which is a large concession), the idea is that a Level 1 policy would cover
only the most cost-effective treatments and a Level 10 would cover the universe,
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

GIOVANNELLI & CURRAN, supra note 156, at 5.
See id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
Johnson et al., supra note 18, at 4.
Id. at 5 (defaulting consumers into the best options and allowing them the ability to opt out
into a different option).
Id.
Id.
See Bhargava & Loewenstein, supra note 109.
Korobkin, supra note 12.
Id. at 528.
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from high to low value.170 He explains that: “[t]he simple numerical rating scale
would provide boundedly rational consumers with a useful tool for allocating
resources between their medical care and other goods and services.”171 He
imagines that “[a]t the time of insurance enrollment, consumers could consult
the current list of relative value ratings for all treatments, organized by condition,
which would provide concrete examples of what interventions would need to be
covered by policies set at different rating levels.”172
The proposal may offer a reasonable way to root out some low-value care if
most people do not buy the top-level plans. It may also eliminate some bias
toward overuse that happens when rationing occurs at the point of care, but
other biases will be stronger with ex ante decisionmaking, including overoptimism, anchoring on certain treatments on (or not on) a particular level
list, or risk aversion.
More detrimentally, even if options are designed more rationally, people
still will not understand the implications of particular bundle levels. People will
no more understand what they get with a Level 8 policy than with the Gold-level
Blue Shield PPO option. More fundamental problems, such as the lack of wellordered preferences, the failure to understand risk and probability, and literacy
and numeracy deficits remain. What will undoubtedly occur is that people with
more disposable income will pick more comprehensive coverage, while people
without as much disposable income will buy as much as they can afford. Few
people will make the kinds of rational tradeoffs Korobkin envisions; his proposal
merely becomes an even more forceful rationing of medical care by economic
means and does little to enhance meaningful choice.
Worse even, it perpetuates the false notion that people are getting what they
want. Most people will have a hard time deciphering what the effects of different
bundles would be on their lives and livelihoods, and how to trade off a level
upgrade against spending on other goods and services. Furthermore, to the
extent people have preferences about deeper or shallower coverage, they might
not align any better to bundles of services organized by some measured value
than to today’s insurance plan bundles. Yet, an insurer, hospital, or policymaker
can claim that someone chose her own fate if she selected a Level 5 plan when
later denied Level 6 medical care.
This type of technocratic tinkering is celebrated as innovation within a
market structure. It might reduce the use of low-value care overall, if fewer plans

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 557.
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cover it than do now (although that same end could be achieved without an
overhaul of health plan design). Yet, it unquestionably grows market bureaucracy,
requiring huge investment in comparative effectiveness research, sorting
treatments into levels, and redesigning health insurance policies accordingly.
At the end of the day, and in light of the reality of how people choose among
health plans, creating choices, even among simplified or differently-organized
options, neither produces the ability for people to choose what they want, nor
does it drive health care value based on those choices. The ACA exchanges have
successfully increased the number of people with insurance. Yet, it is a stretch to
say that they have enabled people to choose health plans most aligned with their
preferences or that competition among plans has resulted in better health care.
Enthoven’s vision of managed competition—with its many iterations over
the years—is hard to square with reality. The research shows that people do not
navigate options with the sophistication Enthoven imagined. More so, it is
difficult to improve their decisions with anything short of a strong default, a
decision-support shove, so to speak.173 If people are defaulted into their best
option, choice becomes an empty concept.
3.

The Bureaucracy and Costs of Managed Competition

Managed competition has not produced efficient results, nor has it avoided
extreme government oversight. Just the ACA version of managed competition
has generated a massive regulatory infrastructure that was established and
continues to grow in a futile attempt to support better consumer choice among
barely distinguishable health plans.
Federal and state governments have spent billions of dollars to establish and
run these ACA exchanges, though the structure sets people up for failure and
creates anxiety. The federal government spent nearly $5 billion on state grants to
establish exchanges and continues to spend $1–2 billion a year on an ongoing
basis for the operation of healthcare.gov, the federally-funded exchange.174 It
spent $2.5 billion to support temporary health insurance cooperatives, many of
which failed.175 When the initial rollout of the healthcare.gov website, which over

173. Cf. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 14, at 1621, 1625 (describing default contributions rates as
operating more like a mandate than a nudge in reality).
174. ANNIE L. MACH & C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RES. SERV., FEDERAL FUNDING FOR HEALTH
INSURANCE
EXCHANGES
(2014),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43066.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GPD6-RNDX].
175. C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RES. SERV., APPROPRIATIONS AND FUND TRANSFERS IN THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA) 9 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41301.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T8ES-YBUA].
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half of the states rely on, failed, enrolling only six people on its first day, the effort
to overhaul it cost $1.7 billion, compared to an initial budget of $93.7 million.176
It also wrought reputational harm on the ACA and the Obama Administration.
States with their own exchanges must fund a large part of their ongoing
operations. California estimates annual costs of over $350 million, funded out of
plan assessments.177 Even a smaller state like Vermont will spend about $50
million a year to run its state exchange on an ongoing basis.178
Innumerable hours of labor have been spent launching and refining this
market. The Department of Health and Human Services proposed, revised, and
issued hundreds of pages of federal regulations to implement the exchanges—all
of which face the same risk of regulatory capture as nonmarket based regulation
and perhaps more because of the critical role that private industry plays.179 From
the passage of the ACA through the end of the Obama Administration, CMS
promulgated twenty-four new rules and generated sixty-four guidance
documents with respect to the exchanges alone.180 An entirely new office, the
Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, was established
within CMS in part to implement them.181
In parallel, the state regulators have been doing the same, first to set up the
exchanges and then later to adapt to the many regulatory changes that have rolled
out over the past ten years of ever-shifting implementation. Implementing an
ACA model based on the ideas of managed competition has required a
tremendous investment of money and regulatory effort. All of this expensive,

176. The
Failed Launch
of www.HealthCare.gov, HBS DIGITAL INITIATIVE,
https://rctom.hbs.org/submission/the-failed-launch-of-www-healthcare-gov
[https://perma.cc/VJ3Q-8PTK] (last modified Nov. 18, 2016).
177. COVERED CALIFORNIA, FISCAL YEAR 2018–2019 BUDGET: PROPOSED 23 (2018),
https://board.coveredca.com/meetings/2018/05-17/CoveredCA_201819_Proposed_Budget-5-17-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/9S3L-4823].
178. VT. AGENCY OF HUM. SERVS., BUDGET DOCUMENT: STATE FISCAL YEAR 2016 88, 92 (2016),
https://dvha.vermont.gov/budget-legislative/sfy201602042015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MNH5-ZSXL].
179. As one example, the 2019 annual ACA exchange market rule received over 400 comments,
about one-third of which came from industry participants, including Anthem, PhRMA, and
DaVita. HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2019, 82 Fed. Reg. 51052 (Nov.
2, 2017); cf. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 14, at 1605 (“Soft paternalist measures run the risk of
being less visible than more traditional regulations and mandates, which could make the
political dynamics more prone to capture rather than less . . . .”).
180. See The Center for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight: Regulations and
Guidance,
CMS.GOV,
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-andGuidance/index.html#HealthInsuranceMarketplaces [https://perma.cc/537U-AKRN]
(counting listings under “Health Insurance Marketplaces” through calendar year 2016).
181. The Center for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight, CMS.GOV,
https://www.cms.gov/cciio [https://perma.cc/WBC6-J782].
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time-intensive tinkering and scrutiny serves to bolster a market structure that
provides insurance for a mere 3 percent of the population.182
This type of effort is replicated in various degrees for the Medicare
supplemental market, including both Medicare Advantage and Medigap, as well
as the Medicare Part D market. Add to these costs the private bureaucracy,
including the operating costs and profits of the insurers who sell policies in these
various managed marketplaces.
There are also opportunity costs. The cost of this bureaucracy arguably
includes price inflation that might have been avoided with a more effective policy
strategy. The efforts needed to bolster the exchanges have consumed health
insurance regulators at both the state and the federal level. They have
commanded oversized technocratic analysis of exchanges and their successes and
shortcomings, with some of the most talented researchers and think tanks
consumed by this task.183
From 2010 until mid-2017, a constant stream of research studies and news
articles obsessed over the functioning of the exchanges. The New England
Journal of Medicine published thirty-five articles focused on the exchanges,
Health Affairs published 280 articles that mention and 140 that focus on the
exchanges, and over 800 law review articles discussed the exchanges, 250 of which
focused on them in depth.184 The New York Times alone published over 300
articles discussing the exchanges from 2010–2016,185 many of which focus almost
obsessively on the state of competition, as measured by the number of
competitors or premiums.186 Scores of researchers track premium prices,
declaring them higher or lower than anticipated and setting off celebration or
dismay.187 Stories of increasing prices or a major insurer, such as United

182. Marketplace Effectuated Enrollment and Financial Assistance, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(February
2017),
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%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/J4KA-83S4]; U.S. and
World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock
[https://perma.cc/9GUN-PQRV].
183. See Allison K. Hoffman, Cost-Sharing Reductions, Technocrat Tinkering, and Market-Based
Health Policy, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 873 (2018) (offering one example of such analysis with
respect to cost-sharing reductions).
184. Original research (on file with author).
185. Id.
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187. See, e.g., Jon R. Gabel et al., In Second Year of Marketplaces, New Entrants, ACA ‘Co-Ops,’ and
Medicaid Plans Restrain Average Premium Growth Rates, 34 HEALTH AFF. 2020 (2015)
(measuring premium growth in federally facilitated and state-based marketplaces 2014–
2015 and finding only modest growth); SABRINA CORLETTE & JOANN VOLK, GEO. U.
HEALTH POL’Y INST., ACTIVE PURCHASING FOR HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: AN
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Healthcare, dropping out of the exchanges incite panic.188 Microscopic attention
to increases in premium prices grabs attention, while revealing little about
whether this model is working or will eventually work.189
Finally, the exchanges have fueled several high-profile, high-stakes legal
challenges, including King v. Burwell,190 over the availability of premium
subsidies in the federal exchange, and House v. Hargan,191 (née House v. Burwell
and briefly House v. Price) over the legitimacy of the Obama Administration’s
payment of cost-sharing reductions without Congressional appropriation.
Dozens of lawsuits have been filed against the federal government for the
nonpayment of money owed to exchange insurers under the ACA.192 Such
litigation arises largely due to the of the complexity of the market-based
infrastructure,193 and likely consumes a lion’s share of the resources in the
Solicitor General’s office.
In sum, managed competition, embodied in the ACA health insurance
exchanges has created a massive regulatory scaffolding—bureaucracy—without
the payoff that the theory predicts. Billions of dollars per year go to the mere
administration of various marketplaces. Countless hours of time are spent
scrutinizing them and making technocratic adjustments to try to get them to
work a little better at the margins, and they have fueled an endless stream of
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ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS (2011), https://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/
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King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (holding that premium subsidies are available on the
federally run exchange, as well as on state exchanges, in favor of the Obama Administration).
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(Mar. 29, 2018), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/significance-risk-corridorslawsuits [https://perma.cc/H226-PCGP].
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litigation and related costs. This is all in addition to the operational costs of
private insurers who are the machinery behind the exchanges. In all likelihood,
this market-based policy creates as much, perhaps more, bureaucracy than a
more direct approach to expanding access would have, and consumers are
arguably worse off than they would have been under a simpler approach.
B.

Moral Hazard, Consumer-Driven Health Care, and the Market
for Medical Care

Perhaps the most influential of economic theories on the development of
health law and policy over the past decades has been moral hazard.194 Moral
hazard has come to mean, most simply, that insurance increases losses. The
greater protection against losses someone has, the less incentive she has to avoid
them.195 Perhaps more than any other idea, it has impeded productive health care
regulation by perpetuating the flawed idea that health care consumers can, and
should, themselves rationalize health care spending. Reflecting on the American
obsession with moral hazard, Malcolm Gladwell wrote in 2005: “Health
economists in other Western nations do not share this obsession . . . . But [in the
U.S.] moral hazard has profoundly shaped the way think tanks formulate policy
and the way experts argue and the way health insurers structure their plans and
the way legislation and regulations have been written.”196 He goes on to credit the
U.S. health care “mess” to the particular way moral hazard has shaped how
American policymakers think about insurance.197
Among other influences, moral hazard prompted a phenomenon of
consumer-driven health care (CDHC). Like managed competition does for
health plans, CDHC relies on individual decisions regarding medical care—at the
point of service—to spark price competition among providers and to reduce
spending on low-value items or services. As economists Jamie Robinson and
Paul Ginsburg put it: “In the consumer-driven world view, patients should
manage their own care, with the advice of their physicians and with information
on prices and performance derived from Internet sites, patient groups, and

194. See Arrow, supra note 25, at 961–62 (introducing the idea of “the moral hazard” for patients
and physicians); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON.
REV. 531 (1968) (arguing that moral hazard is more serious of a problem than Arrow
hypothesized and that it may make some expenses uninsurable).
195. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 238 (1996).
196. Malcolm Gladwell, The Moral-Hazard Myth, NEW YORKER (Aug. 21, 2005),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/08/29/the-moral-hazard-myth
[https://perma.cc/3VT9-W26D].
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personal advisers.”198 In theory, if patients must pay for more out-of-pocket,
rather than with insurance, they would price compare and spend less on lowvalue health care, which would enable them to spend more on things they value
more, such as housing, food, or leisure.199 In turn, a regulatory morass has
developed to try to realize this vision—with a web of laws promoting the
transparency of price information and policing the amount of skin in the game—
even as mounting evidence show this concept does not work in application as
theory predicts.200 As in Part II.A above, this Part proceeds in three Subparts that
outline first the theory, second how and why CDHC has failed to produce wise
rationing as predicted, and finally the bureaucratic scaffolding that has risen up to
support this faltering idea.
1.

The Theory of Moral Hazard and Consumer-Driven Health Care

The concept of moral hazard originated in early fire insurance
underwriting, where it operated in a different way, to describe individuals as
“moral hazards,” or not trustworthy enough to deserve the benefits that
insurance confers.201
Economists, including Kenneth Arrow in 1963202 and Mark Pauly, writing
in response to Arrow in 1968,203 brought the idea of moral hazard into broader
economic theory, where Pauly made it a phenomenon about rationality, more
than morality.204 Instead of a character flaw, moral hazard came to represent the
idea that any rational person who does not have to internalize the full extent of a

198. James C. Robinson & Paul B. Ginsburg, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Promise and
Performance, 28 HEALTH AFF. 272, 274 (Supp. 2009), https://www.healthaffairs.org/
doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.28.2.w272 [https://perma.cc/2CBD-RACD].
199. John C. Goodman, What is Consumer-Directed Health Care?, 25 HEALTH AFF. w540, w540
(2006), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.25.w540 [https://perma.cc/
6LPS-YP6L] (describing the tradeoff between health care and other goods and services and
why patient power is the right approach to such tradeoffs).
200. Several reviews synthesize research prior to the ACA. See, e.g., KATHERINE SWARTZ, ROBERT
WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., COST-SHARING: EFFECTS ON SPENDING AND OUTCOMES (2010),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/786b/cb85cdd5bba0f4b5939d0f428707b6e9bbe2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7355-S7CL]; Katherine Baicker & Dana Goldman, Patient Cost-Sharing
and Healthcare Spending Growth, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 47 (2011); JONATHAN GRUBER, KAISER
FAM. FOUND., THE ROLE OF CONSUMER COPAYMENTS FOR HEALTH CARE: LESSONS FROM THE
RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT AND BEYOND (2006).
201. Baker, supra note 195, at 263–64.
202. Arrow, supra note 25, at 961–62.
203. See Pauly, supra note 194.
204. See Baker, supra note 195, at 271 (describing that economists described what insurers thought
as temptation instead as rational responses to “incentives” based on cost-benefit calculations).
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cost has less incentive to avoid or limit it.205 Pauly argued that “need” for health
care does not exist independently, and that demand for health care is elastic and
follows the same rules as any other consumer product.206 In turn, insurance
should be limited so people do not overconsume health care because the price
feels artificially low.207
Moral hazard can arise in two ways when people have insurance against
losses.208 First, insurance reduces incentives to avoid harms, which is sometimes
called “ex ante” moral hazard.209 Second, insurance creates a risk of malingering
after a loss, or “ex post” moral hazard.210 For example, once sick, people will
overuse care if it is fully paid for by insurance, in turn driving up health
insurance premiums.211
From its initial adoption, leading economists challenged the accuracy of
Pauly’s conception of moral hazard on technical and normative grounds. Arrow,
both in his original writing and in response to Pauly, suggested that other
countervailing factors limit overuse, including the physician acting as a
“controlling agent” by attesting to necessity of a treatment,212 as well as the
insurance company’s review and prevailing social norms.213 John Nyman
challenged the notion that moral hazard was a problem, by showing that much of
what Pauly’s initial models deemed inefficient was in fact efficient spending
because insurance caused a positive income effect once people were ill.214

205. Pauly, supra note 194, at 535. Arrow and others extended the idea beyond insurance, to any
situation where one party’s actions create a loss borne by another. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The
Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 537 (1968). Joseph
Stiglitz later modeled this insight. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The
Pure Theory of Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 4 (1983).
206. Pauly, supra note 194, at 532.
207. Id. at 536.
208. See Baker, supra note 195, at 270 (explaining the distinction between the two); George L.
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987)
(describing the former as the “reduction in precautions taken by the insured to prevent the
loss” and the latter as an “increase in claims against the insurance policy beyond the services
the claimant would purchase if not insured”).
209. See Priest, supra note 208, at 1547.
210. Id.
211. Pauly, supra note 194, at 533–34.
212. Arrow, supra note 25, at 961.
213. Arrow, supra note 205, at 538 (“Nonmarket controls, whether internalized as moral
principles or externally imposed, are to some extent essential for efficiency.”).
214. JOHN A. NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE (2003). Nyman also
challenged the accuracy of the findings in the RAND study that suggested that cost-sharing
did not produce negative health effects, illuminating that a significant number of people in
the high cost-sharing experimental population dropped out of the study. John A. Nyman,
Moral and Other Hazards of Economic Analysis of Health Insurance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015).
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Yet, at the end of the day, Pauly’s arguments and overly-simplified
conception prevailed in the marketplace of ideas, and moral hazard became a
central tenet of law and economics scholarship that is applied widely across
fields—from torts to contracts to bankruptcy—usually to justify limiting liability
and compensation regimes.215 In health care, it motivated a cottage industry of
policy design and scholarship attempting to solve the problem that “overinsurance” causes people to use medical services inefficiently. The solution is to
scale back insurance coverage so that people experience a greater share of costs,216
sometimes referred to as having more “skin in the game.” In turn, people with
more money at stake, in theory, will stop choosing low-value medical care. Once
patients reduce their demand for certain lower-value goods and services, basic
economic theory predicts their prices will drop.
Mark Pauly and Regina Herzlinger, who have written volumes on the topic,
were early academic proponents of CDHC.217 Timothy Jost and others were wary
of the idea from its nascence, cautioning that it likely would not work and would
disproportionately harm lower-income and sicker patients.218 Jost’s cautions
were prescient, as the studies discussed below increasingly illuminate.
These ideas drove an increase in high deductible health plans, beginning in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, where the insured have to pay the first share of

215. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 21, 26 (1987) (discussing
the need to make sure that liability rules induce people to take the right amount of care to
reach an equilibrium between risk and utility created by their actions); Richard A. Epstein,
Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 666 (1985) (arguing against
the foreseeable misuse doctrine that holds manufacturers liable in products cases because
shifting liability to manufactures creates moral hazard of misuse); George L. Priest, A Theory
of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1313–14 (1981) (discussing how to
limit moral hazard through ex-ante definition of warranties in products contracts).
216. See WILLARD G. MANNING & M. SUSAN MARQUIS, HEALTH INSURANCE: THE TRADE-OFF
BETWEEN RISK POOLING AND MORAL HAZARD 31 (1989) (contending that 55 percent
coinsurance is optimal); JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER:
SOLVING AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE CRISIS (1992); Martin Feldstein & Jonathan Gruber, A
Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform 25 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., Working
Paper No. 4852, 1994) (arguing for 50 percent coinsurance and 10 percent of income limits
on out-of-pocket spending).
217. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND
POLICYMAKERS (Regina E. Herzlinger ed., 2004); REGINA HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN
HEALTH CARE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA’S LARGEST
SERVICE INDUSTRY (1996); REGINA HERZLINGER, WHO KILLED HEALTH CARE? AMERICA’S $2
TRILLION MEDICAL PROBLEM—AND THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN CURE 157 (2007); MARK V.
PAULY, AN ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: DO TWO WRONGS MAKE A RIGHT?
(1994).
218. See JOST, supra note 3, at x; M. Gregg Bloche, Consumer-Directed Health Care and the
Disadvantaged, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1315 (2007); Colleen L. Barry et al., Who Chooses a
Consumer-Directed Health Plan?, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1671 (2008).
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medical care costs before insurance reimburses spending.219 Proposals usually
pair these plans with private savings accounts that patients can use to save and
pay for their increased out-of-pocket share.220
CDHC is in strong resurgence. Policymakers have recently advocated for
an expansion of tax credits for health savings accounts and regulations that allow
higher cost-sharing in ACA health plans.221 Moral hazard is used to justify the
current trend toward increased cost-sharing and other “personal responsibility”
policies in state Medicaid programs.222 A new wave of Medicaid waiver proposals
includes, for example, higher cost-sharing and penalties for using the emergency
room for nonemergency care.223
Employers increasingly offer high deductible plans and make plan design
changes that reduce their responsibility for their employees’ medical care
spending; 58 percent of workers with an employer plan had a deductible of
$1,000 or higher for individual coverage in 2018, compared to 22 percent in
2009224 and 10 percent in 2006.225
Moral hazard also motived the rise of tax-advantage savings accounts that
individuals can use to pay for their medical care, when their insurance no longer
does. These accounts were first created as a demonstration project as part of
HIPAA in 1996.226 Even though the demonstration results were disappointing
with very low uptake, a next generation product of health savings accounts
(HSAs) emerged in response to lobbying efforts as part of the 2003 Medicare
Modernization Act and the Bush Administration’s “ownership society

219. JOST, supra note 3, at x.
220. For a comprehensive history of and critique of consumer-driven health care, see JOST, supra
note 3; HEALTH CARE AT RISK: AMERICA’S AILING HEALTH SYSTEM—AND HOW TO HEAL IT
(Jacob S. Hacker ed., 2008).
221. Stephanie Armour, Trump Targets Medicare for All in Re-Election Campaign, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-to-target-medicare-for-all-proposals-inre-election-campaign-11570104191 [https://perma.cc/KPU4-JRYS].
222. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING IN
MEDICAID: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS (2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.
wordpress.com/2013/02/8416.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RDX-QA7D].
223. Robin Rudowitz & MaryBeth Musmeci, The ACA and Medicaid Expansion Waivers, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.kff.org/report-section/the-aca-and-medicaidexpansion-waivers-issue-brief [https://perma.cc/7L8G-R7NV].
224. KAISER FAM. FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 2018 112 (2018),
https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2018-employer-health-benefits-survey
[https://perma.cc/6JYE-M8L3].
225. KAISER FAM. FOUND., 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 4 (2016),
https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2016-employer-health-benefits-survey
[https://perma.cc/BLS8-S4XX].
226. JOST, supra note 3, at 81–83.
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agenda.”227 In parallel, the IRS created rules that require a person to have a plan
with a high deductible to qualify for a tax-advantaged HSA.228 This combination
of high deductible plans with tax-favored savings accounts made them
disproportionately beneficial to people with high incomes who could gain more
from tax-sheltered savings. In 2017, in the wake of the 2016 elections, countless
policies supporting high deductible plans and HSAs came in quick sequence
from Congress and the Trump Administration.229
All of these types of proposals rely on the same theory, that with the right
financial incentives, people will use less low-value health care.
2.

The Shortcomings of Law and Policy to Combat Moral Hazard

Moral hazard relies on assumptions about how people react to incentives
that, even if compelling in theory, have not proven true in practice. The
conceptual shortcomings and the mounting body of evidence described in the
following Subpart make clear that patients will no sooner choose high-value
medical care than they will select wisely among health insurance plans, regardless
of how the incentives are structured. The three Subparts describe first the
theory’s conceptual shortcomings, second empirical evidence of its shortcomings
as applied in policies, and third why efforts to correct failings through choice
architecture and other technocratic tinkering are unlikely to lead to
improvements.
a.

Conceptual Shortcomings

Like with managed competition, even before applied in the real world, the
assumptions that the theory of moral hazard relies on struggle under scrutiny, as
Arrow’s and Nyman’s work argued and as Tom Baker has artfully detailed.230 In
theory, moral hazard assumes money can compensate for losses, so that someone
who is fully insured can be made whole and lacks incentive to avoid losses.231 For
instance, if a fully-insured house burns down and the fire insurance company
pays the owner the full value of the house, the owner is made whole.

227. M. Gregg Bloche, Consumer-Directed Health Care, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1756, 1756 (2006).
228. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 969, HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND OTHER TAXFAVORED HEALTH PLANS 3–4 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p969.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N3MV-BMD4] (requiring at least $1,350 for individual coverage and
$2,700 for family coverage).
229. See supra note 10.
230. See Baker, supra note 195, at 276–83.
231. Id. at 276.
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Theoretically, if insured for more than the full value of the house, the owner
would not prevent a fire or, even worse, might encourage one. This example
illustrates clear practical limits to moral hazard. Although money can replace
some losses, there are many that it cannot, such as the emotional value of home
and possessions.
In the context of health insurance, where losses usually follow from bodily
harm, money is an even worse substitute, which tempers moral hazard’s effects.
An individual has independent reasons to avoid bodily harm, even if the costs of
medical care are fully reimbursed. Many people exercise and eat vegetables to
stay healthy, regardless of whether they have comprehensive health insurance.
And much of illness is random.
It is more plausible that well-insured people will use more medical care after
they are sick or injured. The first empirical support for this idea came when the
RAND Health Insurance Experiment (RAND HIE) showed that, indeed, people
scale back on care when they have to pay for more of it themselves.232
Yet, even this ex-post moral hazard has its conceptual limits. People have
reasons independent from cost to use, or not use, care. Many people would
rather spend their time in places other than a waiting room, and some avoid
medical care altogether.233 Using more care, especially diagnostic care, increases
the risk of false positives that will require more testing, time, and possibly invasive
procedures.234 On the other end of the spectrum, some types of expensive care,
including emergency care, are insensitive to price, meaning that people will use
roughly the same amount regardless of whether they are well insured.235 And as

232. JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE ET AL., FREE FOR ALL?: LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE
EXPERIMENT 40, 162 (1993) (showing that people with less insurance coverage used less care).
This study examined nearly 3000 nonelderly families in plans with several levels of costsharing, ranging from none to 95 percent, and several levels of maximum dollar
expenditures, and found that people with higher coinsurance used less care, reporting
spending 45 percent lower in the 95 percent coinsurance plan than in the free plan. Id.
at 8, 40.
233. Jennifer M. Taber et al., Why do People Avoid Medical Care? A Qualitative Study Using
National Data, 30 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 290 (2014) (“People often avoid seeking medical
care even when they suspect it may be necessary; nearly one-third of respondents in a recent
national United States (U.S.) survey reported avoiding the doctor.”) (footnotes omitted).
234. See, e.g., Joann G. Elmore et al., Ten-Year Risk of False Positive Screening Mammograms and
Clinical Breast Examinations, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1089, 1089 (1998) (finding a 49 percent
risk of false positive result in a retrospective cohort study of 2400 women, resulting in 870
outpatient appointments, 539 diagnostic mammograms, 186 ultrasound examinations, 188
biopsies, and 1 hospitalization).
235. See Newhouse et al., supra note 232, at 47 (showing that demand for some categories of care,
including inpatient medical care for children, was inelastic).
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Arrow noted, doctors as “controlling agents” will resist overuse of care, at least to
some extent.236
A second assumption of moral hazard is that people control their spending
so that they could, in theory, avoid spending on low-value care if sick or injured.
This assumption maps especially poorly in the health care context: The RAND
HIE showed that most of the difference in care utilization by less-insured subjects
occurred when they decided to forgo care altogether.237 Once someone went to a
doctor or hospital, the amount of care used or what they spent on it did not differ
by level of insurance coverage.238 This is because people routinely follow their
doctors’ advice.239 Doctors are especially influential when care is most expensive,
or for serious illness or injury.240 While moral hazard has some blunt, predictive
value on spending, countervailing forces mute its impact.
A final, critical assumption is that with more skin in the game people will cut
out low-value care. Yet, as discussed above in Part I and proven by the empirical
evidence below, layers of impediments thwart sound medical care choices.
So, health care consumers will indeed ration, but not in ways that are
especially efficient.
b.

Problems in Practice

A deep body of empirical evidence has grown to show that the moral hazard
theory has strong practical limits in health care.241 CDHC-based policies are for
the most part not encouraging better tradeoffs between medical care and other
goods, nor is this market-based approach quelling bureaucracy or regulatory
intervention. In fact, it demands the opposite.
Arrow, supra note 25, at 961.
NEWHOUSE ET AL., supra note 232, at 98–100.
Id. at 95.
Cf. Levinson et al., supra note 47 (finding that many people prefer to rely on a
physicians’ advice).
240. See Arora & McHorney, supra note 47, at 338; Lesley F. Degner & Jeffery A. Sloan, Decision
Making During Serious Illness: What Role do Patients Really Want to Play?, 45 J. CLINICAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY 941, 945–46, 948 (1992) (finding that 59 percent of newly diagnosed cancer
patients preferred physicians to make treatment decisions on their behalf; only 12 percent
wanted an active role).
241. Studies of social insurance programs fail to show the increased utilization that moral hazard
predicts would occur with the introduction of indemnity programs. Baker, supra note 195, at
284–89 (citing empirical studies that provide no strong evidence that insurance reduces the
level of care and little evidence of significant “ex-post” moral hazard). As one example,
switching from third-party to no-fault insurance, which under classic theory would increase
accidents considerably, shows only small increases. See J. David Cummings & Mary. A
Weiss, The Stochastic Dominance of No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 60 J. RISK & INS. 230, 233
(1993).
236.
237.
238.
239.
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Evidence on Reductions of Care and Outcomes

To review, proponents claim that CDHC increases efficiency because
people will spend less on lower-value medical care and shift resources to things
they value more. One way they might do so is by reducing the use of low-value
types of care. Another way is to compare prices and choose less-expensive
providers. Yet, the evidence suggests that in practice people are not following this
theoretical playbook.
Studies beginning with the classic RAND HIE confirmed the basic claim
that increased cost-sharing will lower health care spending.242 Yet, what RAND
HIE also showed, and has been affirmed now by a quarter-century of empirical
research, is that reductions do not result from better consumerism, such as
shopping for lower-priced services, or from elimination of wasteful care. With
higher cost-sharing, people reduce beneficial care as much as wasteful care.243
Consumers reduce spending across most health services, including cutting out
beneficial pharmaceuticals and preventive care,244 as well as lower-value care,

242. NEWHOUSE ET AL., supra note 232 at 40; Amelia M. Haviland et al., Do “Consumer Directed”
Health Plans Bend the Cost Curve Over Time?, 46 J. HEALTH ECON. 33, 42 (2016) (“We find
that health care cost growth among firms offering a CDHP is significantly lower in each of the
first three years after offer.”); see also M. KATE BUNDORF, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND.,
CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH PLANS: DO THEY DELIVER? 12 (2012) (reporting, based on
survey of studies, between 5 percent and 14 percent reductions on health care spending on
average from CDHPs).
243. NEWHOUSE ET AL., supra note 232 at 162, 166. See, e.g., Zarek C. Brot-Goldberg et al., What
Does a Deductible Do? The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities, and
Spending Dynamics, 132 Q.J. ECON. 1261, 1266 (2017); (“[C]onsumers meaningfully reduce
both types of care, calling into question whether quantity reductions overall are net welfare
increasing or decreasing.”); Judith H. Hibbard et al., Does Enrollment in a CDHP Stimulate
Cost-Effective Utilization?, 65 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 437, 443 (2008) (showing reduction in
both low-priority, or less cost-effective, and high-priority acute and chronic visits among
people who switched into a CDHP); Mitchell D. Wong et al., Effects of Cost Sharing on Care
Seeking and Health Status: Results from the Medical Outcomes Study, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1889 (2001) (finding that cost-sharing reduced the use of care for both minor and serious
symptoms in a chronically ill population who faced high copayments).
244. See, e.g., Brot-Goldberg et al., supra note 243, at 1293 (“Despite the fact that preventive
services are free both before and after the switch to high-deductible care, we find that
consumers meaningfully reduce consumption of these services.”). Consumers also reduce
services like mental health care and prescription drugs for diabetes management, cholesterol
management, depression, and hypertension. Id. at 1295–96; Michael T. Eaddy et al., How
Patient Cost-Sharing Trends Affect Adherence and Outcomes: A Literature Review, 37
PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 45, 47, 49 (2012) (reporting that 85 percent of relevant studies
reviewed showed that increasing patient share of medication costs led to lower adherence
and, among studies on adherence and outcomes, 86 percent showed statistically significantly
improved outcomes with increased adherence); Leonard Fromer, Prevention of Anaphylaxis:
The Role of the Epinephrine Auto-Injector, 129 AM. J. MED. 1244, 1247 fig.1 (2016) (showing
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such as nonemergent use of emergency departments.245 Economist Katherine
Baicker and colleagues characterize the underuse of high value care as a type of
“behavioral hazard,” which can result even from small cost-sharing.246
There has been a more extensive debate over whether such reductions
ultimately lead to negative health outcomes, although increasingly studies
suggest they can. There have been only two controlled experiments—RAND
HIE and the Oregon Experiment—to examine the ultimate link between
insurance coverage and health outcomes, and neither found a strong connection
in the overall study population.247 If these studies were definitive and people with
higher cost-sharing were randomly to reduce both high- and low-value care
and end up no worse off, that might be an acceptable result, even if different
than anticipated.
Other recent studies, however, have shown evidence of harm when people
face high cost-sharing and reduce care. Even RAND HIE found negative health
outcomes for low-income populations.248 Numerous observational and quasiexperimental studies since found negative outcomes both among low-income
populations and more broadly, among older adults, a population that was
excluded from RAND HIE design.249

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

increased abandonment of prescriptions for lifesaving EpiPens as cost increases, with more
than 50 percent of prescriptions abandoned when patient cost exceeds $300).
J. Frank Wharam et al., Emergency Department Use and Subsequent Hospitalizations Among
Members of a High-Deductible Health Plan, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1093 (2007).
Katherine Baicker et al., Behavioral Hazard in Health Insurance, 130 Q. J. ECON. 1623, 1623
(2015).
NEWHOUSE ET AL., supra note 232; Amy Finkelstein et al., The Oregon Health Insurance
Experiment: Evidence from the First Year, 127 Q. J. ECON. 1057 (2012).
NEWHOUSE ET AL., supra note 232, at 208–11.
See, e.g., Amitabh Chandra et al., Patient Cost-Sharing and Hospitalization Offsets in the
Elderly, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 193, 194 (2010); John Hsu et al., Unintended Consequences of
Caps on Medicare Drug Benefits, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2349, 2354–55 (2006); Robyn
Tamblyn et al., Adverse Events Associated With Prescription Drug Cost-Sharing Among Poor
and Elderly Persons, 285 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 421, 426–27 (2001). Other studies show that
higher cost-sharing reduces behaviors that are known to improve health outcomes, such as
medication adherence. Michael Chernew et al., Effects of Increased Patient Cost Sharing on
Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Care, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1131, 1134–35 (2008)
(studying data from 6 million employees in large firms and finding that increased costsharing resulted in relatively lower medication adherence among individuals in low-income
areas); Amelia M. Haviland et al., How do Consumer-Directed Health Plans Affect Vulnerable
Populations?, 14 F. HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2011) (showing that higher cost-sharing
reduces beneficial preventive and chronic care). For reviews of these and other studies, see
Thomas Rice & Karen Y. Matsuoka, The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Appropriate Utilization
and Health Status: A Review of the Literature on Seniors, 61 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 415 (2004)
(reviewing Medicare studies up until 2004); Katherine Baicker & Dana Goldman, Patient
Cost-Sharing and Healthcare Spending Growth, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 47, 56–60 (2011)
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For example, Medicare recipients whose drug benefits were capped showed
lower rates of drug adherence than did those without caps, even for chronic
diseases like high blood pressure and diabetes.250 Those with capped benefits
were, in turn, more likely to have higher blood pressure and LDL cholesterol and
higher rates of visits to the emergency department, nonelective hospitalizations,
and death.251 Likewise, when a new Canadian law imposed a 25 percent
coinsurance rate and a deductible on prescription drugs, a study showed that
rates of serious adverse events, including hospitalization, nursing home
admission or death roughly doubled among elderly persons and welfare
recipients.252 Another study of significant increases in cost-sharing in the
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) supplemental
coverage for retirees showed decreased use of prescription drugs and physician
office visits.253
Savings from this decrease were offset by increased
hospitalization, which contradicts the findings of the RAND HIE that reductions
in spending were not offset.254
Studies also show that people with less insurance act in ways that might
cause more significant future medical problems, and short-term spending
reductions may not mean less spending in the long run—a finding that neither
the RAND nor Oregon studies were able to measure.255 Inversely, studies show a
link between increased insurance and participation in activities that are proven to
make people healthier, such as better medication adherence and using certain
preventive services.256

250.
251.
252.

253.
254.
255.

256.

(describing studies on insurance and health outcomes, especially on pharmaceuticals); JOST,
supra note 3, at 130–31 (summarizing various studies pre-2007); SWARTZ, supra note 200.
See Hsu et al., supra note 249, at 2354–55.
Id. at 2355–56.
Tamblyn et al., supra note 249, at 426–27 (reporting incidence of adverse events associated
with reductions increasing from 5.8 to 12.6 per 10,000 person-months in the elderly
population and from 14.7 to 27.6 among welfare recipients in the study). People reduced use
of both nonessential and essential drugs—the latter including, for example, antibiotics and
gastroprotective medications. Id.
Chandra et al., supra note 249, at 194.
Id. at 211 (conflicting with the RAND HIE bottom line and suggesting that it may have
missed implications by focusing on a nonelderly population).
Research shows that uninsured people who forgo beneficial care in their pre-Medicare years
catch up and spend relatively more when they age into Medicare. See, e.g., J. Michael
McWilliams et al., Impact of Medicare Coverage on Basic Clinical Services for Previously
Uninsured Adults, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 757 (2003); J. Michael McWilliams et al., Use of
Health Services by Previously Uninsured Beneficiaries, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 143 (2007).
Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Health Insurance Coverage and Health—What the Recent
Evidence Tells Us, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 586 (2017) (surveying research on the impact of
health insurance on financial security and health); Finkelstein et al., supra note 247 (reporting
higher use of preventive care, access to care, and perceived quality of care, as well as selfreported health improvements, following Medicaid expansion to previously uninsured).
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Exploring Consumerist Shortcomings in CDHC

Empirical studies reveal a range of explanations for why skin-in-the-game
incentives are not working as predicted; these studies suggest that even with
endless regulatory tinkering, they are unlikely to improve. One problem is that
people do not seem to understand the incentives created by these health plans
and, if they do, fail to respond as a rational person would to them. For example,
when high-value care is excluded from a plan’s deductible, the goal is to create
incentives for people to maintain use of this care by making it free. Yet, patients
do not understand this dynamic.257 Similarly, people reduce care throughout a
plan year, even if it is fairly certain they will exceed the deductible and other costsharing obligations over the course of the year.258 In doing so, they eliminate care
that is in effect free to them.
More detrimentally, people do not seem willing to price compare to get a
better deal, even under ideal conditions for price shopping, with their own dollars
on the line, for relatively fungible services, and when price data is right at their
fingertips.259 A recent study, based on a natural experiment that occurred when a
large employer changed its employee plan from coverage that paid for all medical
care to a high deductible health plan with high cost-sharing, showed decreased
overall utilization, as in earlier studies.260 Yet, there was no evidence that

257. Mary E. Reed et al., In Consumer-Directed Health Plans, A Majority of Patients were Unaware
of Free or Low-Cost Preventive Care, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2641 (2012) (finding that a majority of
enrollees were unaware that the deductible did not apply to certain high-value care, such as
preventive office visits, medical tests, and screenings).
258. See e.g., Brot-Goldberg et al., supra note 243, at 1306–07 (describing that 25 percent of total
spending reductions over the year in population studied occur from the consumer (i) while
under the deductible and (ii) who is predictably sick and will almost certainly outspend the
deductible). This pattern holds in future years, suggesting people do not learn to estimate
their true shadow prices in future years. Id. at 1308.
259. Brot-Goldberg et al., supra note 243, at 1286–88 (finding that among employees with access
to leading technology for price comparison, there appeared to be no price shopping at all and
that only a minority of employees reported that they knew of (33 percent), used (22 percent)
or benefitted from (4 percent) the tool); Judith H. Hibbard & Edward C. Weeks, Does the
Dissemination of Comparative Data on Physician Fees Affect Consumer Use of Services?, 27
MED. CARE 1167, 1172–73 (1989) (finding that providing hundreds of government
employees and Medicare Part B enrollees a directory listing and the fees charged by local
physicians for common procedures had little effect on their behavior and use of services);
Sunita Desai et al., Association Between Availability of a Price Transparency Tool and
Outpatient Spending, 315 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1874, 1879–80 (2016) (testing a price
transparency tool among employees at two large companies and finding it was not associated
with lower spending or choosing lower-priced ambulatory settings and, in fact, resulted in
modestly higher spending). This study found that only 10 percent of employees even logged
into the tool in the first year of use. Id. at 1879.
260. Brot-Goldberg et al., supra note 243, at 1263.
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employees price compared among services, even though the price comparisons
were made easy and employees paid a significant share of the costs out-ofpocket.261 A coauthor of this study, leading economist Amitabh Chandra, told
the New York Times: “I was all for high-deductible plans before I wrote my
paper,” which he said disabused him of the belief that deductibles and data would
prompt good consumerism.262
Other studies testing price transparency laws or decision aids show similar
results.263 Despite a tool offered in the California Public Employees’ Retirement
System (CalPERS) that displayed prices for lab tests, office visits, and imaging
services, only 12 percent of people used the tool in the first fifteen months after it
was introduced and, for the most part, they did not choose a lower-priced service
after using the tool.264 The study authors concluded that “simply increasing
deductibles and introducing price transparency tools will not induce consumers
to price-shop.”265 Even the study with the strongest positive results showed very
limited consumerism.266

261. Id. at 1265.
262. Margot Sanger-Katz, The Big Problem With High Health Care Deductibles, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/upshot/the-big-problem-with-high-healthcare-deductibles.html [https://perma.cc/ZL25-C2E6].
263. See Sunita Desai et al., Offering a Price Transparency Tool Did Not Reduce Overall Spending
Among California Public Employees and Retirees, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1401, 1405–06 (2017)
(finding that only a small percent of purchases followed a price search and access to a price
transparency tool did not lower spending). This study did find that people used lower-priced
imaging services but only 1 percent of people using imaging services conducted a price
search. Id. See also Ateev Mehrotra et al., Americans Support Price Shopping for Health Care,
But Few Actually Seek Out Price Information, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1392, 1398–99 (2017) (finding
that an unwillingness to switch providers or insurance networks constraints contribute to
extremely low levels of price shopping). Two studies do show modest reduction in prices for
imaging services among people who used a price-transparency tool, but also show that only a
small number of people used it. Christopher Whaley et al., Association Between Availability
of Health Service Prices and Payments for These Services, 312 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1670 (2014)
(5.9 percent of laboratory claims, 6.9 percent of advanced imaging claims, and 26.8 percent of
clinician office visits matched a search with respective savings of 13.93 percent, 13.15 percent,
and 1.02 percent); Anna D. Sinaiko et al., Association Between Viewing Health Care Price
Information and Choice of Health Care Facility, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1868, 1869 (2016)
(reporting that 3.5 percent of users used Aetna’s web-based price transparency tool and, of
those, users chose lower-price services for sleep studies, but the difference was not significant
for the other six services studied).
264. Desai et al., supra note 263, at 1401.
265. Id. at 1406.
266. Whaley et al., supra note 263, at 1672–73 (finding that about 6–7 percent of employees
searched prior within fourteen days of using a service and among those who did, spending
was 13.93 percent lower for laboratory tests, 13.15 percent lower for advanced imaging, 1.02
percent lower for office visits, and 2.4 percent lower for new patient office visits). There is
some limited evidence that people may respond more to a well-designed system of reference
pricing—where price is set at the level of a designated provider and patients must pay extra if
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A sweeping study among people with high deductible plans and easy access
to price data on lower-leg MRIs, which are shoppable, expensive, and “among the
least differentiated health care services” found that “on average, patients travel
past six lower-priced providers in route to where they received care.”267 This
study found that only 14 percent of people went to the lowest-cost MRI provider
within thirty minutes of her home and that patients could have reduced out-ofpocket costs by over $80 and insurer spending by over $220 (over 27 percent and
40 percent excess spending).268 The referring physician was the strongest
determinant of where people went for an MRI and the median referring
orthopedic doctor sent no patients to the lowest-cost provider.269 While many of
the above studies document the failures of consumerism without pinpointing the
exact situs of the failure, this one suggests that at least one factor is agency, namely
that patients rely on their doctors to make decisions.
In sharp contrast to these scenarios where prices were made transparent, the
price of health care is usually indecipherable.270 Often, neither insurers nor
providers can or will disclose the price of a service beforehand. This is in part due
to a belief that prices are proprietary—a problem regulation could address. Yet, it
is also due to the unpredictable way medicine is reimbursed, by units of care, so
that prices may genuinely be unknowable in advance. If a surgery proves more
complicated than anticipated, surgical or hospital bills will be higher. Prices may
differ by insured, by insurer, and by provider, so that even the doctor providing
the services is unlikely to know how much her services will cost for the patient.271
It is also noteworthy that typically even if users have good information on
price, they lack that on quality, which is just as important for making wise

267.
268.
269.
270.

271.

they choose nondesignated providers with higher prices. The California Personnel
Retirement System (CalPERS), for example, has had success in reducing spending with
reference pricing combined with preauthorization to explain pricing to patients. David
Frankford & Sara Rosenbaum, Go Slow on Reference Pricing: Not Ready for Prime Time,
HEALTH
AFF.
(Mar.
9,
2015),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20150309.045147/full [https://perma.cc/G9Y9-YSQT]. Although this experiment
showed the ability to steer people toward lower-cost services, it saved 0.26 percent of total
expenditure and increased plan administrative costs. Id.
Chernew et al., supra note 249, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 3.
See generally STEVEN BRILL, AMERICA’S BITTER PILL: MONEY, POLITICS, BACKROOM DEALS, AND
THE FIGHT TO FIX OUR BROKEN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (2015); Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why
Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME, Feb. 20, 2013 (exposing the high and indecipherable prices
of medical care and the reasons why).
See e.g., G. Michael Allan et al., Physician Awareness of Drug Cost: A Systemic Review, 4 PLOS
MED. 1486, 1486 (2007) (reviewing studies showing doctors’ ignorance of prescription
drug prices).
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decisions. Although ratings systems have attempted to judge high and low
hospital performance, they are underdeveloped and inconclusive, and studies
show that the four existing national rating systems have produced inconsistent
assessments.272 Even if consumers had good data on both price and quality and
wanted to use it, they would be faced with impossibly complex decisions about
cost/quality tradeoffs and might lack the proficiency to navigate this complexity.
CDHC advocates argue consumers can overcome such shortcomings
because they successfully navigate markets for other complex goods. Yet, the
complexity of health care has proven greater than choosing between a Mac and
PC. More importantly, it is becoming evident that patients do not view their
medical care as just another consumer good, and resist invitation to price
compare. They will follow a doctor’s specific advice, even if the doctor
recommends, knowingly or not, avoidably higher-priced options.
Some scholars herald international examples as consumerism success
stories, such as Switzerland, Singapore, Germany, and even China. Even though
these countries have systems that build in some degree of choice of services or
health plan, none relies on consumerism to save money; rather, they (and other
peer nations) all use supply-side incentives and regulatory price controls or
rationing to get results.273 What choice-based features in these systems do is to
allow people to opt for higher level service or amenities, such as a private room,
for the most past. The theory that consumer choice will drive better health
care quality and prices is becoming increasingly hard to defend, as CDHC is
tested in practice.

272. J. Matthew Austin et al., National Hospital Ratings Systems Share Few Common Scores and
May Generate Confusion Instead of Clarity, 34 HEALTH AFF. 423 (2015).
273. In the Swiss system, for example, the government mandates benefits, sets national fees
schedules for physicians and maximum pricing for hospitals and pharmaceuticals, and
approves community-rated premiums. Nikola Biller-Andorno & Thomas Zeltner,
Individual Responsibility and Community Solidarity—The Swiss Health Care System, 373
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2193, 2195 (2015). In Singapore, government control of prices and
rationing of health services, not the presence of medical savings accounts, drive cost control
efforts. Michael D. Barr, Medical Savings Accounts in Singapore: A Critical Inquiry, 26 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 709, 716–18 (2001). See also Winnie C. Yip & William C. Hsaio,
Medical Savings Accounts: Lessons From China, 16 HEALTH AFF. 244, 250 (1997) (describing
that neither China nor Singapore are demand-side success stories and that the Singaporean
system, which is often cited by CDHC advocates as an example of success, led to redundant
proliferation of technology and overprescribing); Olga Khazan, What American Healthcare
Can Learn From Germany, ATLANTIC (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/
archive/2014/04/what-american-healthcare-can-learn-from-germany/360133
[https://perma.cc/PDW7-JPG7] (describing the uniform fee schedule and other German
cost-cutting regulatory measures).
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More Technocratic Tinkering to Improve CDHC’s

Like in insurance plan choice, rather than see these deep failures as a sign
that consumers may not be the right agents to drive down prices or root out lowvalue services, these shortcomings have impelled attempts to design more
nuanced systems to nudge consumers toward better decisions. Scholars propose
rebates and incentives to steer choices by making low-value goods relatively more
expensive.274 The classic model in this mold is value-based insurance design (VBID), proposed by A. Mark Fendrick and Michael Chernew and others, which
proposes charging a patient higher copayments for lower-value therapies and less
for therapies that are more likely to be effective.275 Unlike later iterations,
Fendrick and Chernew wisely suggest not paying for wasteful care at all, which
would reduce or eliminate zero-value care without consumerism. A related idea
is reference pricing, usually applied to pharmaceuticals, where insurance covers
the price for a low-cost benchmark drug, and if the patient chooses another
higher-priced drug that is deemed a close substitute, she must pay the
difference.276 These efforts show some, albeit limited, success in carefully
designed pilots and populations.277
Other proposals, like Korobkin’s discussed above, also attempt to vary
coverage by value to shape how people use care.278 People precommit to plans
that cover only higher value care, and have to pay out of pocket altogether for
uncovered services, creating a blunt and strong deterrent against using such
services and, as a side effect, a maze of coverage and decisions for consumers
to navigate.
Another similar proposal uses cash payments in a complex system to
discourage people from lower-value care.279 Christopher Robertson proposes
that when a doctor recommends expensive treatments that are arguably not cost
effective, the insurer could offer the choice between a portion of the cost of the
274. This idea began with value-based insurance design (VBID) research by A. Mark Fendrick,
Michael Chernew, and others and was initially called benefit-based copay. Michael E.
Chernew et al., Value-Based Insurance Design, 26 HEALTH AFF. w195 (2007),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.26.2.w195 [https://perma.cc/KPF4LYVH]. Iterations on the idea by legal scholars include Korobkin, supra note 12; Christopher
Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to Put Skin Back in the Health Care Game, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 921 (2013).
275. Chernew et al., supra note 274.
276. See Panos Kanavos & Uwe Reinhardt, Reference Pricing for Drugs: Is It Compatible With U.S.
Health Care?, 22 HEALTH AFF. 16 (2003) (describing international models of reference pricing
and early results).
277. See Frankford & Rosenbaum, supra note 266.
278. See Korobkin, supra note 12.
279. Robertson, supra note 274.
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treatment in cash or the full treatment in kind. He gives the example of a drug
that costs $70,000, where the insurer will either provide the drug or pay the
patient $10,000 in cash.280
He sells this approach as the “painless” way to have skin in the game. It
seems potentially quite painful, however, especially for lower-income people.
The proposal enhances incentives to forgo care, but much more strongly for poor
people, who are more sensitive to the potential for a cash payoff. Such choices are
morally problematic are unproductive in the long run. A policy that suggests
people have a “choice” to use care or get cash reduces social obligations to ensure
care for one another, while prompting poor people disproportionately to tradeoff
among what they may perceive as basic needs.
More importantly, this proposal only adds complexity to decisions that
people already struggle to make. Imagine that a patient is deciding between an
expensive drug with a low probability of saving her life, versus paying the rent, or
helping her child afford higher education. Dangling the potential for this
treatment that her doctor has recommended or offered and that she will struggle
to evaluate independently, and then making her choose between it and
desperately needed cash is far from painless.
These proposals all offer clever, technocratic solutions that reinforce
scaffolding around market based CDHC approaches. Yet, to the extent certain
drugs or treatment have no value or are “not worth their cost,”281 the goal should
be for insurers simply not to pay for them and for doctors not to prescribe them.
Scholars and policymakers should redouble efforts on resisting FDA approval for
such drugs,282 rather than contorting the shape of insurance policies in hopes
that patients will refuse them, to preserve some imagined and unattractive
version of choice.
Nudge solutions result in an unsatisfactory middle ground. The stronger
the push, the less the approach honors individual decisionmaking. Choice and
autonomy become illusory. The weaker the incentive, the less an individual will
decide based on it, as the evidence above shows. When it comes to health
insurance or health care decisions, the level of default needed to prompt
successful consumerism may be a determinative default, not a suggestive nudge
like framing effects.283

280. Id. at 945.
281. Id. at 927.
282. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Barak D. Richman, A Preferable Path for Thwarting Pharmaceutical
Product Hopping, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 22, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/
10.1377/hblog20180522.408497/full [https://perma.cc/L876-3MY8].
283. See Johnson et al., supra note 18.
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Finally, to the extent higher cost-sharing plus informed nudges did prompt
better consumerism, system effects would be marginal. A relatively small
number of very sick people are responsible for the majority of health care
spending annually,284 and most high spenders are not using discretionary services
(or those that a consumer would perceive as discretionary). One study estimates
that, at most, only 7 percent of consumer out-of-pocket spending is on
“shoppable” services, defined as scheduled in advance and with a choice of
providers and price data.285 Conversely, many clearly discretionary services,
including elective procedures such as cosmetic surgery, laser eye surgery, or
bariatric surgery, are generally not covered by insurance.286 So even if these skinin-the-game policies incentivized consumers to decline low-value, discretionary
spending or to shop for lower-priced services, the potential dollars saved would
be small in comparison to the investment needed to get these policies to work.
An extreme response to the failures described is that the incentives are not
blunt enough and the right answer is to maximize one’s skin in the game to drive
down prices to what people are willing to pay.287 A no-insurance approach would
undoubtedly have a downward effect on overall spending, but that would be the
only good result. The early twentieth century taught that medical markets
without insurance produce unsatisfying results.288 People failed to get critical
care.289 Others faced insolvency due to medical spending.290 And eventually, this
cash pay system receded and insurance grew up because medical professionals
who had a hard time getting bills paid had to select patients they believed
could pay the bills.291 It is no surprise that no developed country takes a noinsurance approach.
The body of evidence discussed above undermines the very foundation of
CDHC and skin-in-the-game thinking. People with financial incentives and
good data do not reduce low-value care or make decisions based on price
284. STEVEN B. COHEN, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, THE CONCENTRATION OF
HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES AND RELATED EXPENSES FOR COSTLY MEDICAL CONDITIONS, 2012
1 (2014) (reporting that the top 5 percent of the population accounted for 50 percent of total
health care spending).
285. Amanda Frost et al., Health Care Consumerism: Can the Tail Wag the Dog?, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160302.053566/full
[https://perma.cc/3VZM-YBPC]. An estimated 40 percent of total health care expenditures
are on shoppable services. Id.
286. See DIANA FARRELL ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., ACCOUNTING FOR THE COST OF US
HEALTH CARE: A NEW LOOK AT WHY AMERICANS SPEND MORE 28 (2008).
287. SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13.
288. See JOST, supra note 3, at 43–46.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 46.
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comparisons. It seems the best possible result of these policies is a reduction in
use of care overall—good and bad—which will be harmful in at least some cases.
What these policies have accomplished is to shift responsibility for paying
for health care from insurance pools and employers to individuals. This may be
the result that CDHC advocates ultimately and honestly seek—less on-budget
health care spending, rather than a genuine rationalization of medical care use or
prices. But it is fallacious to claim that such a result improves welfare by enabling
people to better use their resources to get what they want.
3.

The Bureaucracy and Costs of Consumer-Driven Health Care

As with managed competition, the efforts to limit moral hazard through
market-based policy have produced tremendous regulatory and intellectual
scaffolding. This infrastructure has high direct and opportunity costs, which are
hard to justify in light of the ethical concerns with and technical failings of such
policies in practice.
The CDHC bureaucracy is perhaps best illustrated by the proliferation of
transparency laws and private investment into transparency tools that support
this particular market-based bureaucracy. Transparency might have benefits if
the mere public sharing of data shames providers to lower prices, but the
evidence above suggests that policies that aim to increase transparency to support
consumer decisionmaking will offer little benefit.
Transparency has generated business for private companies like Castlight or
Truven Health Analytics, who build cost-estimator and other tools that major
health plans are now offering. Venture capital firms, according to one source,
“have poured money into healthcare transparency tool companies,” including
$184 million into Castlight before its 2014 initial public offering, $86.3 million
into a provider-search website competitor, Vitals, $26.5 million for MDsave,
which lists prices for competitors, and $45 million for Amino, part of a “new
wave of transparency companies with its consumer-friendly interface and realtime data.”292
Proposals—academic and legislative—to increase price transparency have
become nothing short of a health policy obsession.293 Half of the states have
292. Maria Castellucci & Shelby Livingston, Achieving Transparency in Healthcare, MODERN
HEALTHCARE,
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/reports/achieving-transparency-inhealthcare/#! [https://perma.cc/3MPT-A95R].
293. See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY IN HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES (Holly
Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2019); David Cutler & Leemore Dafny, Designing Transparency
Systems for Medical Care Prices, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 894 (2011) (challenging total
transparency but offering more nuanced versions); Morgan A. Muir et al., Clarifying Costs:

1986

66 UCLA L. R EV. 1926 (2019)

passed laws to make prices more transparent to consumers.294 Many states are
working to create, either through regulation or through voluntary efforts,
databases that aggregate commercial claims data in part to publish price
comparisons for consumers.295 Organizations encourage proliferation of these
laws by rating each state based on them, scoring the scope of information, type of
information, and quality of website for consumers.296
The federal government has also joined in. As CMS Administrator, Seema
Verma, touted in a press release on the various transparency rules the current
Administration has issued: “You Have the Right to Know the Price.”297 To help
vindicate this right, CMS finalized a 2019 rule requiring that all hospitals publish
a list of their standard charges online in a machine-readable format.298 CMS also
requested input on what it would take for hospitals to better inform patients of
out-of-pocket obligations, including those for out-of-network physicians
working at an in-network hospital, resulting in high surprise bills.299 CMS
required drug manufactures to include list prices in television ads and launched
new dashboards for Medicare and Medicaid drug spending—presumably to
shame the companies, as much as to inform consumers.300 And CMS is releasing

294.
295.

296.

297.
298.

299.
300.

Can Increased Price Transparency Reduce Healthcare Spending?, 4 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV.
319 (2013) (explaining price transparency and examining existing initiatives and their
shortcomings); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Care Price Transparency and Economic Theory, 312
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1642 (2014) (arguing for greater price transparency based on the Whaley
study, supra note 266).
DENISE LOVE ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, ALL-PAYER CLAIMS DATABASES: STATE
INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE TRANSPARENCY (2010) (describing the use of state allpayer claims databases to improve price transparency).
Id. at 3. These states must navigate carefully, after Vermont’s law requiring all employers and
insurers to disclose claims and utilization data was found preempted by the federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136
S. Ct. 936 (2016).
See, e.g., FRANÇOIS DE BRANTES & SUZANNE DELBANCO, REPORT CARD ON STATE PRICE
TRANSPARENCY
LAWS—JULY
2016
(2016),
https://dev-catalyst-for-paymentreform.pantheonsite.io/wp-content/uploads/woocommerce_uploads/2017/04/2016-ReportCard-on-State-Price-Transparency-Laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TME-Q36U] (reporting on
the states’ relative development of transparency rules on a “report card” suggesting that more
development is beneficial).
Seema Verma, You Have the Right to Know the Price, CMS.GOV (Nov. 17, 2018),
https://www.cms.gov/blog/you-have-right-know-price [https://perma.cc/Z4P6-T54G].
Medicare Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 41,144, at 41,686 (August 17, 2018) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pts. 412, 413, 424, and 495), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/
2018/08/17/2018-16766/medicare-program-hospital-inpatient-prospective-paymentsystems-for-acute-care-hospitals-and-the [https://perma.cc/3ZX8-TMAT].
Jeff Byers & David Lim, CMS Pushes Hospitals to Post Prices Online, HEALTHCARE DIVE (Apr.
25, 2018), https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/cms-IPPS-2019-proposed-rule/522089
[https://perma.cc/C56W-WXRR].
Verma, supra note 297.
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a web-based Medicare price lookup to compare prices and copayments for
procedures that are offered in both hospital and outpatient settings.301
This regulatory fixation imagines that if prices were transparent and
comprehensible, it would pave the way for better consumerism, despite the rich
body of evidence to the contrary, discussed above. CMS’s intended regulated
disclosure of surprise bills from out-of-network anesthesiologists or radiologists
is especially ironic because most patients have little or no ability to navigate
around these bills, and there is little evidence that disclosure alone will shame
these out-of-network providers into lower prices.
The governmental infrastructure in support of CDHC takes other forms as
well, including consumer protection regulations and constant revision of tax
laws. Before the passage of the ACA, states had enacted consumer protection
laws to limit the amount of financial exposure that people, especially those in
vulnerable populations, could have to health care spending.302 The rise of high
deductible plans and HSAs demanded that states reconsider these laws.303 Many
states, for example, prohibited cost-sharing for certain services or populations,
such as for home health visits or for victims of violent crimes.304 Yet, because
health plans had to be considered “high deductible” (defined in 2019 as having
deductibles of $1350 per individual and $2700 per family) to be eligible to be
paired with HSAs under federal law, states revisited and often repealed these
protections.305 In addition, states had to decide whether to reconcile state tax law
exemption of HSAs with the federal exemption. In 2005–2006, fifteen states
amended their laws to enable favorable treatment for HSAs under state tax law.306
In total—from 2004 to early 2011—states passed over eighty laws to
accommodate and promote HSAs,307 losing tax revenue in the process.
Federal law regarding HSAs and high deductible plans is also in constant
flux. The ACA mandated coverage for preventative health care without
copayments, even in high deductible plans.308 It also reduced the breadth of

Id.
JOST, supra note 3, at 160–65.
Id.
Id.
Id.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATES LEGISLATORS, HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND THE
STATES (2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/hsas-health-savings-accounts.aspx
[https://perma.cc/A44Y-42WK].
307. Id. at tbls.1, 1A, 2 & 3 (summarizing HSA bills signed into law from 2004 through
March 2011).
308. ACA § 1001 (2010), amending Public Health Service Act § 2713 (exempting routine
examination and well-childcare, immunizations, tobacco cessation programs, and certain
preventive health screenings from cost-sharing, so that they are paid fully by insurance plans).
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
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services that could be funded from HSAs, eliminating, for example, the use of
HSA funds on over-the-counter drugs.309 This type of regulatory tinkering
requires a constant revisiting of how much skin in the game is appropriate
and for what services, with much greater precision than consumers could
possibly understand.
Even before actively encouraged to do so in early 2018 by the Trump
Administration,310 state Medicaid programs experimented with policy designs
that incorporated cost-sharing, despite the unambiguous evidence that even
small amounts of cost-sharing can cause poor health outcomes in low-income
populations.311 These demonstration experiments consume regulatory resources
and deflect attention away from testing other ways to achieve more efficient
Medicaid spending without risking negative health outcomes.312 To try to create
some boundary for experimentation with such strategies in Medicaid, DHHS
developed detailed federal rules outlining how much cost-sharing is allowable
and in what forms. These rules are rehashed and rewritten by each
administration, playing in the weeds of health policy.313
More detrimentally, building this kind of regulatory scaffolding around
CDHC perpetuates the idea that we should turn to individuals to solve what are
complex and systemic problems, like high prices and low-value care. CDHC
feeds a culture of individual responsibility.314 It also perpetuates a false idea that
consumer overconsumption of health care drives high health care spending in
the United States, even though research regularly affirms that price and mix of
services, not quantity, make the United States an outlier.315 Americans rely more
on specialists and high-end technology that do not necessarily improve
outcomes.316 This American story of overuse will not be solved by the blunt
instruments of deductibles, copayments, or transparency laws, especially if the

309. See id. § 9003.
310. Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare &
Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Dirs. (SMD: 18–002, Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5JR7-R2LK].
311. Newhouse et al., supra note 232, at 208–11.
312. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 222, at 1.
313. Id.
314. Allison K. Hoffman, The Unhealthy Return to Individual Responsibility in Health Policy, REG.
REV. (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/01/16/hoffman-unhealthy-returnindividual-responsibility-health-policy [https://perma.cc/3N5L-H8FU].
315. Gerald F. Anderson et al., It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So Different from
Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89 (2003); FARRELL ET AL., supra note 286; Gerald F.
Anderson et al., It’s Still the Prices, Stupid: Why the US Spends So Much on Health Care, and a
Tribute to Uwe Reinhardt, 38 HEALTH AFF. 87 (2019).
316. FARRELL ET AL., supra note 286, at 16, 25, 48–49.
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providers who guide patient decisionmaking recommend such care. Consumers
lack the power, knowledge, and will to rewrite this story.
C.

Health Care Marketplace Competition and Antitrust Law

The two above Subparts focus on how economic theory influenced the rise
of policies that rely on individual-level consumerism. This Subpart examines
antitrust law, focusing on merger analysis, which is one step removed from
consumer decisionmaking. Nevertheless, what is interesting is that modern
antitrust analysis is still deeply reliant on assumptions of effective consumerism.
This Subpart offers a brief sketch of how reflexive and pervasive reference to
consumer preferences pervades health law, even when less explicit.
What antitrust law shares with the two ideas above is the desire to use
market dynamics to produce higher-value health care. As one set of experts
wrote, “[e]nsuring that markets function efficiently is central to an effective
health system that provides high quality, accessible, and affordable care.”317 Also
like the above ideas, antitrust regulation and enforcement has fallen short in
practice, despite tremendous efforts spent on scrutinizing and refining it.
Ironically, in light of the failings of regulated market dynamics to contain prices,
some experts now suggest consumerist techniques to disrupt the current,
consolidated state of the market and, in theory, reinvigorate competition.
Looking at antitrust law is important both as a discreet example of a
struggling market-based regulatory approach, and because the application of
antitrust law to health care has lubricated the accelerated roll out of market-based
policies, like managed competition and CDHC, by offering principled
boundaries for government intervention and regulation. Instead of arguing for
total deregulation, proponents of market-based solutions make the more
moderate case that if the government enforces antitrust law well, competitive
markets can create efficient results and, in turn, government regulation of prices
or production will be unnecessary.318 As antitrust expert Tim Greaney described:
“Properly applied, antitrust law should promote decentralized decision-making

317. MARTIN GAYNOR ET AL., MAKING HEALTH CARE MARKETS WORK: COMPETITION POLICY FOR
HEALTH CARE 2 (2017), https://healthpolicy.usc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/
01/04.2017_Making20healthcare20markets20work-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SQH-3JDU].
318. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health
Care, 89 OR. L. REV. 847, 871 (2011) (arguing for the benefits of greater antitrust enforcement
with respect to ACOs); Clark C. Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the
Market for Health Services, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 716, 777–84 (1970) (arguing for
increased reliance on antitrust law and federal preemption of state regulation of health
maintenance organizations).
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by market participants while encouraging efficient combinations that serve
consumer welfare.”319 In other words, markets can find sweet spots in pricing
and production in a way that government regulators cannot. These promises
turn attention to antitrust regulation so that the market can produce
better quality and lower cost care without having to rely on direct
substantive regulation.
Finally, proponents argue that even if antitrust law produces imperfect
results, it is better than direct regulation of market participants or prices, which
would risk harm to innovation.320 These claims are a stretch. Even though there
has been important health care innovation in the United States, it is not clear that
it was the result of, or maximized by, market-based regulation. Further, evidence
shows that, in recent years, so-called health care innovation is largely on the flat of
the curve, doing more work to drive up prices than to improve health.321
This Part describes, first, very briefly antitrust theory with respect to health
care mergers, second, how this theory falls short, and third, the costs of this
approach, in terms of market bureaucracy and, more importantly, forgone
opportunities to deal with the high prices in U.S. health care. Finally, it considers
how experts respond to these problems, including, for some, by proposing an
ironic return to consumerism.
1.

The Theory of Antitrust Law and Competitive Markets

The U.S. Department of Justice’s website states that the goal of antitrust law
is to promote competition to protect the people from harms that could result
from an anticompetitive environment.322 Since the Progressive Era, antitrust law
has shifted its analytical center from trust busting and preventing concentrations

319. Thomas L. Greaney, Competition Policy and Organizational Fragmentation in Health Care,
71 U. PITT. L. REV. 217, 225 (2009).
320. Havighurst, supra note 318, at 743.
321. See, e.g., Vinay Prasad et al., Precision Oncology: Origins, Optimism, and Potential, 17 LANCET
ONCOLOGY e84 (2016) (noting high prices of proton beam accelerators and scarcity of
evidence regarding their superiority to other therapies); Skinner et al., supra note 6 at 44–45
(questioning innovation in cardiac research); Ian F. Tannock & John A. Hickman, Limits to
Personalized Cancer Medicine, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1289 (2016) (questioning whether
spending on precision medicine will justify outcomes). For critiques that focus on
suggestions for driving higher-value health care, by focusing spending and innovation in
more cost-effective directions, see STEVEN GARBER ET AL, REDIRECTING INNOVATION IN U.S.
HEALTH CARE: OPTIONS TO DECREASE SPENDING AND INCREASE VALUE (2014); NICHOLAS
BAGLEY ET AL., HAMILTON PROJECT, CORRECTING SIGNALS FOR INNOVATION IN HEALTH CARE 5
(2015).
322. Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/mission [https://perma.cc/7P39MX6V] (last visited Oct. 2, 2017).
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of private power to consumer welfare.323 As the DOJ website promises:
“Competition in a free market benefits American consumers through lower
prices, better quality and greater choice.”324 This shift has brought with it an
analytical lens focused on the end consumer.
Antitrust law became relevant in health care starting only in the mid-1970s.
Before then, the health care marketplace was largely sheltered from antitrust
liability by the “learned profession exemption,” which placed professionals
outside the scope of normal commerce.325 The basic idea was that since doctors,
and other professionals, acted to serve patients, they should be exempt from
antitrust scrutiny, which could have the adverse effect of introducing
considerations of profitmaking into their consciousness.326
In the mid-1970s, as medicine looked and acted more and more like a
business, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the learned profession exemption,327
and, in parallel, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice
(DOJ) bolstered their health care antitrust enforcement programs and efforts.328
Under modern law, the FTC and DOJ may review329 and block a transaction
when the “effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
to tend to create a monopoly.”330 Legal inquiry weighs harm to consumers
against potential benefits of a merger to competition, and usually focuses on
price effects.
Especially as regulatory attempts to stem growing health care costs failed or
were rejected, such as health planning in the 1970s and managed care in the
1980s, attention turned to fostering competition in the industry to use the market
to mediate price inflation and value. In recent years, the potential
anticompetitive effect of health care mergers has gained particular attention once

323. RAHMAN, supra note 12, at 72, 81.
324. See supra note 322.
325. See Joseph P. Bauer, Professional Activities and the Antitrust Laws, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
570, 571–72 (1975). Other rationales were that professional activity was local (not interstate
commerce) and that physicians were already supervised and regulated by state laws. Id.
at 571.
326. Id. at 572, 587.
327. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787–88 (1975). Goldfarb included a placeholder in
footnote 17 that suggested the exception might not be totally extinguished. Id. at 788 n.17. In
a second case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that local hospital activity affects interstate
commerce sufficient for it to exercise subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
328. 1975 F.T.C. Ann. Rep. at 3–4.
329. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2016).
330. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2016).
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again.331 Regulators scrutinize mergers to try to preserve a competitive market to
keep prices in check and quality high, but, in practice, efforts fall short of this
ideal.
2.

Shortcomings of Antitrust Theory as Applied
to Health Care Mergers

a.

Conceptual Problems

Conceptually, the unusual structure of health care purchasing through
insurance complicates health care antitrust analysis from the start. Even defining
the consumer is challenging. Insurers or employers usually act as an
intermediary between the patient and health care providers (doctors, hospitals,
and other suppliers), by designing plans and networks and negotiating for prices
for services.332
Antitrust analysis sometimes considers an employer or an insurer as a proxy
for the hypothetical end consumer, which is problematic.333 The analysis
assumes these intermediary buyers will negotiate on this end consumer’s behalf
for the best plans, networks, and prices possible.334 Yet, neither employer nor
insurer interests are necessarily aligned with the end users.335 Insurers, for
example, can and do pass higher prices off to employers. Employers who face
higher health care spending, in turn, pass costs off to their employees in the form
of stagnant wages.336 These dynamics reduce the motivation for insurers to find

331. Edith Ramirez, Antitrust Enforcement in Health Care–Controlling Costs, Improving Quality,
371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2245, 2245 (2014).
332. Most people have insurance through employers, and most of those plans are “self-funded,”
which means the employers have nearly total control over defining health plan options for
employees, including what services are covered and what providers are included. See KAISER
FAM. FOUND., supra note 224.
333. See William M. Sage & Peter J. Hammer, A Copernican View of Health Care Antitrust, 65
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 255 (2002).
334. See Sage & Hammer, supra note 333, at 270; FTC. v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d
327, 342 (3d Cir. 2016) (looking to how insurers would respond to a SSNIP when considering
result of a merger); FTC. v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 475 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“But as we have explained, insurers are the most relevant buyers. Insurers must consider
both whether employers would offer their plans and whether employees would sign up for
them.”); Kartell v. Blue Shield, 749 F.2d 922, 925–26 (1st Cir. 1984).
335. See DAVID M. FRANKFORD & SARA ROSENBAUM, RUTGERS L. SCH. & GEO. WASH. U., TAMING
HEALTHCARE SPENDING: COULD STATE RATE SETTING WORK? 1, 8 (2017),
http://www.cshp.rutgers.edu/Downloads/11170.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2UG-8LB5].
336. See FTC. v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1299 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, No.
96–2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *1 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997); David I. Auerbach & Arthur L.
Kellermann, A Decade of Health Care Cost Growth Has Wiped Out Real Income Gains for an
Average US Family, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1630, 1631 (2011).
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the hard edge of negotiation. When they do, they often retain excess profits for
themselves, rather than passing them down the chain.
Likewise, employer and employee interests might diverge in broad ways
when employers design health plans. Because of the transient nature of
employment, employers may underinvest in types of care that produce long-term
benefits. Employees might care most about the flexibility to go to a doctor they
know and trust, but employers increasingly choose narrow network options as
the mechanism to keep plan costs down. So, conceptually, even in the best-case
scenario, competition may not prioritize the things end consumers most value.
Although the end consumer is often obscured by health care antitrust
analysis, the value of a competitive marketplace for health care services can often
only be fully realized if patient consumers can navigate options well, or if proxies
do so on their behalf. Merger law, for example, often scrutinizes interactions
between providers (hospitals, doctors, medical device or pharmaceutical
companies), on the one hand, and the aggregators (usually insurers and
employers), on the others. Yet, an imaginary patient consumer is ever present.
Courts factor in idealized models of how patients navigate health plan options or
medical care options within a health plan, or how they might do so in a changed
landscape, which is problematic for all of the reasons discussed above.337 In the
end, the consumer’s imagined behavior—for example, whether she will buy a
health plan that fails to include a particular hospital in network or how far she
might travel for good care or to save money—deeply influences legal analysis.338
Reliance on the idea of how a hypothetical patient will respond to choices and

337. See, e.g., FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1046–55 (8th Cir. 1999)
(considering how people in the Poplar Bluff community do and might navigate provider
options across geography).
338. See, e.g., FTC. v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 343 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Patients, of
course, are relevant. For instance, an antitrust defendant may be able to demonstrate that
enough patients would buy a health plan marketed to them with no in-network hospital in
the proposed geographic market. It would necessarily follow that those patients who
purchased the health plan would have to turn to hospitals outside the relevant market (lest
they pay significant out-of-pocket costs for an out-of-network hospital).”); Saint Alphonsus
Med. Ctr.-Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 778 F.3d. 775, 784–85 (9th Cir. 2015)
(recognizing that insurers are considered the “consumer” for market analysis, but then
asserting that because residents in Nampa would resist going outside the local areas for
primary care, the insurers would include local primary care services in the plan even in light
of a price increase); Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp at 1291 (“[T]he FTC must present
evidence of practical alternative sources to which consumers of general acute care and
primary care inpatient hospital services would turn if the merger were consummated and the
merged entity raised prices beyond competitive levels. Determination of the relevant
geographic market is a pragmatic, highly fact-driven undertaking.”).
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incentives has embedded into antitrust analysis all of the problems discussed
above.
b.

The Strained Application of Antitrust Law to Health Care

Application of the law in an imperfect judicial and regulatory environment
only draws further from the cramped theoretical ideal. After four decades of
antitrust enforcement in the health care industry, the provider market is more
consolidated than ever, sending prices on a steep upward trajectory without
notable increases in quality.339
Scholars have advanced a host of explanations for consolidation, from
regulatory failure to misguided judicial decisions, all of which are likely true to
some degree.340 Some scholars suggest that health care regulations, especially
state regulations, prevent potentially useful cooperation, integration, and entry.341
Another common explanation is that courts and regulators misapplied
antitrust law.342 Tim Greaney describes that with respect to litigation, the
“principal shortcoming was the courts’ tendency to oversimplify antitrust
analysis by adopting simplistic, Chicago-school assumptions about markets
while failing to incorporate the effects of market imperfections in their analyses of
health markets.”343
Courts, like consumers, have found health care products harder to define
than cars or computers, for all of the reasons outlined in Part I. Reasonable
substitutes are often not obvious. For example, any one condition might be

339. See MARTIN GAYNOR & ROBERT TOWN, THE IMPACT OF HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION—UPDATE
2–3 (2012) (reporting that hospital consolidation increased the price of hospital care and
sometimes decreases quality); WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, HOW HAS HOSPITAL
CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE? 1, 6–7 (2006)
(documenting changes in concentration and the upward effect on prices during the 1990s);
Leemore Dafny, Hospital Industry Consolidation—Still More to Come?, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED.
198, 198 (2014) (“[T]he last hospital-merger wave (in the 1990s) led to substantial price
increases with little or no countervailing benefit.”).
340. Coverage of these failures and explanations for them are numerous. See, e.g., Barak D.
Richman, Antitrust and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Return to Basics, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
121, 122–24 (2007) (cataloging reasons like court nullification of regulatory actions,
complexity of analysis, and hostility among courts to competition in health care).
341. See Einer Elhauge, Obamacare and the Theory of the Firm, in THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE
REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 202 (Anup Malani & Michael H. Schill eds., 2015); Greaney
supra note 319, at 225–28;.
342. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Efficiencies in Merger Analysis: Alchemy in the Age of
Empiricism?, in ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMPETITION LAW 191 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2009)
(arguing that regulators and judges should be more realistic about the uncertainty in the
application of the “efficiencies defense”).
343. Greaney, supra note 319, at 227.
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treated in a range of ways, from taking a pill to surgery to waiting and seeing, all
which might be reasonable treatments depending on the age of the patient, health
history, or genetics, among other factors. Furthermore, health care is sold in
disaggregated process parts and inputs (for example, appointment with surgeon,
hospital bed, anesthesia), rather than as “assembled products” (for example, knee
surgery), which makes it more difficult for courts and customers, alike, to
scrutinize the product being sold.344 In response, courts have defined markets
coarsely, in clusters, such as by level of inpatient care (primary, secondary, or
tertiary care), rather than service-by-service (cardiac care vs. orthopedic care),
which can mask anticompetitive effects at the service level.345 Courts also struggle
with how and whether to consider quality in their analysis.346
Others blame a pro-professionals bias that survived the formal rejection of
the learned professions exemption, causing regulators and judges to balk at strict
application of antitrust doctrine to hospitals, especially nonprofit hospitals, and
doctors.347 Regulators devised various exceptions to per se illegality and are more
willing to consider surrounding facts and circumstances when it comes to the
health care industry,348 especially if in the service of protecting hospitals or
doctors from the forces of managed care.349 Judges’ inclination to protect
hospitals threatened by managed care companies sometimes led courts to permit

344. William M. Sage, Assembled Products: The Key to More Effective Competition and Antitrust
Oversight in Health Care, 101 CORNELL L. REV 609, 617–21 (2016).
345. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 318, at 868–69.
346. See Sage & Hammer, supra note 333, at 258 (assuming that competition will drive up quality,
while it also mediates price).
347. See Spencer Weber Waller, How Much of Health Care Antitrust is Really Antitrust?, 48 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 643 (2017).
348. Id. at 657–59. See also, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMMISSION, STATEMENTS OF
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 3–4 (1996) (discussing ways that
“efficiencies,” in the forms of financial and clinical integration will be considered with respect
to physician joint venture arrangements).
349. See Greaney supra note 319, at 228. Courts overrode regulators’ well-justified challenges to
hospital mergers in dozens of decisions in the managed care era, starting in the 1990s, which
led to a period of chilled enforcement, ending only recently. See, e.g., FTC v. Tenet Health
Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1053 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 273 (8th
Cir. 1995); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
amended by 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2001), aff’d, 217 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v.
Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1302–03 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, No. 96–
2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *1 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902
F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot, 107 F.3d 632, 637 (8th Cir. 1997);
Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. 224, 285 (1994). See also Peter J. Hammer & William
M. Sage, Critical Issues in Hospital Antitrust Law, 22 HEALTH AFF. 88, 90 (2003) (describing
the ways in which courts have disfavored health care regulation).
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providers to consolidate to bolster their relative bargaining power.350 This
judicial gerrymandering proved to be playing with fire, as evinced by the current
disproportionate level of market concentration among providers.351
For all of these reasons and more, it is clear that antitrust regulation has
failed to achieve the above-quoted DOJ ideal for consumers and faces a steep
climb to ever do so, even if there is room for improvement. To the contrary, it has
not stopped harmful consolidation among hospitals and providers, and health
care costs continue to grow faster than the rest of the economy.352
Faith that competition will magically generate high-value options for
consumers is getting hard to defend. Policy is necessarily implemented in an
imperfect judicial and regulatory environment, and inconsistent courts and
stifling state regulations predated the take up of antitrust enforcement in health
law in the 1970s. The problem may be as much the results we expect from
regulating competition as the imperfect environment itself.
3.

The Implications: Antitrust’s Market Bureaucracy

It is difficult to know exactly the size of the apparatus created to evaluate and
litigate anticompetitive activity in the health care sector, but it is sizeable.
Between 2009 and 2013, over one-third of all Federal Trade Commission
investigations involved hospitals.353 From 1996 to 2017, the FTC initiated 211
cases or proceedings to enforce health care antitrust matters—ninety-two of
those after 2010.354 Between 1976 and 1996, the FTC and DOJ settled by consent
decree an estimated sixty-five enforcement actions against price fixing.355 The
federal health care division of the FTC alone employs several dozen attorneys. In
2015, the FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez reiterated that health care was a
major area of focus: “the FTC devotes significant resources to preventing mergers
that threaten to raise prices or undermine cost-containment efforts in a variety of
health care markets.”356 And most states have their own regulatory agencies,

350. See Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law in
Health Care, 21 HEALTH AFF. 185 (2002).
351. See supra note 339.
352. Id.
353. Richard B. Benenson & Kerry J. LeMonte, FTC’s Focus on Healthcare Mergers and
Consolidation, 45 COLO. LAW. 15, 15 (2016).
354. Cases Tagged with Healthcare, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/casesproceedings/terms/282 [https://perma.cc/88U2-H7JT].
355. Greaney, supra note 319, at 232.
356. Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law, H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 114th Cong.
(2015) (prepared statement of Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n).
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working in parallel. Calls by experts for better enforcement would require a
doubling down.
Antitrust cases are expensive to investigate and litigate, relying deeply on
the opinions of high-priced experts in economics and law. Leemore Dafny
describes pre-merger analysis:
[E]nforcers must devote substantial time and resources to evaluating
these individual transactions and—if appropriate—to satisfying the
legal standards for challenging them. Economics experts must comb
through reams of claims data, using complex statistical methods to
assess the extent to which the merging hospitals compete and, where
possible, to predict the magnitude of likely price increases. On the
other side of the scale, enforcers must weigh the potential benefits that
would accrue from the merger (and that cannot otherwise be realized),
which may arise from cost reductions, improvements in quality or
access to care, or all of the above.357

These direct costs may be relatively small compared to overall health
spending, but they represent a significant investment for the lukewarm results
they have produced to date.
The larger cost is opportunity costs and distraction from alternatives. As
experts focus on markets to regulate prices, prices have skyrocketed on
everything from medical devices to pharmaceuticals to outpatient care.
Furthermore, as with managed competition and CDHC, experts and the
media pour over health care mergers. Antitrust law and the potential of
competitive markets has captured the attention of academics and the
imagination of news sources. From 2001 to 2015, over 1600 law review articles
included in depth discussion of health care antitrust enforcement.358 In that same
period, the Wall Street Journal published 1500 articles that mention the topic,
with the New York Times and Washington Post contributing over 500 each.359
The New England Journal of Medicine had over fifty articles on the topic.360 This
level of attention to a technocratic endeavor is striking.
4.

Redux: Proposals to Bolster Competition and the Consumerist Turn

In light of the shortcoming of antitrust merger enforcement, experts now
pour energy into legal reforms to spur competition and to disrupt

357.
358.
359.
360.

Dafny, supra note 339, at 198.
Search criteria and results on file with author. Search conducted through December 2016.
Id.
Id.
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consolidation.361 Some advocate for better antitrust enforcement, including
increased oversight and improved legal analysis.362 Such suggestions are often
paired with Medicare payment policies that could support more competition.363
Others propose deregulation or federal preemption or repeal of state laws that
lessen competition.364
Some experts, including Leemore Dafny and Tim Greaney, remain
circumspect about getting the legal analysis right and acknowledge the intensive
investment that would be needed to do so.365 Furthermore, they acknowledge
that even if better enforcement were to reduce future consolidation, it can do little
to address current levels of provider concentration. Thus, increasingly, some
experts are beginning to ask whether price regulation may be the singular
response to current levels of consolidation.366
Yet, finally and ironically, other experts take a strong turn back to
consumerism as the solution to reignite competition. Ideas range from new
361. For a brief summary of many of the leading ideas, see Gaynor et al., supra note 317, and
THOMAS L. GREANEY & BARAK D. RICHMAN, AM. ANTITRUST INST., PROMOTING COMPETITION
IN HEALTHCARE ENFORCEMENT AND POLICY: AN ACTIVE COMPETITION AGENDA (2018),
https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AAI_Healthcare-WP-PartII_6.18.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7TH-98SQ] (summarizing a whole host of the commonlyadvanced incremental solutions, mostly focused on state deregulation).
362. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Regulating for Efficiency in Health Care Through the Antitrust
Laws, 2 UTAH L. REV. 465, 475–82 (1995) (discussing the problems with DOJ and FTC policy
statements and the inconsistent use of efficiency defenses to detrimental effect); Robert F.
Leibenluft, Antitrust and Provider Collaborations: Where We’ve Been and What Should be
Done Now, 40 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 847 (2015); Havighurst & Richman, supra note 318,
at 874–75 (arguing for preapproval of every proposed ACO); Sage & Hammer, supra note
333, at 267–89 (arguing for a “Copernican” view of antitrust, focusing more on social welfare
to gauge efficiency).
363. GAYNOR ET AL., supra note 317, at 10–11 (arguing, for example, to eliminate “facility fees” for
services that can be provided out of hospitals, and simplifying administrative and payment
requirements to encourage small-group physician practices).
364. See id. at 22–27 (summarizing these types of laws and proposed solutions); HAVIGHURST,
supra note 13. For example, some states have “scope of practice” laws that define the bounds
of what each medical professional can do, based on licensure category, which can limit access
to lower-cost providers for services (e.g., nurses for certain primary care they are qualified to
provide instead of doctors). See SCOPE OF PRACTICE POLICY, http://scopeofpracticepolicy.org
[https://perma.cc/8XA2-JTVL] (describing various state laws).
365. See Dafny, supra note 339, at 198; Greaney, supra note 362, at 484–85, 489–97.
366. See, e.g., Erin C. Fuse Brown & Jaime S. King, The Double-Edged Sword of Health Care
Integration: Consolidation and Cost Control, 92 IND. L.J. 55, 78 (2016) (outlining methods that
states can use to regulate prices); Sherry A. Glied & Stuart H. Altman, Beyond Antitrust:
Health Care and Health Insurance Market Trends and the Future of Competition, 36 HEALTH
AFF. 1572, 1576 (2017) (considering two strategies for rate regulation, based on the number of
competitors in an area); Thomas L. Greaney, Coping with Concentration, 36 HEALTH AFF.
1564, 1568–69 (2017) (discussing rate regulation targeting dominant providers). Cf.
Havighurst & Richman, supra note 318, at 883 (conceding that price controls may be needed
to some degree).
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products—medical tourism, mobile health, or telemedicine—to new incentive
structures to attempt to shift the playing field.367
Bill Sage has critiqued, for example, how the product is defined in hospital
merger enforcement.368 He suggests that a major flaw is that we treat health care
products as process steps, rather than as assembled end products like other
consumer goods.369 In other words, when someone goes in for surgery, she gets
one bill from her surgeon, another from her anesthesiologist, and another (or
several) from the hospital. Sage argues that the end good must be something that
a patient values and understands, rather than disaggregated lines on a bill. He
offers examples of an assembled end good including a hip surgery with a
warranty, medical tourism, or end-of-life care370 and outlines the many ways
antitrust law and other regulations would need to change to accommodate such
assembled products.371 Although he does not promote this idea as a consumer
panacea, the implication is that if the regulation were better and the products
were clearer, consumers and their proxies would reject options with high prices
or low quality.372
In a similar consumerist turn, Clark Havighurst and Barak Richman
advocate for requiring hospitals to negotiate prices individually for each service,
rather than in a bundle of all services they offer (a common practice known as
tying).373 Havighurst and Richman imagine that once insurers focus on the price
of an individual service at one hospital versus another, they could institute more
favorable coverage terms, such as lower copayments, to encourage patients to
travel to providers farther from home or in a new facility.374

367. See, e.g., Sage, supra note 344 (seeking to define products in “assembled” way that make sense
to end consumers); Leemore S. Dafny & Thomas H. Lee, Health Care Needs Real
Competition, 94 HARV. BUS. REV. 76, 76, 87 (2016) (“Consumers can energize the marketplace
by creating real consequences for the winners and losers. If patients choose to receive care
from high-value providers, which may mean traveling farther, then providers will focus their
energy on improving care delivery.”); David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals,
Market Share, and Consolidation, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1964, 1969 (2013) (suggesting
higher cost-sharing for health care at a “dominant health system” than at a less expensive
one in the market).
368. Sage, supra note 344.
369. Id.
370. See id. at 634.
371. See id. at 637.
372. See id. at 694–95 (discussing how assembled products would enable people to
comparison shop).
373. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 318, at 876–77.
374. Id. at 877. See also Cutler & Morton, supra note 367, at 1969 (suggesting higher cost-sharing
at higher-priced providers as a solution to problems of consolidation).
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These solutions simply come back to the idea that the right decisionmaking
architecture can solve structural problems—here anticompetitive prices wrought
by provider consolidation.375 But, the reality of how people really make medical
care choices and how they fail to respond to insurance policy incentives strongly
suggests otherwise.376 Even if process steps were assembled into end products,
legal barriers were lifted to allow new entrants, and consumers could save money
under the terms of their insurance policies by traveling farther for care, this
reshaped market would still face an imperfect consumer who has shown an
inability and unwillingness to navigate such options.
Imagine that a patient—or her purchasing proxy—has a choice between
two assembled products. The first is hip replacement surgery with Dr. A at a
large, well-known academic medical center. Dr. A has a 90 percent success rate,
offers a thirty-year warranty, and charges $30,000. The second is the same hip
replacement surgery with Dr. B at a small local hospital. Dr. B has an 80 percent
success rate and offers a fifteen-year warranty, but charges only $20,000. Patients
would struggle to determine whether the slightly higher rate of success and
additional fifteen years on the warranty are worth $10,000 more. And proxies
like insurers or employers who aggregate such services into plans and networks
may do no better. There may be some easy choices. Some people will not be able
to afford the more expensive surgery, and will go with Dr. B. If the surgeries were
the same price, it might be easier to choose the one with a higher success rate but,
even in that case, the patient would have to understand this data and, if she did,
still might wonder if some aspect of quality were not captured in the numbers.
Maybe one doctor’s success rate is lower because he is especially skilled and is
referred the most challenging cases. Such choices are considerably more
complicated than the simple price comparisons that patients in the studies above
did not embrace and would likely boggle most purchasers, even more
sophisticated ones.
***
The above discussion in Part II has illustrated how in the past several
decades scholars and policymakers have embraced economic theory and marketbased solutions to attempt to solve some of health care’s most intractable and
structural challenges by looking to forces of market competition and to
consumers. Yet, this embrace has been too full. Market-based policies have not
resulted in a utopia where smart consumers approach a plethora of options, reject
375. See Sage, supra note 344, at 694 (“As in other commercial sectors, however,
consumers become motivated when they understand what they are buying and can
compare their options.”).
376. See supra Part II.B.
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wasteful care, and send signals so that competition among industry players drives
down prices. Even more, attempts to create some semblance of this ideal by
chipping away at market failures and boundedly-rational consumers have
required intense regulatory scaffolding and constant refinement to little avail.
The job of health law has become to bolster markets. As illustrated above, this
market bureaucracy comes with high costs, direct and indirect, and is not making
people better off. Quite the opposite.
Some object by saying that the problem is not the markets, themselves, but
the overregulation of markets that has caused the problem by impeding health
competition.377 In fact, legal scholars, such as Charlie Silver and David Hyman,
argue for a doubling down on market-based approaches that would displace
regulation.378 These market loyalists argue that the problem is that we have not
let markets operate freely enough or demanded enough of health care consumers.
Hyman shared this view in testimony before the Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pension on reducing health care costs in June 2018,379
suggesting it still holds purchase in policymaking.
There are several problems with this reasoning. First is that we have already
seen the effects of unregulated markets. They serve the wealthy and healthy and
leave the rest uninsured. In turn, providers have to scramble for payment and
cherry pick patients. Second, the evidence cited above makes clear that health
care consumerism fundamentally does not work and, thus, demanding more of it
makes little sense.
Even more, a world of increasing choices is actively making people worse
off.380 Although there are exceptions to the rule (likely disproportionately among
academic readers of this Article), most people do not prefer to make decisions
about their own health insurance or, in many cases, their medical care.381 People
dread shopping for health insurance; 30 percent of respondents to one survey
report they would rather prepare their taxes than shop for health insurance.382 In
a book on choice by one legal expert, the very example he uses to illustrate people
not wanting to have to make choices is when a doctor asked him if he wanted to

377. See, e.g., SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13; HAVIGHURST, supra note 13.
378. SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13.
379. How to Reduce Health Care Costs: Understanding the Cost of Health Care in America: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 115th Cong. (2018) (testimony of
David A. Hyman, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center). Thank you to Matt
Lawrence showing me this testimony.
380. SCHWARTZ, supra note 137.
381. See sources and text accompanying supra note 47.
382. eHealthInsurance, supra note 58.
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get an MRI or not.383 He wrote: “Sometime we want to be told what’s best.”384
Health law experts Carl Schneider and Mark Hall quipped: “So, we are
increasingly freed from paternalism, for we have proliferating choices about
proliferating things, but we are increasingly prisoners of the need to learn enough
to handle decisions that we make badly, that we would like to escape, and that
divert us from things we would rather devote ourselves to.”385 The very existence
of a market-based system is contrary to many people’s preferences. Increasing
retail health care or medical tourism will do nothing to address this fact.
In a poignant memoir written as he was dying from lung cancer and
published posthumously, Dr. Paul Kalanithi, a Stanford neurosurgeon, cedes
decisionmaking to his doctor, a peer and colleague, as his body weakens during
the course of cancer treatment.386 He still had the capacity to weigh prognoses
and side effects and costs, but he did not want to do so any longer.387 He wanted a
trusted expert to guide him, once he had made the initial decision to begin
aggressive treatment to slow the advancement of his terminal lung cancer.
We have over relied on policies that look to consumer choices and market
forces to solve system-level failures, especially in light of mounting evidence of
the limitations of these approaches in practice. Many scholars and policymakers
have gone so far in the direction of market-based health policy that they cannot
find the brakes, even when evident that the road is a dead end.
This Part’s comprehensive review of empirical evidence highlighted this fact
to make the following case: If market-based approaches are no more efficient and
are as bureaucratic as any other approach, it is time to end our reflexive reliance
on them. The law has normalized market-based approaches and deflects
attention from alternatives. If instead, we assessed different policy approaches
based on what they produce, rather than on the hope of what they will produce,
the dominance of market-based ideas in health care, and likely in other fields too,
will recede and create space for alternatives. Then, the hard work begins.

III.

COMPARING BUREAUCRACIES AND CONSIDERING CHOICE

This final Part considers why market-based approaches proliferate despite
mounting empirical proof of their failings. It looks first briefly at the deep
problems of politics and political economy, which have been examined in more

383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

KENT GREENFIELD, THE MYTH OF CHOICE 133 (2011).
Id.
Schneider & Hall, supra note 3, at 51.
PAUL KALANITHI, WHEN BREATH BECOMES AIR (2016).
Id. at 190–91.

Health Care’s Market Bureaucracy

2003

detail elsewhere.388 It then turns to a second, under-examined driver, contending
that their durability lies also in the way these approaches have elevated the value
of choice—a particular version of choice defined in individual, microeconomic
terms. Finally, it concludes by suggesting that this sanctification of choice has
gone too far. For health policy and regulation to advance demands seeking a
more capacious understanding of when, and what, expressions of choice are
meaningful and rejecting the privileging of choice when it is not.
A.

Understanding the Loyalty to Faltering Market-Based Policies

1.

Politics and Political Economy

Economists readily admit that health care markets don’t work.
Simultaneously, they—and others to whom that fact might not be so obvious—
continue to pour their efforts into testing and attempting to mend health care
markets, at best making incremental improvements. This Subpart considers
why, looking at both the political economy of these policies and their
rhetorical resonance.
Consider the ACA exchanges as an example. Before they were adopted as
part of the ACA and before resources were devoted to building and bolstering a
new marketplace, there was enough evidence on literacy, numeracy, and earlier
experiments with managed competition to foreshadow that consumerism in a
managed marketplace would fail. If the end goal was simply to get more people
insured, which the exchanges have in fact done adequately well, there were
certainly simpler and less expensive options to do so.
One explanation is that the average policymaker may genuinely have
thought that competition among private plans in a new marketplace would work,
unaware of the empirical evidence otherwise. Others were laser focused on
getting more people insured, and the exchanges may have seemed the only path
forward politically.
Since the 1970s, markets are a language that both Democrats and
Republicans have increasingly become willing to speak.389 Market-based
approaches, the product of a political movement beginning in the Reagan era,
have come to be perceived as more neutral, scientific, or measurable than other
approaches. They focus on metrics. We measure numbers of competing health
plans and insured lives with managed competition. With moral hazard,

388. See supra note 23.
389. Lily Geismer, Democrats and Neoliberalism, VOX (June 11, 2019), https://www.vox.com/
polyarchy/2019/6/11/18660240/democrats-neoliberalism [https://perma.cc/Y3B6-HA48].
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economic experts measure the effects of different levels and types of cost-sharing
on consumption. With antitrust, economic experts scrutinize the market share a
combined entity will have, using complex indices. All this measuring and
managing of numbers casts the project as an objective science.390
Yet, this so-called objective science is far from neutral. It obscures the
morality of an end result defined by aggregation of individual decisions. People
with more purchasing power have more influence and people with more
education, time, and resources navigate the system more successfully. It
surreptitiously lubricates a distribution of care that favors the wealthiest
and educated.
These models also allow policymakers to avoid making unpopular rationing
decisions, while still claiming they have acted to solve spending problems. If
competition and consumerism cuts spending and reduces industry revenue, it
happens a step removed from legislators. If the exchanges had worked as
Enthoven envisioned, providers eventually would have received lower
reimbursements, and reliance on specialists slowly would have decreased. But it
would have been consumers and insurers, not elected officials, to blame.
More likely, these solutions will not reduce spending and will affirmatively
benefit influential constituents.391 The winners from market-based policies are
the health care industries and members who have accreted political power over
past decades and now exert it on the political process through high spending on
lobbying.392 With the ACA exchanges, for example, insurers gain business, and
hospitals and providers gain a larger share of insured patients, some with
relatively well-paying private plans.393 The aggregation of years of reliance on

390. See Frankford, supra note 24 (describing how the field of health services research and
neoclassical health economics look to technocratic solutions and make what are often
political or humanitarian questions seem more positivist); JOST, supra note 3, at 89
(describing the claim that economists see mathematics as conferring special authority,
allowing them to “get away with a good deal of nonsense” (quoting Robert Evans, Toward a
Healthier Economics, in HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND HEALTH ECONOMICS: PERSPECTIVES ON
DISTRIBUTION 492 (M.L. Barer et al. eds., 1998))).
391. See Megan R. Wilson, Lobbying’s Top 50: Who’s Spending Big, THE HILL (Feb. 7, 2017),
http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/318177-lobbyings-top-50whos-spending-big [https://perma.cc/F94L-CZA8] (showing that many of the top spenders
on lobbying are in health care, including Blue Cross Blue Shield in third place, the American
Hospital Association in fourth place, the Pharmaceutical Research & Manufactures of
America in fifth place, and the American Medical Association in sixth place).
392. Id.
393. Anna Wilde Mathews, Health Insurers Set to Expand Offerings Under the ACA, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/health-insurers-set-to-expand-offeringsunder-the-aca-11566468120 [https://perma.cc/8NBS-944L]; Robert Pear, Health Care and
Insurance Industries Mobilize to Kill ‘Medicare for All’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2019),
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market-based approaches to control prices, to no avail, has helped to spur a
massive health care industrial complex with layers of highly-salaried executives
and consistently high profits. Although this investment in health care has yielded
benefits, including significant employment of health care workers, it is difficult to
justify spending that does not result in demonstrable improvement to
Americans’ health.394
These polices, in turn, also have become a way to keep public spending from
growing as health care costs balloon. But they have done so by shifting spending
from the public budget to individual household budgets. As Enthoven initially
envisioned, if competition does not drive down prices and insurance voucher
values grow more slowly than costs, individuals will finance the increasing gap.395
Most versions of policy based on Enthoven’s ideas are in part such a strategy to
control public spending, by covertly moving shortfalls onto individuals,
simultaneously transforming the project of insurance from one of social
solidarity to individual responsibility.396
Likewise, when employers adopt high deductible health plans, they leave the
rationing and bargain hunting to their employees, even if the employees might
not trim or shop wisely, or at all. At the end of the day, the employer can control
health benefit spending, and the employee either reduces medical care or spends
more out of pocket on it.
Enthoven explicitly envisioned that managed competition would
produce—or preserve—a two-tiered system, where wealthier people topped off
their vouchers to buy better plans. Defending this aspect of his proposal,
Enthoven wrote, “I believe it would be foolish to reject it on the grounds that it
does not reach a hypothetical egalitarian ideal that has never been attained in any
society and is surely not supported by the American people today.”397 While he
might be right that many people think egalitarianism is un-American, managed
competition—and other market-based approaches—obfuscates the choice of
values like budgetary frugality over equality.

394.
395.
396.
397.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/23/us/politics/medicare-for-all-lobbyists.html
[https://perma.cc/2CCA-X9KW].
See SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13, at 21–22 (providing an overview of their chapters that
document excessive industry profit and a lack of concomitant health outcomes).
See Enthoven, Second Part, supra note 85, at 716.
See Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS.
L.J. 11, 14 (1999).
Id. The structure of the proposal, however, conceals egalitarian shortcomings of the idea
because everyone gets an equal voucher, adjusted only to account for age.
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The Role of Choice

This story of winners and losers is critical to the perpetuation of ill-fated
market-based solutions. Yet, it is not the whole story. An underexamined, but
perhaps as important, reason for their durability is that these policies align with a
relatively recent American obsession with choice, since at least the 1970s, when a
generation defined itself in protest to the draft and Vietnam War. Early kernels
in health care might be traced to tomes like Our Bodies Ourselves, published first
as a course booklet in 1970 by a group of women called the Boston Women’s
Health Book Collaborative, who were seeking to help women find selfempowerment over their bodies.398 Choice takes legal root in cases like Griswold
v. Connecticut in 1965 and Roe v. Wade in 1973, which recognized control
through language prohibiting government intrusion over individual
reproductive choices.399 Although this choice revolution does not spark from
neoliberalism, it may have helped to fuel it, by centering on a particularized and
individual version of choice.
In health care, the sanctification of choice was an understandable response
to many years when patients’ preferences came second. For most of the twentieth
century, doctors largely controlled medical care decisions.400 After the passage of
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 and the concurrent growth of private insurance,
spending grew, prompting the rise of more central planning and of managed care
in the 1970s and 1980s, and insurers increasingly held the reins to control
patients’ access to doctors and medical care.401 Since then, however, consumer
choice has come to be something of a “sacred value,” or one that “a community
treats as possessing transcendental significance that precludes comparisons,
trade-offs, or indeed any mingling with secular values.”402 Simply put, choice
always wins.
398. See Our Story, OUR BODIES OURSELVES, https://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/our-story
[https://perma.cc/3N49-HFC4]. Thank you to Tom Baker for highlighting this aspect of the
choice movement.
399. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (invalidating a law that prohibited the use
of contraception as an unconstitutional “governmental intrusion”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 170 (1973) (right to abortion is “embraced within the personal liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause”).
400. STARR, supra note 1, at 27 (“Throughout the medical system, the profession was able by
1920—and for the next half century—to establish organizational structures that preserved a
distinct sphere of professional dominance and autonomy.”).
401. Id. at 8 (“More recently, that system has begun to slip from their control, as power has moved
away from the organized profession toward complexes of medical schools and hospitals,
financing and regulatory agencies, health insurance companies, prepaid health plans, and
health care chains, conglomerates, holding companies, and other corporations.”).
402. Tetlock, supra note 14, at 320.
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In this vein, informed consent gained steam, seeking to put medical
decisions back in the hands of patients, for better or for worse. Market-based
policies grew up in parallel, elevating the value of choice and defining choice
narrowly—in microeconomic terms of preferences and purchases. An
individual’s agency came to be measured by her buying power and self-interest.
Even if laudable in concept, however, choice can obfuscate what a polity
genuinely values when defined so narrowly. For example, measuring what
people value by how they act individually in a market can undermine tools that
by their very purpose serve collective goals. Health insurance aims to make
health care spending a collective endeavor, spreading the costs of medical care
among an insured population, regardless of any one person’s individual medical
needs in a particular year.403 Although it might have been otherwise,404 the
downfall of the ACA’s individual mandate that required most Americans to carry
health insurance came in part because it sought to achieve a collective goal
through individual choices and purchases. It prompted Americans to think not
about the goal of guaranteed and universal coverage but instead about their own
bottom line—exactly how much their insurance policy cost and what they got in
return. Choice centered the policy discussion in the wrong ideological place.
The political economy of health care is notoriously sticky, but the obsession
with choice—and, in particular, the narrow market conception of choice—may
be less so. Americans in recent decades may have become enamored of the
idea of choice and critical of big government, but views on such issues can
likely change.
There is evidence that these views are, in fact, not as strong as they are
sometimes made out to be. Studies show many conservative voters disliked
Obamacare and exchanges not because they didn’t want government
involvement in health care but rather because they wanted Medicaid instead of
private insurance.405 The recent surge in popularity of the idea of single payer
systems, even if rooted in an incomplete understanding of what such a policy
would mean, signals an increasing openness to new regulatory approaches that
are less focused on individualism.

403. See Deborah Stone, Health Equity in a Trump Administration, 42 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L.
995, 997 (2017).
404. See Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets,
and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED 7, 31 (2010).
405. See Sarah Kliff, Why Obamacare Enrollees Voted for Trump, VOX (Dec. 13, 2016, 8:10 AM),
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2016/12/13/13848794/kentucky-obamacaretrump [https://perma.cc/7HE2-72CR] (reporting that interviews with Trump supporters,
enrolled through the exchanges, reveal a pattern of frustration that those on Medicaid are
“getting even better, even cheaper benefits”).
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Considering the Meaning of Choice Beyond Markets

If health policy and law are to progress, it is imperative to examine the
proper place of individual choice. In many cases, individual choice is altogether
the wrong organizing principle to animate health regulation. In other cases—
way fewer than imagined—it may be meaningful. And in many cases, even if the
principle of choice is meaningful in concept, looking to individual market activity
to measure what people value is flawed in practice. Dismantling the ineffective
market bureaucracy lies in untangling these spaces.
1.

Questioning the Sanctity of Choice

In many cases, better regulatory responses, including to inefficiencies in the
system, reveal themselves only through pushback on the modern sanctification of
choice.406 When choice is illusory, unnavigable, or makes people miserable, it is
not worth elevating. Sometimes there is only one right option. When one
treatment option is far superior to another, enabling choice between the two is
illogical, and arguably cruel. If a particular treatment does not work, or when it is
very expensive and does little good, having it as an option is a rouse.407
Insurers, with public insurers in the lead, must begin to exclude such
treatments from coverage, even if doing so provokes resistance. Further, the
FDA and other regulatory bodies should take a hard line and reject treatments
and therapies without marginal value.408 Where to draw the line can be difficult,
but even a conservative attempt would be progress. Although this kind of
regulatory hardline will undoubtedly garner backlash from some vocal interest

406. Some scholars wholly reject the idea of choice in favor of justice, such as rejecting
“reproductive choice” for “reproductive justice.” See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, Reproductive
Justice, Not Just Rights, DISSENT (Fall 2015), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/
article/reproductive-justice-not-just-rights [https://perma.cc/8GU9-LSG7].
407. As one example, studies have exposed excessive overuse of Cardiac stents that is expensive
and possibly harmful. See, e.g., Aaron E. Carroll, Health Stents are Useless for Most Stable
Patients. They’re Still Widely Used, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Feb. 12, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/upshot/heart-stents-are-useless-for-most-stablepatients-theyre-still-widely-used.html [https://perma.cc/Y4ER-VKF9]; see also ORG. ECON.
COOPERATION & DEV., TACKLING WASTEFUL SPENDING ON HEALTH (2017), https://read.oecdilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/tackling-wasteful-spending-onhealth_9789264266414-en#page1
[https://perma.cc/7NMP-T6U8#page5]
(describing
practices ranging from overdiagnosis and overtreatment to underuse of generic drugs).
408. See, e.g., SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13, at 120–21 (citing examples of wasteful care that
Medicare reimburses, including colonoscopies for patients over age 75, prostate cancer
screening for men over 75, and procedures for vertebral fractures that were shown to be both
ineffective and risky and cost Medicare about $1 billion annually).
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groups, it is nonetheless the sounder regulatory option in the end.409 It may be
more justifiable in light of the failure of subtler efforts to get people to stop using
such services.
Likewise, if one insurance plan dominates another in all or most cases, it
would be better simply to issue beneficiaries the better plan, rather than to create
a false semblance of choice. At the very least, employers should stop offering
dominated plans or be penalized for doing so. Medicare should work to cull out
dominated Part D and Medicare Advantage plans and regulators should
significantly narrow the proliferation of options in these spaces, which would
make the project of periodically eliminating dominated plans much easier.
Paternalism, even if unpopular, is preferable in these cases to creating
complex regulatory structures that set people up to make poor choices. The
reality is that, in health care, market-based approaches are themselves moving in
a paternalistic direction with the layering of increasingly directive decision aids
and default rules. This idea, coined “libertarian paternalism,” has been sold as a
means to preserve choice.410 Yet, it struggles to maintain its libertarian
dimension in health care, where decisionmaking challenges run deep, and
softer nudges fall short.
Decentering the discussion away from choice prompts consideration of
alternatives that have been pushed aside to avoid political struggles or hard,
normative debates. If consumer choice among health plans will never rationalize
overreliance on highly-paid specialists, then maybe it is time to reckon with this
problem directly. If consumers cannot—or will not—root through options to
choose the cheapest provider and market competition has not checked prices
sufficiently, then it may be time to deal directly with the outsized prices in the U.S.
health care system.

409. Such resistance surfaced in ACA debates when Congress created a new organization called
the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) to consider comparative
effectiveness of different treatments. In response to initial backlash, PCORI’s power was
limited, and Medicare cannot rely on comparative–cost effectiveness assessments for
payment decisions, but it is still collecting potentially valuable data. See ZEKE EMANUEL ET AL.,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RE-EVALUATING THE PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH
INSTITUTE
(2016),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/
25103643/PCORI-brief1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE97-QFJQ]. Some of the backlash arises
from groups who argue that research is not conducted evenhandedly and could
disproportionately harm certain people, but instead of using such input to reject databased policymaking, it should motivate efforts to improve research quality.
410. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 5–6.
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Fortunately, there is a roadmap with a variety of alternatives to address these
kinds of systemic problems.411 Other OECD countries rely on a range of
regulatory mechanisms to control prices and to ration.412 Even if some of these
countries’ approaches work better than others, they all work better than the
ineffective consumerist approaches currently prioritized in the United States.
Most peer nations, for example, have some version of central price setting or
ceiling to keep spending down, even those countries that are often celebrated as
market success stories, such as Singapore, Switzerland, or China.413 These
systems’ designs all include elements of choice, but none of them relies on
consumerism for price control.414 Even some individual states have shown
successful experimentation with price controls in the United States , suggesting
its feasibility within the U.S. health care system.415 Maryland has been centrally
setting payment rates for hospitals for over forty years and updated its
payment structure in 2018, estimating savings of as much as $1 billon over the
next five years.416
Likewise, peer countries offer various more thoughtful ways to conduct
rationing. The British system is perhaps the best known, where the National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) explicitly makes decisions
about what treatment will be reimbursed by the National Health Service based on
cost-effectiveness and other social values, including factors like clinical need and
innovation potential.417 Other countries like France and Germany have a less
formal system, yet have developed centralized processes for identifying and not
paying for unnecessary or low-value services.418

411. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, OECD, PRICE SETTING AND PRICE REGULATION IN HEALTH
CARE
(2019),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/ed3c16ff-en.pdf?expires=1575
553830&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=6A646FC3C924020558D08BB6FFCBD794
[https://perma.cc/CLS6-TYDC]; see also discussion and sources cited supra note 277 on the
point that other countries do not rely on consumerism to drive down prices, even if they
include elements of choice in their systems.
412. Id. at 3–4.
413. See supra note 273.
414. Id.
415. See Frankford & Rosenbaum, supra note 335, at 11; Aaron Baum et al., Health Care Spending
Slowed After Rhode Island Applied Affordability Standards to Commercial Insurers, 38
HEALTH AFF. 237 (2019); Carmela Coyle, Maryland’s Progress on the Path to the Triple Aim,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20151112.051749/full.
416. See Coyle, supra note 415.
417. See generally Peter Littlejohns et al., Social Values and Health Priority Setting in England:
“Values” Based Decision Making, 26 J. HEALTH ORG. & MGMT. 363 (2012).
418. See Katharina Kieslich, Social Values and Health Priority Setting in Germany, 26 J. HEALTH
ORG. & MGMT. 374 (2012); see also Monika Steffen, Universalism, Responsiveness,
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Finally, pushing back on the sanctity of choice would not only unlock
consideration of better solutions that are not choice centric, it would also prevent
further construction of ineffective market-based bureaucracy. If prices were
regulated centrally, for example, there would be no need for CMS and states to
invest in a web of transparency laws to try to track and understand the variance in
prices across the states. Likewise, imagine if the ACA had created—or a future
policy creates—a baseline health plan for all uninsured low- and middle-income
Americans that is issued to anyone who qualifies. It would eliminate the need for
the entire market bureaucracy produced by the exchanges.
Admittedly, any regulatory approach has its own complexities and its own
bureaucratic needs. Design of a baseline health plan would demand navigating
the state-by-state nature of insurance and provider networks and contests over
what benefits to include and how much to reimburse for care. Yet, regulatory
efforts could and should focus on these kinds of critical questions that might
produce valuable results, rather than on technocratic tinkering to scaffold
competitive structures that are not producing, and will never produce, the
desired results.
2.

Reinvigorating Meaningful Choice

Deemphasizing the supremacy of individual choice does not reduce all
health regulation to paternalism. In limited circumstances and on careful
scrutiny, individual choice may indeed be valuable and thus should be honored
and supported by regulation. However, in the many cases when individual,
especially market, choice is a poor proxy for what people value, it is imperative to
develop better proxies.
Fortunately, a wealth of collective engagement on issues of health care could
inform policies that are more in line with shared priorities and popular will. This
Article merely scratches the surface of this topic to suggest the possibility of
developing responsive policies without relying on individual choice.
a.

Individual Choice

Choice in an individualized sense may be valuable in some, limited, ways,
where it does genuinely enhance autonomy. Market based health policy has
generated myriad layers of choice. An individual must choose whether to have
insurance and, if yes, then among health plan options. She then must choose her
Sustainability—Regulating the French Health Care System, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 401,
404 (2016).
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providers, including her doctor, hospital, imaging center, pharmacy, lab, physical
therapist, and so on. Then, she must choose what care to seek from each of these
providers. Yet, most people do not value, or want to make, most of these choices
and do not navigate them well, as shown above.
That said, some people in the United States deeply care about having a
doctor they know and trust. This particularly American attachment sparked
resistance to managed care in the 1990s. Deliberations and town hall meetings
debating the ACA in 2010 likewise made clear that people do not want to lose
access to their doctors.419
Choosing a doctor differs from many choices the market bureaucracy has
asked people to make. It can be deeply personal. For many, it is not about prices
or finding an objectively best physician. Rather, it may be about shared values or
morals or about finding someone who will take the time to communicate in a way
that makes sense. For others, it is about convenience of location, scheduling, or
office hours. This is the type of decision that may be heterogenous and that
people could more plausibly make in a way aligned with their own interests.
Ironically, as health care choices proliferate in so many ways, choice of
provider has diminished.420 Even though President Obama promised that people
could keep their doctors, his promises proved empty for some people (and
earned him PolitiFact’s lie of the year).421 Insurers cancelled existing individual
plans to accommodate the development of new ACA exchange plans, cutting
people off from their existing providers, and new plans had notoriously narrow
provider networks.422 Medicaid and Medicare are both increasingly moving
toward managed care, where provider networks are often more limited.423 If
419. See DAVID BETTS ET AL., DELOITTE, WHAT MATTERS MOST TO THE HEALTH CARE CONSUMER 3
(2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/life-scienceshealth-care/us-lshc-cx-survey-pov-provider-paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/48QL-LZVE]
(explaining that what consumers most want is “to be known and understood in order to get a
personalized health care experience”).
420. I thank Zach Liscow for helping highlight this irony.
421. See Louis Jacobson, Barack Obama Says That What He Said Was You Could Keep Your Plan
‘If It Hasn’t Changed Since the Law Passed’, POLITIFACT (Nov. 6, 2013, 11:35 AM),
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2013/nov/06/barack-obama/barackobama-says-what-hed-said-was-you-could-keep [https://perma.cc/RTL2-MZFN].
422. Id. See also Jason Millman, This is Obama’s Explanation for Why You Might Not Get to Keep
Your Doctor, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2014/03/14/this-is-obamas-explanation-for-why-you-might-not-get-to-keepyour-doctor [https://perma.cc/GYP9-E4J3].
423. See GREG SCOTT ET AL., DELOITTE, HEALTH PLAN FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 2011–2016 2
(2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/life-sciences-and-health-care/articles/
government-health-plan-financial-trends.html [https://perma.cc/N77L-MSQD] (noting
significant increase in private insurer revenue from Medicare Advantage and Medicaid from
2011–2016).
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health care regulation honored those places when individual choice genuinely
matters, it would preserve the ability to find and keep doctors we like and trust.
As another more contentious example, polling suggests that a majority of
people—and a large majority of women—support reproductive choice.424 Yet,
state legislatures continue to pass counter majoritarian legislation that
dramatically limits reproductive choice.425
b.

Collective Choice

Finally, in most cases, what people value most is more complicated than
what is suggested by their market purchases. Going forward, these two must be
disaggregated. This Subpart offers one last reflection, turning back to the reason
we elevated choice in the first place. At its core, a regulatory system that is
designed to support market choices was supposed to enable us to use our
resources on the things we most value, which is an admirable goal in concept.
Yet, when what people care about cannot be expressed in what they buy, it is
necessary to work to understand priorities in a more capacious way.
It is common refrain that a lack of consensus is what led us to market-based
policies in the first place, but such pronouncements are overstated. Some clear
threads of agreement weave broadly among the populace. Most people value
universal health care coverage.426 They want—and want others to have—access
to health care without incurring financial insecurity.427
Contentious moments especially reveal consensus, and, in this era of health
policy turmoil, people are actively deliberating over values and priorities in public
fora. When Congress tried to repeal the ACA in the summer of 2017, people rose
up against the roll back of the law and its coverage expansion.428 Similarly, public

424. See Public Opinion on Abortion, Views on Abortion, 1995–2019, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 29,
2019), https://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion [https://perma.cc/
S8JR-J997].
425. See, e.g., Lydia Saad, Alabama Bill at Odds with Public Consensus on Abortion, GALLUP BLOG
(May 15, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/257627/alabama-bill-odds-publicconsensus-abortion.aspx [https://perma.cc/E2JD-HDFF].
426. Poll: Most Back Public Health Care Option, CBS NEWS (June 19, 2009, 4:50 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-most-back-public-health-care-option,
[https://perma.cc/JP3G-CZ2E] (finding that 64 percent of surveyed think the government
should guarantee universal coverage and 57 percent would be willing to pay more taxes to
ensure it).
427. See id. (concluding that 50 percent were satisfied with their own costs but only 19 percent
were satisfied with costs for the country as a whole).
428. Perry Bacon Jr., Why the GOP Is So Hell-Bent on Passing an Unpopular Health Care Bill,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 15, 2017, 9:48 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-the-
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outrage percolates regarding exorbitant drug pricing and the bind in which it has
put many American families, causing Americans to identify lowering drug prices
as a top 2017 Congressional priority.429
Health care is a ripe forum to reexamine how we understand Americans’
priorities. We have turned to markets in part because of skepticism of
democracy’s ability to fix entrenched problems at a moment of deep political
dysfunction.430 In health care, problems of vested interests and political capture
are especially acute.431
Yet, even at this moment when democracy limps along, examples have
emerged where democratic deliberation over health care priorities is vibrant,
even if not resolved. This final Part offers a few examples—themselves
admittedly imperfect—of ways that people have collectively discovered or
expressed what they most value in a health care system. It does not imply these
are the best or only examples but rather aims to illustrate the possibility that
deliberative or democratic processes can productively shape health regulation.
C.

A Few Illustrations to Suggest a Path Forward

Assuming consensus indeed exists that it is a social priority to identify and
reduce spending on low-value care, there are many possible ways to do so.432

429.
430.

431.

432.

gop-is-so-hell-bent-on-passing-an-unpopular-health-care-bill
[https://perma.cc/W2KHA7DG].
See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, REFORMING BIOPHARMACEUTICAL PRICING AT HOME AND
ABROAD 2f (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/CEA-RxWhite-Paper-Final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RMB-5RBQ].
More generally, political scientists have documented how policymaking has become less
democratic, for reasons ranging from a bias in what policymakers hear to more complex
policy feedback effects that discourage certain groups of people from active civic engagement.
For an overview of both of these lines of study, see Suzanne Mettler & Joe Soss, The
Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass
Politics, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 55 (2004) (outlining systems theory in political science and the rise
of research on policy feedback and its effects on mass political behavior); Joe Soss & Lawrence
R. Jacobs, The Place of Inequality: Non-Participation in the American Polity, 124 POL. SCI. Q.
95 (2009) (documenting the effects of rising economic inequality on political participation).
Over the past twenty years, pharmaceutical companies have consistently topped industry
spending on lobbying activity followed by insurance (#2), hospitals and nursing homes (#8),
health professionals (#13), and health services/HMOs (#16).
Top Industries,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=i
[https://perma.cc/8432-FVW7]. Adding all of these categories, combined health care
industry spending dwarfs that of all other industries.
See, e.g., MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND
ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS (1997) (discussing the ethics and economics of
different systems of rationing).
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Some doubt the value of collective deliberation on rationing,433 which may be
legitimate when thinking of rationing treatment-by-treatment. Yet, deliberation
over principles that can guide priorities and tradeoffs may be more productive. A
first step might be to define more broadly how voters, citizens, and patients
define value.434
1.

Examining Shared Values

Oregon attempted such deliberation in order to expand its Medicaid
program in the early 1990s.435 Through a public, iterative process, it developed
the Oregon List, a prioritized list of medical care for its Medicaid program in
order to cover more people by covering fewer services.436 The state Health
Services Commission held eleven public hearings, conducted 1000 randomdigit-dialed telephone surveys, and authorized a citizens’ advocacy group,
Oregon Health Decisions, to hold forty-seven community forums, soliciting
input on a questionnaire about the relative importance of certain health
conditions or services and engaging in public discussion.437
Based on public input, clinical data, and outcomes research, the state
developed an algorithm to array medical conditions in rank order of priority.438
Medicaid dollars would be allocated based on rankings, starting by paying for
items at the top of the list and moving down the list as far as funds for a particular
year would allow.439

433. See, e.g., Jonathan Oberlander et al., Rationing Medical Care: Rhetoric and Reality in the
Oregon Health Plan, 164 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1583 (2001).
434. See Frank Pasquale, The Hidden Costs of Health Care Cost-Cutting: Toward a Postneoliberal
Health-Reform Agenda, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 173 (2014) (“How much should our
society spend on health care? That is a deep and difficult, political and economic (and
fundamentally politico-economic) question. Yet it ought to be addressed before
policymakers point to high health care spending in itself as a rationale for reducing the
purchasing power of patients, reducing compensation of physicians, nurses, and other
providers, or deterring investment in hospitals, drugs, and devices.”); cf. Richard H. Pildes &
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995) (“A special
goal is to incorporate public judgments about risk so long as they are appropriately informed
and reasonable, even when those judgments diverge from expert understandings. . . . [P]ublic
judgments often reflect a distinctive kind of rationality, one that rejects some conventional
forms of cost-benefit balancing.”).
435. Oberlander et al., supra note 433, at 1584–85.
436. Id.; see also Daniel M. Fox & Howard M. Leichter, Rationing Care in Oregon: The New
Accountability, 10 HEALTH AFF. 7 (1991).
437. Fox & Leichter, supra note 436, at 20–21.
438. Id. at 21–22.
439. Id.
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One of the insights in Oregon was that the public gave relative priority to
preventive services and dental care, and services such as dental checkups were, in
turn, ranked higher than the physician members would have placed them.440
Further, the public and experts both rejected some of the ways that the algorithms
prioritized low-cost yet nonessential services over high cost but potentially
lifesaving ones, even if the former scored higher on a total dollar per outcome
measure.441 For example, on the initial list, addressing thumb sucking
(presumably not that expensive) ranked above hospitalization for a starving child
(expensive).442 Such priorities were changed in a second list.443
Even though the list was first rejected by the Bush Administration in a
waiver application and later haphazardly revised to accommodate federal
administrators’ demands and concerns of disability discrimination, and even
though the list has not been used as anticipated as a rationing tool, the process to
create it nevertheless illustrates the potential for understanding collective
preferences, even on sensitive questions. People assembled in community
meetings and hashed out concerns and priorities, which directly informed
state policymaking.444
Even critics of the Oregon List recognize that the process of developing it
built public support for raising taxes to fund expanded insurance for the poor, a
valuable end in itself.445 The discussion thus created spending priorities that at
least marginally better reflected community values and had community support.
Deliberation over health care values has occurred in other fora—both
experimental and organic. Over the past two decades, federal agencies have
asked how to get better public engagement on important health care matters. On
the question of how evidence should inform health care decisionmaking, the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality created a community forum under
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to increase public deliberation.446
The project relied on a range of tools, including James Fishkin’s Deliberative

Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Some criticize that the meetings were over representative of interest groups, especially
physicians. Id. at 25–26.
445. Oberlander et al., supra note 433, at 1586.
446. See KRISTIN CARMAN ET AL., AM. INSTS. FOR RES., COMMUNITY FORUM DELIBERATIVE METHODS
DEMONSTRATION: EVALUATING EFFECTIVENESS AND ELICITING PUBLIC VIEWS ON USE OF
EVIDENCE
(2013),
https://effectivehealthcare.ahrq.gov/sites/default/files/related_files/
deliberative-methods-demonstration-executive-131125.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S72VMSGD].

440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
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Polling,447 designed to gauge and build consensus on complex issues in smallgroup settings.
For one part of the demonstration, investigators convened seventy-six
deliberative groups for various durations of time with 907 sociodemographically
diverse participants in four locations across the United States.448 They posed the
following question to try to gauge values about the respective roles of patients and
physicians in making medical decisions: “Should individual patients, their
doctors, or both be able to make any health decisions no matter what the evidence
of medical effectiveness shows, or should society ever specify some boundaries
for these decisions?”449
Research surfaced several important values, including that people found
evidence of harm to communities or individuals as a more compelling reason to
accept limits on choices than evidence of ineffectiveness of treatment.450 It also
found that even though people resisted cookie cutter medical decisions, a
majority thought that doctors should not be able to provide a medical treatment
that will not work for a patient.451 Over the course of the discussion, the
proportion of participants taking this position increased.452 Furthermore,
participants voiced comfort with restrictions on ineffective treatments, including
that insurance should not pay for them.453 Finally, deliberation increased
knowledge of medical evidence and comparative effectiveness research.454 This
type of deliberative process can provide input for shaping policies and may also
help participants solidify their support for such policies.
Another less discrete and more organic example where public deliberation
is both shaping and revealing a dynamic understanding of larger values is on
palliative and end-of-life care, which aim to make people more comfortable
during illness and before death. Again, productive engagement resulted from
discussion one level removed from decisions on specific treatments and focused
more conceptually on values like pain versus comfort, or longer versus more
able life.

447. James S. Fishkin, Consulting the Public Through Deliberative Polling, 22 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 128 (2003).
448. Kristin L. Carman et al., Understanding an Informed Public’s Views on the Role of Evidence in
Making Health Care Decisions, 35 HEALTH AFF. 566, 567 (2016).
449. Id.
450. Id. at 571 (“Evidence of physical harm was the most persuasive factor in increasing
participants’ acceptance of limits to patients’ and clinicians’ choices.”).
451. Id. at 569–71.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 571.
454. Id. at 569.
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Conventional wisdom says that Americans have a taste for expensive
lifesaving interventions. Yet, efforts to engage with people on this question in
more conceptual ways—and outside of life and death moments—have revealed
otherwise. Hospice care is a half century old,455 but active efforts to engage people
in discussion on what is desirable and possible in the case of terminal illness or at
the end of life have been slower to develop.
One community that has been ahead of the curve is the Wisconsin city of La
Crosse, where 96 percent of people who die have an advance directive in place.456
The movement in La Crosse began in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Bud
Hammes, an ethicist who worked in the Gunderson Health System, developed a
template for providers to talk to their patients about end-of-life preferences as
part of routine medical care.457 The program, which began with a successful small
pilot run by nurses trained to have end-of-life conversations, later scaled, first in
the Gunderson System, and into other communities as an independent
organization.458 This effort, even though it began in a very individualized way,
spurred collective community deliberation over the value of invasive and
expensive life-prolonging interventions.
In parallel, other organizations have aimed to start and shape conversations
about dying. One of the earliest such programs, Five Wishes, was started in 1996
in Florida by a nonprofit called Aging with Dignity, with support from the Robert
Woods Johnson Foundation.459 These types of programs attempted to normalize
talking and thinking about death and to resist overmedicalization by using more
generalized and plain language that asks people to consider, for example, who
they want help with their care and how comfortable they want to be.
What is most interesting about these examples is not the legal documents
that they have generated, but rather how they show people and communities
discussing what values could shape the way someone thinks about serious illness
or death. Does someone care most about survival or about being comfortable?

455. Nicole Fisher, The History of Hospice: A Different Kind of Health ‘Care’, FORBES (June 22,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolefisher/2018/06/22/the-history-of-hospice-adifferent-kind-of-health-care/#6aa3495f660c [https://perma.cc/EG67-VYNJ].
456. Sarah Kliff, Wisconsin Is Learning How to Die, VOX (May 28, 2015, 7:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2015/5/28/8672527/death-la-crosse-wisconsin
[https://perma.cc/
VF8H-Z3XQ].
457. Id.
458. Larry Beresford, Advance Directives: Planning for the End, LANCET U.S. STATE OF HEALTH
BLOG (Aug. 24, 2017, 7:28 PM), https://marlin-prod.literatumonline.com/pbassets/Lancet/lancet/TL_USA_Posts.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN5K-BTHE ].
459. See ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., “FIVE WISHES:” AN EASY ADVANCE DIRECTIVE
PROMOTES DIALOGUE ON END-OF-LIFE CARE (1998); About Us, AGING WITH DIGNITY,
https://agingwithdignity.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/PG6Q-9CME].
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How does someone like to make important decisions, and with whom?
Concurrently, clinical trials have shown the potential of palliative care and
counseling to avoid unnecessary medical care and to improve outcomes and
sometimes even prolong life.460 These efforts have both raised and revealed
different ways a health care system—and the people in it—might approach death.
Undoubtedly, people remember vividly when payment for end-of-life
counseling was proposed as part of the ACA in 2009, and opponents of health
care reform famously decried it as a move toward death panels; the payments
were thus withdrawn from the health care reform package.461 Yet, only six years
after the death panels outcry, CMS faced little opposition to the proposed rule to
authorize Medicare reimbursements for advanced care planning discussions.462
Indeed, comments on the proposed rule submitted by both individuals and
health care organizations overwhelmingly supported the change in policy, once
considered on its terms and not as a pawn in a larger battle.463 The percentage of
larger hospitals with palliative care programs is now 90 percent, compared to
only 15 percent of hospitals with over 50 beds in 1998.464
This example suggests that, even on one of the most sensitive topics—
targeted for attack by overly vocal interest groups—people and communities can
engage productively on discussion of tradeoffs between, for example, extending
life and quality of life, if engaged in the right settings and at the right level of
conceptual abstraction. And these conversations can then begin to support
policymaking that increases investments in palliative care, further weaving it into
the fabric of medical practice. Although not the primary goal, in the end, this
kind of thoughtful consideration of how people want to deal with serious illness,

460. See Preeti N. Malani & Eric Widera, The Promise of Palliative Care: Translating Clinical Trials
to Clinical Care, 316 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2090 (2016) (reviewing research on palliative care);
Jennifer S. Temel et al., Early Palliative Care for Patients With Metastatic Non-Small-Cell
Lung Cancer, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 733 (2010) (finding better quality of life, fewer depressive
symptoms, and longer median survival among patients with metastatic non–small-cell lung
cancer receiving early palliative care).
461. Paula Span, A Quiet End to the ‘Death Panels’ Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/health/end-of-death-panels-myth-brings-new-endof-life-challenges.html [https://perma.cc/KJ44-N89Z].
462. Id.
463. Search Results Displaying Public Comment Submissions for Advance Care Planning, 81 Fed.
Reg. 46161 (proposed July 15, 2016) (to be codified at 42 CFR Parts 405, 410, 411, 414, 417,
422, 460), https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=25&so=DESC&sb=comment
DueDate&po=0&s=%22advance%2Bcare%2Bplanning%22&dct=PS&D=CMS-2016-0116
[https://perma.cc/26C8-MFX2].
464. Tamara Dumanovsky et al., The Growth of Palliative Care in U.S. Hospitals: A Status Report,
19 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 8, 13–14 (2016).
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pain, and death could simultaneously spur policymaking that roots out wasteful,
invasive end-of-life expenditures.
2.

Access, Ballot Initiatives, and Medicaid Expansion

Finally, separating the discussion about what people most value from
market mechanisms can reveal that people might care most about others, and the
distribution of resources to others. The fight over Medicaid expansion is
revealing the depths of insight into a shared commitment to access that is being
expressed though a more traditional democratic tool: ballot measures.
The ACA intended to expand Medicaid access in all states to people earning
up to 138 percent of the federal poverty level, but was thwarted in the courts.465
The first major legal challenge to the ACA, NFIB v. Sebelius, in effect made this
expansion optional, so states could keep their pre–ACA eligibility categories or
expand and, in turn, receive federal matching funds for upwards of 90 percent of
the spending on newly qualified enrollees.466 As of September 2018, thirty-six
states and the District of Columbia had adopted the expansion.467
What is remarkable is that in the fourteen opt out states, voters have begun
to directly override their representatives’ decision with ballot initiatives.468 Maine
was the first to pass a ballot initiative to expand Medicaid in November 2017.
Voters in Idaho, Nebraska, and Utah followed in November 2018. Ironically, and
illustrating that implementing laws people value may be more challenging than
gauging what they value, politicians, including former Republican Governor
LePage in Maine and current legislators in Utah, have dug their heels in to resist
implementing the referenda.469

465. Nat’l Fed. Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
466. Id.
467. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER FAM. FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org [https://perma.cc/4MQK-KTHV] (follow “State Health Facts” hyperlink;
then follow “Health Reform” hyperlink; then follow “Status of State Action on the Medicaid
Expansion” hyperlink).
468. Larisa Antoinisse & Robin Rudowitz, An Overview of State Approaches to Adopting the
Medicaid Expansion, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.kff.org/reportsection/an-overview-of-state-approaches-to-adopting-the-medicaid-expansion-issue-brief
[https://perma.cc/L2VG-3A6R].
469. Michael Shepherd, Maine’s Top Court Backs Ruling That LePage Must Send Medicaid
Expansion Plan to Feds, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Aug. 23, 2018, 1:54 PM),
https://bangordailynews.com/2018/08/23/politics/maines-top-court-backs-ruling-thatlepage-must-send-medicaid-expansion-plan-to-feds
[https://perma.cc/QSU9-TBSF];
Medicaid Expansion Adjustments, S.B. 96, 2019 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019) (as enrolled by
Legislature,
Feb.
11,
2019),
https://le.utah.gov/~2019/bills/sbillenr/SB0096.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T2RB-2FVP] (bill scaling back expansion in Utah).
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A takeaway from these initiatives is that people deeply value access to
medical care in their communities—especially for lower-income community
members. These initiatives passed because people who would not directly benefit
personally from the expansion voted in its favor. Health regulation should focus
on gauging and realizing such expressions of shared commitments. Bureaucracy
is inevitable, but it should bolster a health care system that can fulfill, rather than
frustrate, what people and communities genuinely care about.
These examples will not—in and of themselves—transform the U.S. health
care system, but they illustrate different ways to develop health system priorities
that reflect shared commitments. None of health care’s problems is easy. But the
hope that the market will simultaneously fix escalating, wasteful spending and
also produce what people want has pushed aside working on alternatives that
could more effectively achieve these two important and sometimes distinct goals.
Relinquishing the false hope in markets can clear space for solutions that could
genuinely improve the value of health care spending and make people healthier
and more secure.
CONCLUSION
Market-based solutions preserve an aura of choice and autonomy and have
garnered widespread appeal in recent decades. They may be appropriate when
there is no right answer; when heterogeneity of wants can genuinely be
accommodated by the market; when people are reasonably good decisionmakers;
and when the subject in question is not life or death. Then, consumers may be the
best arbiters. But such moments are fewer than imagined, especially in the realm
of health care.
The growing body of evidence discussed in this Article shows that marketbased approaches have largely failed health law and suggests we can do better. It
is time to let go of the false hope that market-based solutions will solve U.S. health
care woes.
Eschewing market-based policymaking is a refusal to continue to create
structures that do not work and that set people up to fail, knowing they will likely
do so, and then labeling that failure as choice. As Deborah Stone wisely
cautioned, “[i]t is cynical to think that people will feel better about deprivation or
bad outcomes as long as they believe they have had a hand in choosing their
fate . . . . [C]onsumer choice offers citizens procedural comfort but less
substantive help.”470 We must relinquish fleeting and shallow procedural

470. Stone, supra note 8, at 486.
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comfort for sounder answers. In some cases, that might mean deprioritizing
choice. In other cases, once we divorce choice from markets, we can ask what the
polity genuinely values and can work to overcome the barriers to realize such
ends, whether those barriers are technical, political, or sociological.
In the end, it is possible that the social and political price of taking on these
harder conversations is too high. Collective engagement on hard problems may
seem naïve at a moment in time with extraordinarily high political divisiveness, a
breakdown in representative government, and concentrated wealth and interests
controlling policy. Trying to gauge shared priorities in a deeper way will of
course be contentious and divisive, particularly if it reveals that what some people
want is discriminatory or rights threatening. One possibility is that ineffective,
bureaucratic market-based policies may be the price we pay to keep the peace.
Yet, this Article has shown that this price is extremely high. And, at the end
of the day, these market-based policies, as battles over the ACA have most
recently illustrated, have not been mollifying. They have merely buried
contentious issues to reemerge later.
We must take on political challenges and uncomfortable conversations to
make real progress on the most intractable health policy problems. As long as we
continue painstakingly to build health care’s market bureaucracy, we are too
distracted and too tired to have these conversations. This Article has argued that
we must put down the technocratic tools and turn our collective efforts to
building more productive intellectual foundations for the next era of health
policy, law, and regulation.

